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Abstract
A central task of marketing is understanding consumer preferences and uncovering
consumer heterogeneity. A range of critical decisions, e.g., new product development,
market segmentation and targeting, or pricing, rest upon accurate estimation of
consumer preferences. Marketing literature has mainly focused on the development
of models and estimation procedures that allow uncovering consumer preference
heterogeneity. However, consumers are different not only in their tastes but also in
the way they make purchase decisions. In particular, there is a considerable amount
of evidence that consumers ignore available information on choice alternatives and
product attributes when making purchase decisions.
While efforts have been made to develop models accounting consumers’ inatten-
tion to alternatives, models accounting for consumers’ inattention to attributes
remains an understudied area in marketing literature. Whereas, which attributes
consumers truly consider when buying products is of high importance for practi-
tioners to understand and leverage.
The overall objective of this dissertation is to enhance our understanding of
consumers’ inattention to attributes when making choices. It aims to 1) examine
the prevalence of such inattention across numerous contexts and settings, 2) in-
vestigate and extend the approaches that explicitly accommodate such behavior,
3) understand potential biases that may arise, and 4) demonstrate managerial
implications when such behavior is neglected.
The findings from a broad set of applications suggest that consumers ignore
a substantial amount of available attribute information across various contexts
(e.g., product categories) and settings (e.g., of high or low complexity). Second, we
establish that choice models explicitly accounting for such behavior and, additionally,
leveraging supplementary data such as eye tracking, result in better in- and out-of-
sample fit. Third, neglecting such behavior leads to significant biases, the direction
and the magnitude of which depend on the type of the attribute (i.e., whether a
particular direction of preferences can be expected) and the share of consumers
ignoring this attribute. As a result, managers may make suboptimal pricing and
targeting decisions.
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Zusammenfassung
Eine zentrale Aufgabe des Marketings ist es, die Präferenzen von Konsumenten
zu verstehen und die Heterogenität der Konsumenten aufzudecken. Eine Reihe
kritischer Entscheidungen, z.B. bei der Neuproduktentwicklung, der Marktsegmen-
tierung und dem Targeting oder der Preisgestaltung, beruhen auf der genauen
Einschätzung der Konsumentenpräferenzen. Die Marketingliteratur hat sich bisher
auf die Entwicklung von Modellen und Schätzverfahren konzentriert, die es er-
möglichen, Heterogenität der Konsumentenpräferenzen aufzudecken. Konsumenten
unterscheiden sich jedoch nicht nur in ihrem Geschmack, sondern auch in der Art
und Weise, wie sie Kaufentscheidungen treffen. Insbesondere gibt es eine hohe Evi-
denz dafür, dass Konsumenten verfügbare Informationen über Auswahlalternativen
und Produkteigenschaften bei Kaufentscheidungen ignorieren.
Es wurden zwar Anstrengungen unternommen, Modelle zu entwickeln, die die
Unaufmerksamkeit der Konsumenten gegenüber Alternativen berücksichtigen, aber
Modelle, die die Unaufmerksamkeit der Konsumenten gegenüber Produkteigen-
schaften berücksichtigen, sind in der Marketingliteratur nach wie vor ein noch
wenig untersuchtes Gebiete. Die Frage, welche Produkteigenschaften Konsumenten
beim Kauf von Produkten wirklich berücksichtigen, ist für die Praxis von großer
Bedeutung, um sie zu verstehen und zu nutzen.
Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, unser Verständniss für die Unaufmerksamkeit
der Konsumenten gegenüber Produkteigenschaften bezüglich Entscheidungen zu
verbessern. Es geht darum, 1) die Verbreitung einer solchen Unaufmerksamkeit in
verschiedene Kontexten zu untersuchen, 2) die Methoden, die ein solches Verhalten
explizit berücksichtigen, zu untersuchen und zu erweitern, 3) potenzielle Verzer-
rungen in Parametern zu verstehen und 4) Implikationen für das Management
abzuleiten.
Die Ergebnisse aus einer umfassenden Reihe von Anwendungen legen nahe, dass
Konsumenten in verschiedenen Kontexten (z.B. Produktkategorien) und Settings
(z.B. von hoher oder niedriger Komplexität) eine Menge an verfügbaren Informatio-
nen bezüglich Produkteigenschaften ignorieren. Zweitens, Entscheidungsmodelle,
die ein solches Verhalten explizit berücksichtigen und zusätzlich weitere Daten wie
z.B. Eye-Tracking nutzen, zu einem besseren In- und Out-of-Sample-Fit führen.
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Drittens, führt die Missachtung eines solchen Verhaltens zu signifikanten Verzerrun-
gen, deren Richtung und Größe von der Art des Merkmals (d.h., ob eine bestimmte
Richtung der Präferenzen erwartet werden kann) und dem Anteil der Konsumenten,
die dieses Merkmal ignorieren, abhängt. Infolgedessen kann es dazu kommen, dass
Manager keine optimalen Preis- und Targeting-Entscheidungen treffen.
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1 | Introduction
A central task of marketing is to understand consumer preferences. In this context,
heterogeneity plays a particularly important role (Allenby and Rossi 1998). It is
the heterogeneity that facilitates product differentiation, market segmentation and
targeting, as well as price discrimination (Allenby and Rossi 1998). A range of
critical decisions related to marketing mix elements – product, price, promotion,
and place, rest on accurate estimation of consumer preferences (Keane and Wasi
2013). Hence, many efforts in discrete choice models, which are used for measuring
preferences and supporting the outlined marketing decisions, focused on the develop-
ment of models and estimation procedures that allow uncovering the heterogeneity
of consumer preferences (Russell 2014). When data on consumer characteristics,
e.g., demographics or past purchase history, are available, these can be used to
identify the “observed” consumer heterogeneity (e.g., Kalyanam and Putler 1997;
Guadagni and Little 1983). Alternatively, “unobserved” heterogeneity models can
be utilized (Allenby and Rossi 1998). In these models, it is typical in marketing
literature to assume that preference parameters come from a discrete distribution,
often termed as a finite mixture or latent class model (e.g., Kamakura and Russell
1989), or a continuous (e.g., multivariate normal) distribution (e.g., Allenby and
Ginter 1995; Erdem 1996). Further advances in discrete choice models primarily
focused on allowing for even more flexible forms of preference heterogeneity to
accommodate potential multi-modal parameter distribution in the population (e.g.,
Keane and Wasi 2013; Voleti et al. 2017).
However, heterogeneity can stem not only from differences in consumer prefer-
ences but also from the way they make purchase decisions (Kamakura et al. 1996).
To be more explicit, in any model, we make certain assumptions on how consumers
behave. Discrete choice models typically build upon the behavioral theory of the
random utility maximization (RUM; McFadden 1974)1. RUM relies on the standard
assumptions originating from neoclassical microeconomic theory. In particular,
consumers are assumed to take into account all the available information, apply a
compensatory decision rule2, and maximize their utility. The latter is specified as
1This theory originates from the seminal work of Thurstone (1927) and Luce (1959).
2Compensatory decision rule implies that the negative aspects on one product attribute can be
balanced out by positive aspects on another attribute
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
a linear additive function of product attributes (deterministic component) and an
error term (random component).
Empirical research in marketing, behavioral decision-making, and behavioral
economics has documented many cases of “behavioral biases,” i.e., violations of
the assumptions of the standard economic theory (Thaler 2016) that also apply
to the RUM model. Ample observational and experimental evidence of violations
of standard economic assumptions has enabled a classification framework of these
biases into three broad groups: nonstandard preferences, nonstandard beliefs,
and nonstandard decision-making (DellaVigna 2009). The class of nonstandard
preferences refers to violations of the standard economic assumptions that are
related to the utility function (e.g., time-inconsistent preferences or reference-
dependence). The class of nonstandard beliefs includes biases that emerge in
the presence of uncertainty and violate the standard economic assumptions on
how consumers form beliefs. Finally, the class of nonstandard decision-making
addresses observations of non-utility-maximizing behavior, including violation of
the assumption of full and perfect information processing. As this thesis will
establish, behavioral biases affect consumers throughout all the phases of purchase
decision-making – need recognition, pre-purchase, purchase, and post-purchase
phases. It is generally accepted that these four phases capture the key aspects of
consumers’ activities during the process of product purchase (e.g., Lee et al. 2018).
The primary focus of this thesis is on nonstandard decision-making, in particular
limited attention, and its impact on consumers in the purchase phase.
It is well established that consumers have limited cognitive abilities and do
not process all the available information (Payne et al. 1992). Many studies in
marketing provide evidence that increase in complexity and the amount of available
information (including an increase in the number of choice alternatives and product
attributes) may lead to information overload (Malhotra 1982), prompting people to
apply simplifying heuristics (Payne et al. 1992), ignore information (Shi et al. 2013),
or defer from making a choice altogether (Dhar 1997). Hence, limited attention is a
direct violation of the assumption of full information processing in the RUM model
and may lead to choices that are inconsistent with utility maximization assumption
(Simon 1955).
In marketing literature, much consideration was given to developing models that
account for consumers’ limited attention to available alternatives. In particular,
these models commonly assume that consumers first restrict the number of alterna-
tives they consider, and it is within this “consideration set” of alternatives that they
make purchase decisions in accordance to the assumptions of the RUM model (e.g.,
Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker 1996; Swait and Ben-Akiva 1987). A core element
of these models is how these consideration sets are formed. For example, given
actual purchase data (e.g., scanner panel), the inclusion of various alternatives
3into consideration set can been conditioned on marketing mix variables as well as
past purchase data (e.g., Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker 1996; Mehta et al. 2003;
Draganska and Klapper 2011). Also, methods have been proposed that utilize only
observed choice data (e.g., Swait and Ben-Akiva 1987).
While the topic of limited attention to alternatives has and continues to draw
much attention (e.g., see Fosgerau et al. 2016; Joo 2018), choice models incorporating
limited attention to attributes remain rather scarce in marketing literature. Driven
by consumers’ motivations and beliefs (Gilbride et al. 2006) or cognitive constraints
(Bettman et al. 1998), consumers may find different product attributes relevant
when making purchase decisions. For example, some consumers may prefer fairtrade
products. For others, the presence of the fairtrade label may not affect the purchase
decision in any way (i.e., the effect of the fairtrade label for them is precisely zero).
However, typical models of consumer preference heterogeneity mentioned above are
not well equipped to deal with such behavior (Gilbride et al. 2006). As they pool
data across the sample, they may not be able to distinguish between low (i.e., close
to zero) and zero effect (e.g., Gilbride et al. 2006; Hess et al. 2013). As highlighted
earlier, this can have repercussions on many crucial managerial decisions.
Nevertheless, only several studies in marketing literature explicitly examine
the importance of incorporating consumers’ inattention to product attributes in
discrete choice models. Other applications stem from adjacent fields of operation
research, transportation science, and health economics. Consumers’ inattention to
attributes has been conventionally termed as “attribute non-attendance” (ANA) in
these adjacent fields (hereafter this terminology is adopted, ANA and consumers’
inattention to attributes are used as synonyms). However, findings and insights in
these applications are not always directly transferable to the marketing context,
and overall many questions remain open. In the remaining part, the specific
research gaps are identified, which represent the more specific research agenda of
this dissertation.
First, in terms of choice context, methods accounting for ANA have been applied
in marketing applications for products sold on e-commerce websites (Currim et al.
2015), durable products3 (Gilbride et al. 2006), coffee makers (Meißner et al. 2011),
as well as digital cameras (Maldonado et al. 2015; Maldonado et al. 2017). Due to
the limited number and variety of applications, it remains unclear how prevalent
ANA is in other contexts (e.g., non-durable product choice) and settings (e.g., high
vs. low complexity settings). As a consequence, it is not apparent how critical it
is to explicitly accommodate such behavior in choice models for these different
cases. Applications in other fields include such contexts as route choice (e.g., Hess
et al. 2013) or prescription drug choice of doctors (Hole et al. 2013), which are
3The exact product category and product attributes are unknown in both Currim et al. (2015)
and Gilbride et al. (2006) due to the proprietary nature of the data.
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quite different from typical marketing contexts. The first aim of this dissertation
is, therefore, to examine the prevalence of ANA in various marketing contexts and
settings.
Second, we still have limited understanding of how ANA affects the uncovered
preference distribution and the direction and the magnitude of biases that may arise
when ANA is neglected in the model. In general, several approaches were proposed
that explicitly allow for ANA and can infer it using only choice data. Some of
these methods primarily focus on out-of-sample predictions (e.g., Maldonado et al.
2015; Maldonado et al. 2017)4. As a result, we do not learn much from these
applications about the uncovered distribution of preference parameters. Other
methods include the heterogeneous variable selection model proposed by Gilbride
et al. (2006) and the latent class approach of, e.g., Hess et al. (2013) and Hole et al.
(2013), which is closely related to consideration set models of Swait and Ben-Akiva
(1987). In the latent class approach, latent classes are defined a priori describing
every possible combination of attributes that may be ignored by consumers. Both
the heterogeneous variable selection model and the latent class approach can
simultaneously account for ANA and preference heterogeneity5.
Overall, findings suggest that choice models that fail to account for ANA result
in biased estimates. This has severe implications for all the subsequently computed
measures such as willingness to pay (WTP) or relative importance of attributes
(e.g., Gilbride et al. 2006; Hess et al. 2013; Hole et al. 2013). In particular, all
these applications report that the mean estimates of preference distribution are
biased towards zero. Such a result is intuitive. As some consumers ignore particular
attributes and, therefore, have a true effect of zero, they pull the average effect
closer to zero. By contrast, the direction and the magnitude of the biases in the
estimates of the variance of preference distribution are not necessarily obvious.
Applications in transportation science, which predominantly include attributes that
should have a clear preference direction (e.g., price or time), report an upward
bias, i.e., overstatement of the amount of heterogeneity (e.g., Collins 2012). In
marketing contexts, many of the attributes (e.g., brand, color, or flavor) allow
firms to differentiate their products horizontally (Draganska and Jain 2006). For
such attributes, the parameter distribution can span both positive and negative
domains6. Existing applications do not inform us what the direction and the
4More explicitly, Maldonado et al. (2015) and Maldonado et al. (2017) deploy feature selection
tools from machine learning literature, in particular support vector machine (SVM) algorithm,
to infer the attributes ignored by consumers. The proposed approach performs better in
out-of-sample predictions than the standard model, which assumes full information processing.
5These models are very similar. However, in contrast to Hess et al. (2013) and Hole et al.
(2013), Gilbride et al. (2006) utilize Bayesian estimation methods. In the comparison of the two
approaches, Scarpa et al. (2009) did not find significant differences in the results. Therefore,
later on, this thesis adopts the latent class approach.
6For instance, some consumers may prefer, e.g., a pink smartphone, while others not. As a result,
we could expect to find both positive and negative parameters for the color pink.
5magnitude of the biases in parameter estimates would be if some consumers ignore
these attributes. Hence, this dissertation aims to investigate how ANA affects
preference distribution, the direction and the magnitude of the biases that may
arise when the choice model does not account for ANA, and the subsequent effects
on managerial decisions. Third, it remains an open question if the proposed models
can be further augmented to understand individual-level behavior better. For
example, Hole et al. (2013) and Collins et al. (2013) suggest using respondents’
stated measure of ANA as a covariate in the latent class approach for modeling
consumer inattention to attributes. Nevertheless, the objectivity and reliability of
this measure remain an issue. Eye tracking data, on the other hand, is considered
to be more objective (Meißner and Oll 2017). The measures derived from eye
tracking have been used before as deterministic indicators of ANA (e.g., Meißner
et al. 2011; Balcombe et al. 2015). An open question remains: how useful are such
measures as covariates within a latent class approach? This dissertation, therefore,
aims to investigate the added value of augmenting models that explicitly account
for ANA using measures derived from eye tracking data.
In summary, the overall objective of this dissertation is to enhance our under-
standing of consumer inattention to product attributes when making purchase
decisions. More specifically, this thesis aims to cover the gaps in the marketing
literature outlined above through a collection of three articles. Figure 1.1 illustrates
the overall structure of the thesis.
The first article (Chapter 2) titled “Behavioral Biases in Marketing” is a joint work
with Katharina Dowling, Daniel Guhl, Daniel Klapper, Lucas Stich, and Martin
Spann published in the Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science (see Dowling
et al. 2020). It is a conceptual paper, which provides a comprehensive review of
behavioral biases in marketing. While the extensive marketing literature documents
consumers’ nonrational behavior, behavioral biases might not always be consistently
termed or formally described. Hence, the review article utilizes a commonly used
classification of biases in behavioral economics (i.e., nonstandard preferences,
nonstandard beliefs, and nonstandard decision-making; DellaVigna 2009) outlined
before and examines their impact across different phases of consumer purchase
decision-making. This organizing framework allows to identify connections and
differences within and across categories in both dimensions, as well as outline varying
degrees of influence of particular classes of biases in particular phases of consumer
decision-making. The article finds a rich literature covering behavioral biases
during the pre-purchase and purchase phases, whereas the marketing literature
dedicated to behavioral biases during the need recognition and post-purchase phases
is relatively scarce. Moreover, the findings suggest that particularly nonstandard
decision-making influences all the phases. However, a wider variety of specific biases
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Figure 1.1. Overall structure of the thesis
in this class, including framing, context effects, and especially limited attention,
affect consumers in the purchase phase.
As previously mentioned, some aspects of the limited attention and its impact
on consumers in the purchase phase are understudied in marketing literature.
Hence, the following two empirical articles aim to cover this gap and focus on this
particular behavioral bias in this particular phase of purchase decision-making. In
Figure 1.1, this is represented through the grey highlighting of the corresponding
phase and class of bias in the framework of Article 1. The arrows illustrate the
link between Article 1 and the two empirical articles. The two empirical articles
include Article 2 (Chapter 3) titled “When Zeros Count: Confounding in Preference
Heterogeneity and Attribute Non-attendance,” which is a working paper with Daniel
Guhl and Friederike Paetz, and Article 3 (Chapter 4) titled “Inferring Attribute
Non-attendance using Eye Tracking in Choice-based Conjoint Analysis” – a joint
7work with Daniel Guhl and Daniel Klapper published in the Journal of Business
Research (see Yegoryan et al. 2020).
Articles 2 and 3 share some similarities (see Figure 1.1). Both articles use data
from a choice-based conjoint (CBC) study. Article 2 uses a broad set of 10 different
datasets that vary in terms of the financial risk or stakes of the decision, as well as
the number of attributes presented to the respondents (i.e., the complexity of the
decision). This broad set of applications allows examining the persistence of ANA
in different contexts and settings. Two applications in Article 3 involve choices of
durable goods (coffee-makers and laptops). By contrast, here, a combination of
choice data from a CBC and simultaneously collected eye tracking data is utilized.
Both articles have a methodological focus and adopt the latent class approach
with a continuous parameter distribution across classes suggested by Hole et al.
(2013) for simultaneously modeling ANA and preference heterogeneity. Hole et al.
(2013) refer to it as mixed endogenous attribute attendance (MEAA) model. Both
articles compare this model with several benchmarks that include choice models
that account for neither preference heterogeneity nor ANA (i.e., multinomial
logit (MNL) model), only preference heterogeneity (i.e., mixed multinomial logit
(MMNL) model), and only ANA (endogenous attribute attendance (EAA) model;
see Hole 2011). Article 2 further compares the MEAA model with a mixture
of normals multinomial logit (MMMNL; see, e.g., Keane and Wasi 2013) model,
which allows incorporating more flexible forms of preference distribution. Through
the comparison of these models, Article 2 investigates the confounding between
preference heterogeneity and ANA. As previously outlined, models that ignore ANA
may falsely identify consumers who ignore the particular attribute as having low
sensitivity (Gilbride et al. 2006; Hole et al. 2013). On the other hand, models that
ignore preference heterogeneity may falsely classify consumers with low sensitivity
as having zero sensitivity, i.e., ignoring the particular attribute (Hess et al. 2013;
Hole et al. 2013). A particular focus of Article 2 is on investigating how ANA
affects the recovery of preference distribution and examining the direction and the
magnitude of resulting biases in parameter estimates. Moreover, considering the
broader set of empirical applications, Article 2 provides insights on which situations
and for which research goals the models accommodating ANA are necessary and
when the application of the standard model may be sufficient.
Article 3 proposes a further extension of the latent class approach. More
specifically, models accounting for ANA are augmented using a measure of visual
attention derived from eye tracking data. This method allows linking visual
attention to attribute attendance and subsequently choice. The augmented models
are then compared to their counterparts (i.e., EAA and MEAA) to investigate the
added value of eye tracking in this framework in helping to understand individual-
level behavior.
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First, across the two empirical articles, the dissertation establishes that consumers
ignore attribute information across all 12 empirical applications. They do so not
only in categories that involve low financial risk (e.g., buying orange juice) but
also in high-stake decisions (e.g., choosing a holiday destination or investing in a
laptop). ANA occurs not only in high complexity settings (e.g., with 5-8 attributes)
but also in low complexity settings (e.g., with only 3-4 attributes). In general, the
results indicate that consumers tend to ignore attribute information more when
low financial risks are associated with a purchase decision, and in more complex
settings with a higher number of attributes.
Second, regarding the direction and the magnitude of the biases, the results
suggest that biases in parameter estimates do indeed occur when choice models do
not accommodate either preference heterogeneity or ANA. In line with previous
literature, the mean estimates are found to be predominantly biased towards
zero when neglecting ANA in the choice model. Contrary to previous literature,
cases of over- and underestimation of the amount of heterogeneity are found when
choice models fail to account for ANA. The magnitude and the direction of the
bias appear to depend on the amount of ANA and the location of the preference
distribution with respect to zero. We find that when the distribution is located
further away from zero (e.g., in the cases of attributes like price or fairtrade label),
we commonly observe an overestimation of the variance of preference distribution
when the choice model neglects ANA. On the other hand, the estimates of variance
are predominately understated when the preference distribution spans across both
positive and negative domain. For example, such cases are found for attributes
like brand. Consequentially, biases in estimates yield substantial differences in the
distribution of WTP and measures of the relative importance of attributes. Using a
model that neglects ANA, may lead to suboptimal pricing and targeting decisions.
Third, the results establish that visual attention measures derived from eye track-
ing significantly help the identification of different attribute processing strategies
used by consumers and improve model fit. Such model augmentation is useful
for a deeper understanding of how visual attention influences choice and can be
leveraged for one-to-one targeting. Moreover, while all in all, we find that visual
attention to a particular attribute increases the likelihood of using this attribute
in the decision-making, the same amount of visual attention results in different
attendance probabilities across attributes. Therefore, the model may capture the
effects of the presentation format of the attributes and choice tasks in general.
In summary, this dissertation contributes to several streams of research, including
behavioral biases in general and limited attention in particular, discrete choice
modeling, and eye tracking literature. It provides further insights on the prevalence
of ANA in various contexts and settings, highlights the importance of accommo-
dating such behavior in choice models, enhances our understanding of potential
9biases that may arise, and demonstrates managerial implications when the analyst
neglects consumer inattention to attributes.
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Narine Yegoryan
Abstract
Psychology and economics (together known as behavioral economics) are two
prominent disciplines underlying many theories in marketing. The extensive
marketing literature documents consumers’ nonrational behavior even though
behavioral biases might not always be consistently termed or formally described.
In this review, we identify and synthesize empirical research on behavioral biases in
marketing. We document the key findings according to three classes of deviations
(i.e., nonstandard preferences, nonstandard beliefs, and nonstandard decision-
making) and the four phases of consumer purchase decision-making (i.e., need
recognition, pre-purchase, purchase, and post-purchase). Our organizing framework
allows us to (1) synthesize instructive marketing papers in a concise and meaningful
manner and (2) identify connections and differences within and across categories
in both dimensions. In our review, we discuss specific implications for management
and avenues for future research.
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2.1 Introduction
For several decades, research in the field of behavioral economics (i.e., the mixture
of psychology and economics) has provided ample evidence showing that individual
decisions are often systematically biased and do not confirm the forecasts of the
standard economic theory (Thaler 2016). Such “behavioral biases” represent
deviations from the standard economic model, which assumes that people are
rational, i.e., have stable preferences, maximize expected utility (defined over final
payoffs), exponentially discount future utility, process information in a Bayesian
manner, and are purely self-interested (Rabin 2002). In line with contemporary
research in economics, this paper refers to the standard economic model as a clearly
defined benchmark (i.e., a model) for making predictions about and analyzing
observed human behavior (Rabin 2002). Behavioral scientists have successfully
established new theories that formalize and can explain behavior that deviates
from the standard economic model.
In business research, particularly in the domains of marketing and finance2, the
use of psychological theory has a long history and is deeply rooted in the study of
human behavior. In fact, precisely predicting human behavior to inform marketing
decisions is a key objective of marketing. Marketing has always been concerned
with explaining the motivations and belief systems of buyers and sellers; however,
in contrast to (behavioral) economics, marketing lacks a uniform framework and
terminology (Conick 2017). Furthermore, although economics and psychology are
the two most influential disciplines underlying marketing (Ho et al. 2006), to date,
no review has documented empirical findings by focusing solely on behavioral biases
in marketing. Nonetheless, marketers could benefit from drawing more extensively
from the many theoretical explanations provided by behavioral economics, and
economists could benefit from more closely following developments in marketing
(e.g., developments exploiting the availability of rich consumer data documenting
instances of nonrational behavior)3.
In this paper, we aim to integrate research from behavioral economics and
marketing. The objectives of this paper are to identify and synthesize marketing
research that analyzes behavior deviating from neoclassical predictions and to map
these findings onto a structure involving elements of marketing and economics. We
focus on evidence from both the field and the laboratory4. We aim to identify
2A review documenting empirical findings in the field of behavioral finance is provided by Barberis
and Thaler (2003).
3http://evonomics.com/behavioraleconomics-neglect-marketing
4In contrast to the typical context-free laboratory experiments performed in the field of economics,
laboratory studies in the field of marketing usually involve a marketing context and may,
therefore, provide interesting insight into how consumers and firms might behave under different
circumstances.
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commonalities, differences, and nonobvious connections between the two fields
(Palmatier et al. 2018).
The contribution of our review paper is two-fold. First, we provide a structured
review of how behavioral biases studied in marketing contexts and published in
marketing outlets can affect the four phases of consumer purchase decision-making:
(1) need recognition, (2) pre-purchase, (3) purchase, and (4) post-purchase. It
is widely accepted that these four phases capture the key aspects of consumers’
activities during the process of product purchase, ranging from early theoretical
models of consumer behavior (e.g., Howard and Sheth 1969) to current descriptions
of consumer decision-making (e.g., Lee et al. 2018). We focus on three theoretically
substantiated classes of biases (i.e., nonstandard preferences, nonstandard beliefs,
and nonstandard decision-making; DellaVigna 2009) rather than on individual
biases and synthesize their effects on consumers during each phase of purchase
decision-making. Using this framework, we analyze how each of the three classes can
influence each of the four phases. We identify and discuss nonobvious connections
and different levels of importance of the three classes within and across phases.
In addition, we introduce marketing researchers to the terminology employed in
the field of behavioral economics and, thus, may help them better navigate the
extensive list of documented biases in this field. Moreover, we provide scholars
from the field of behavioral economics easy access to the rich marketing literature
related to applied empirical research.
Second, we provide specific implications for marketing practice and discuss
potential directions for future research. We debate (1) behavioral biases in digital
and digitally enhanced environments, (2) behavioral biases in the context of big
data and data analytics, (3) behavioral biases and marketing instruments, and
(4) potential negative consequences of exploiting behavioral biases. Moreover, we
propose and discuss five streams of future research. We identify research directions
and opportunities related to (1) the phases of consumer purchase decision-making
and the classes of behavioral biases, (2) marketing instruments, (3) methodology,
(4) new technologies and business models, and (5) competition, learning, and
persistence.
The paper’s structure reflects the goal of combining marketing and behavioral
economics. The conceptual framework described in the following section introduces
the four phases of consumer purchase decision-making, outlines the three classes of
behavioral biases, and explains our research process. Subsequently, using particu-
larly instructive papers, we illustrate how each of the three classes can influence
each of the four phases. We discuss connections and differences within and across
phases. Finally, we derive specific implications for practice and identify avenues for
future research. The paper ends with a summary and conclusion.
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2.2 Conceptual Framework and Research Process
In this section, we present and discuss the conceptual framework of our review.
Figure 2.1 shows the four phases of consumer purchase decision-making, including
the different key activities of each phase, and how these are influenced by the three
classes of behavioral biases. We also embed key insights from our review regarding
differences across phases and classes.
The four phases do not always follow each other in a linear, sequential way (e.g.,
Lemon and Verhoef 2016). As indicated by the dashed arrows above the four phases
in Figure 2.1, consumers’ shopping journeys can be nonlinear. For example, in
impulse buying situations, consumers may recognize a need in the need recognition
phase and then directly proceed to the purchase phase without any pre-purchase
activities. Moreover, consumers may iterate through the four phases multiple times
in the case of repeat purchases, as indicated by the solid arrow underneath the four
phases in Figure 2.1.
Reviewing and studying all four phases provides a more detailed understanding
of behavioral biases in marketing. The marketing literature often focuses on the
pre-purchase and purchase phases; hence, insights into these phases and related
biases occur more frequently (indicated by the bold outlines). Nevertheless, since
behavioral biases may originate during any phase, only exploring the two core phases
may lead to an incomplete understanding of consumers’ purchase decision-making.
For example, consumers frequently become aware of a need through advertising
(need recognition phase), but consumers may systematically misinterpret the
advertised information, which may result in biased decisions in the purchase phase.
Similarly, behavioral biases (e.g., the endowment effect) can influence consumers’
product-return decisions in the post-purchase phase. Given that biases can span
multiple phases or that several biases can interact across phases, it is necessary to
consider all four phases of consumer purchase decision-making.
We propose that the three classes of behavioral biases have different levels of
importance across the four phases, as highlighted in Figure 2.1 (in increasing
importance from light to dark gray). Nonstandard preferences are particularly
important during the pre-purchase and purchase phases since consumers’ preferences
are relevant for both the evaluation of and search for alternatives as well as the
quantity and timing of the actual purchase. We observe a similar pattern for
nonstandard beliefs, with an even greater relevance of the pre-purchase phase.
Nonstandard beliefs play an important role when consumers must make predictions
about their future behavior, which usually involves uncertainty. This is especially
relevant in the pre-purchase phase, in which many of the activities require estimates
under uncertainty (e.g., usage estimation). Nonstandard decision-making affects all
phases of consumer purchase decision-making. Particularly prevalent biases within
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Notes: The term “nonstandard” is adopted from DellaVigna (2009) and refers to deviations
from the standard model in economics, divided into preferences, beliefs, and decision making.
The marketing literature often focuses on the pre-purchase and purchase phases, and hence,
insights into these phases and related biases are more frequent (indicated by the bold outlines).
Consumers may skip phases (dashed arrows above the four phases) and/or iterate through the
phases multiple times (solid arrow underneath the four phases). The three classes of behavioral
biases have different levels of importance across the four phases (increasing importance from light
to dark grey).
Figure 2.1. Conceptual framework
the class of nonstandard decision-making, such as framing effects, are especially
important during the pre-purchase and purchase phases but to a lesser extent in
their adjacent phases. However, social pressure and persuasion matter during the
need recognition phase (e.g., recognizing a need through advertising or peers), and
emotions are particularly relevant in the post-purchase phase (e.g., word-of-mouth
(WOM) behavior). In the following, we introduce and discuss the four phases of
consumer purchase decision-making and the three classes of behavioral biases in
detail and summarize our research process.
2.2.1 Phases of Consumer Purchase Decision-Making
The process of consumers’ purchase decision-making is often presented as four
distinct phases, including (1) need recognition, (2) pre-purchase activities, (3) pur-
chase decision, and (4) post-purchase activities (e.g., Yadav et al. 2013). Although
we are well aware that customer journeys are affected by an evolving retailing
16 CHAPTER 2. BEHAVIORAL BIASES IN MARKETING
landscape (e.g., technological and structural changes; Lee et al. 2018), we believe
that the core states of the purchase process remain valid.
2.2.1.1 Need Recognition
During the need recognition phase, the consumer recognizes a problem or need
due to an internal signal (e.g., thirst) or an external signal (e.g., advertisement;
Yadav et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2018). During this phase, consumers become aware
and intrigued by a particular brand, product (category), or some aspect of the
shopping environment. The consumer’s social environment also often plays an
essential role in influencing and determining the consumer’s perceived needs. For
example, we learn about products by observing other people (offline or online),
which may subsequently prompt us to adopt the same products.
2.2.1.2 Pre-purchase Activities
During the pre-purchase phase, consumers engage in information search and evalu-
ation of alternatives (Lee et al. 2018; Yadav et al. 2013). This process can involve
browsing for products or actively searching for a specific product. During this
phase of the decision process, consumers deliberatively assess the various products
in their consideration set and how such products align with their needs, wants,
and objectives. Consumers also evaluate the effort (i.e., money, time, and energy)
required to acquire the product. If the effort is considered excessive relative to
the benefits, consumers may choose not to proceed with a purchase during the
following phase. In addition to the specific product, consumers evaluate inferred
firm motives (e.g., the perception of price fairness).
2.2.1.3 Purchase Decision
During the purchase decision phase, consumers make decisions regarding whether
to make a purchase, which and how many product(s) to buy, which seller from
whom to purchase, the timing of the purchase, and other terms and conditions
related to the purchase (Lee et al. 2018; Yadav et al. 2013). This phase also includes
potential waiting time, such as for products purchased online to be shipped and
delivered. In some purchases (i.e., impulse buying), consumers may directly jump
to this phase (see also the meta-analytic review of Iyer et al. 2019 in this special
issue).
2.2.1.4 Post-purchase Activities
After a purchase, consumers use the product and often compare their actual
consumption experience with their expectations (Lee et al. 2018; Yadav et al.
2013). Consumers assess the strengths and weaknesses of the product and may
subsequently support and promote or criticize the product. This activity involves
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actively reviewing or recommending the product (e.g., through word-of-mouth or
social media) or simply talking about or broadcasting their purchase (e.g., “pins”,
“check-ins”, “bought by”, status updates, blog posts, tweets, etc.). Consumers
may also emphasize the strengths of a product to confirm that they made the
right decision. This assessment can affect their overall evaluation of the product,
satisfaction with the purchase experience, and intention to repurchase.
2.2.2 Three Classes of Behavioral Biases
In this section, we introduce and briefly explain behavioral biases, which are widely
covered in behavioral economics and marketing. We follow the framework of
DellaVigna (2009) in classifying deviations (i.e., behavioral biases) of individual
behavior from the standard economic model (Rabin 2002), which serves as a
benchmark. The modern field of (micro) economics has already adopted many ideas
from behavioral economics and currently has a far richer understanding of human
behavior than the standard economic model suggests. Contemporary economists
distinguish the following three classes of deviations from this model (DellaVigna
2009): nonstandard preferences, nonstandard beliefs, and nonstandard decision-
making5. We follow this classification due to the following advantages. First, these
classes are theoretically substantiated and widely used in the field of economics;
however, these classes are also related to marketing and consumer psychology.
Second, using the three classes, we can categorize a large set of individual biases
based on economic theory and facilitate the uncovering of relationships among
biases (i.e., aggregating insights). Third, using this framework is helpful because
the standard economic model provides a well-defined benchmark.
2.2.2.1 Nonstandard Preferences
The first class of behavioral biases, nonstandard preferences, includes the follow-
ing deviations from the standard economic model regarding the utility function:
time-inconsistent preferences, reference-dependent utility, and social preferences.
Regarding time-inconsistent preferences, empirical evidence suggests that individu-
als can have a “present bias” or “declining impatience”, which is consistent with
(quasi)-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997; Loewenstein and Prelec 1992), that
can capture consumers’ problems of self-control. For example, a person signs up for
a gym membership to force their future self to exercise. As the future approaches,
the person must decide whether to exercise, and the future utility is discounted
more steeply. Thus, the person tends to procrastinate and postpone exercising
(DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006). Alternative theories, e.g., temporal construal
level theory, can also help explain such behavior (Trope and Liberman 2000).
5The Appendix summarizes examples of each bias dimension from seminal papers, including a
verbal definition and an illustration, in three tables (one per class of biases).
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Furthermore, by assuming reference-dependent utility, loss aversion, and a nonlin-
ear probability weighting function, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979)
addresses several issues supported by empirical evidence, such as that individuals
1) focus on relative versus absolute trade-offs and think in terms of gains and
losses rather than overall wealth, 2) are more sensitive to losses than gains, and
3) over/under weigh small/large probabilities. Finally, vast empirical evidence
suggests that people have social preferences and are not purely self-interested but
are also concerned with social welfare and fairness, e.g., in ultimatum or dictator
games (Camerer and Thaler 1995), or engage in charitable giving (DellaVigna et al.
2012).
2.2.2.2 Nonstandard Beliefs
The second class of deviations considered are nonstandard beliefs, which emerge in
the presence of uncertain factors in decision-making. Under uncertainty, decision-
makers must form beliefs regarding potential outcomes or “states of the world”. The
standard economic model predicts that, on average, people correctly evaluate the
distribution of these states and update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule for incoming
information. However, empirical evidence suggests that consumers often form
systematically incorrect beliefs and do not act as Bayesian information processors
(DellaVigna 2009; Rabin 2002). Three main dimensions related to this context can
be distinguished.
First, belief-based biases comprise overconfidence, which involves overestimating
one’s actual ability, performance, level of control, or chance of success; considering
one’s abilities to be better-than-average (overplacement); or being too confident of
one’s knowledge, e.g., overprecision (see, e.g., Moore and Healy 2008). Similarly,
individuals may be overly positive about the prospect of a desirable outcome that is
unrelated to their abilities or knowledge (overoptimism). As a result, a wide range of
irrational behavior may occur, such as clinging to one’s beliefs despite contradictory
evidence, disregarding other prospects and opportunities, or underestimating risks
(Windschitl and Stuart 2015).
Second, consumers might be affected by projection bias, i.e., individuals project
their current state into the future, such as when ordering food in a hungry state
(Read and van Leeuwen 1998) or ordering winter clothing on a cold day (Conlin et al.
2007). Third, the misconception that small random samples are as representative
as large samples, which is known as the law of small numbers (Tversky and
Kahneman 1971), might lead to false generalizations as people tend to ignore
base-rate frequency (prior probability) and sample size when making inferences
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Examples of the law of small numbers include the
“gambler’s fallacy” (Tversky 1974) and the related “hot hand fallacy” (Gilovich
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et al. 1985), which describe individuals’ beliefs that respective negative or positive
correlations exist in random processes.
2.2.2.3 Nonstandard Decision-Making
This class of deviations addresses observations of non-utility-maximizing behavior
due to violations of the following assumptions: individuals are full and perfect
information processors, who consider the incentives of information sources and
make context-invariant choices; moreover, they are emotionless and deliberate.
The notion that choices are constructed (Bettman et al. 1998) and that the
particular choice architecture (framing/context) affects the choices people make
is generally accepted (Simonson 2008). For example, framing effects may emerge
due to the reference-dependent utility function, which render some characteristics
more salient or implicitly manipulate goals (see Levin et al. 1998). This pattern
is also observed in an intertemporal choice context, such as “temporal frames”
(Loewenstein 1988), which describes the same option (with the same time interval)
as a delayed or expedited decision and can lead to different discount rates. Moreover,
choices might be affected by context effects that emerge due to a choice set
composition. In particular, a product may attract a larger share in settings in
which it is a middle rather than an extreme option, which is referred to as the
compromise effect. Relatedly, a locally inferior product can be introduced, resulting
in the so-called attraction effect. Tversky (1972) further distinguishes the similarity
effect, which implies that an alternative loses choice share relative to a more similar
alternative.
Furthermore, the premise of individuals’ limited cognitive abilities and limited
attention has been addressed since Simon (1955). People tend to pay more attention
to salient factors or ignore some available information. Considerations of inattention
have given rise to many alternative decision rules of utility maximization, including
elimination-by-aspect (Tversky 1972), lexicographic rules (Tversky 1969), and
satisficing (Simon 1959).
Subsequently, studies investigating persuasion effects have largely disputed the
assumption that rational agents are aware of the incentives of information providers
(e.g., firms or politicians) and that they consider them when making decisions.
Moreover, individuals’ attitudes and behaviors might be subjected to social pressure
(DellaVigna et al. 2012) or social influence, i.e., pressure from their reference group
(e.g., peers or family).
Finally, emotions are largely neglected by standard economic theory. However,
emotions, including visceral influences, e.g., hunger or thirst (Loewenstein 1996),
anticipatory emotions, e.g., anxiety or fear, and anticipated emotions, e.g., regret
(Loewenstein et al. 2001), have been shown to drive consumer behavior.
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2.2.3 Research Process
To identify relevant articles for our review, we employed the Scopus6 database and
searched for articles with titles, abstracts, and keywords related to particular terms7
without restriction regarding the publication date in the following leading marketing
journals: Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Marketing Science,
Journal of Consumer Research, Management Science, Journal of the Academy of
Marketing Science, International Journal of Research in Marketing, Journal of
Retailing, Journal of Consumer Psychology, Journal of Service Research, Marketing
Letters, Quantitative Marketing and Economics, and Journal of Interactive Market-
ing. As keywords, we used the main dimensions of the three classes of behavioral
biases as discussed in the previous subsection (e.g., time-inconsistent preferences,
overconfidence, or limited attention).
We found 724 keyword/journal counts from 697 unique articles (our “seed list”).
After closer examination, we only retained empirical papers, further excluded papers
that used the keywords in a different context (e.g., persuasion), and extended our
list by adding relevant papers if necessary. The Journal of Marketing Research,
Marketing Science, and Management Science emerged as the main outlets of
marketing research related to behavioral biases. Furthermore, some biases were
found to receive only minimal attention (e.g., law of small numbers), whereas other
topics appeared very popular in the field of marketing and were associated with a
large body of literature (e.g., reference dependence and framing/context effects).
The keyword search indicated that even though the number of marketing papers
related to behavioral biases is substantial, inconsistencies in terminology, definitional
ambiguities, and alternative conceptual frameworks that do not explicitly rely
on economic theory complicate the process of identifying relevant papers and
synthesizing their results. Therefore, we chose to use the following alternative
approach: We begin our review with a unifying framework and then build a concise
structure by organizing and discussing the classes of behavioral biases within the
phases of consumer purchase decision-making. We identify papers from our cleaned
and augmented list by a (qualitative) combination of citation counts, journal quality,
recency, and relevance. Our goal is to provide instructive examples of all classes of
biases from marketing research and to highlight important links, distinctive features,
and differences related to the phases of consumer purchase decision-making. We
emphasize the “first” connection of a bias and phase, i.e., we highlight where
particular biases originate.
6https://www.scopus.com
7The rationale for searching the title, abstract, and keywords is that this information is accessible
to everyone and not behind a paywall. This permissibility facilitates the replicability of the
process.
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2.3 Behavioral Biases in Consumer Purchase Decision-
Making
In this section, we review particularly instructive papers from marketing research
to illustrate how each of the three classes of behavioral biases can influence each of
the four phases of consumer purchase decision-making. We dedicate a subsection
to each of the phases, and each of these subsections follows the same structure.
We organize the reviewed papers into tables that present the class of behavioral
biases, the specific bias(es), the exact reference, the key activities in the phase that
are affected by the bias(es), the marketing instrument, and a summary of the key
findings. Based on these tables, we discuss general insights and specifics about each
phase. Finally, we compare the individual phases of consumer purchase decision-
making and the three classes of behavioral biases, and we discuss connections and
differences across phases and classes.
2.3.1 Need Recognition Phase
In this section, we discuss how nonstandard preferences, beliefs, and decision-
making affect consumers during the need recognition phase, as they recognize needs
through internal or external signals. We summarize the key findings in Table 2.1
and discuss general insights and specifics subsequently.
The existing marketing literature focusing on behavioral biases during the need
recognition phase is limited. We believe that one explanation for this observation is
that “recognizing a need” is intangible and often difficult to measure. Nevertheless,
the examples in the table above illustrate how behavioral biases in each of the
three classes can affect consumers’ awareness of a need, and more examples are
conceivable. Across the three classes, consumer behavior can be biased during the
need recognition phase and not only during the subsequent stages. Although an
error may be realized only after a purchase, its cause could occur during the need
recognition phase. For example, external cues (e.g., colors in the environment)
might trigger a need that leads to distorted product evaluations (e.g., higher
awareness of orange sodas) and, eventually, to decisions during the subsequent
stages (Berger and Fitzsimon 2008). Additionally, because advertising aims to
trigger consumer needs, behavioral biases related to advertising appear to be a
prominent theme during the need recognition phase. For example, advertising
often leads to consumers learning about new nutritional information. However,
Andrews et al. (1998) show that consumers often misinterpret (i.e., overgeneralize)
the common nutrient content claims in advertising. Thus, advertising plays an
important role in consumers’ recognition of problems or needs, but the behavioral
biases of consumers may influence the effects of the advertised claims.
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Nonstandard
preferences
Time-
inconsistent
preferences
Goukens et al.
(2007)
Recognizing a
need through
an internal
signal (hunger)
and external
signal (visual
food cues)
Product The authors demonstrate that hunger and visual food cues increase consumers’ variety seeking (study
1). They show that when the perceived value of a desired object (e.g., a sandwich) increases, the
number of alternatives deemed to satisfy this desire also increases. Specifically, hunger increases the
perceived value of food items and, as a result, the set of products under consideration (i.e., higher
variety seeking).
Social
preferences
Stenstrom et al.
(2018)
Recognizing a
need through
an internal
signal
(menstrual
cycle)
Promotion The authors find that women feel the need to act more prosocially during their luteal phase than
during their follicular phase. The authors suggest that during the luteal phase, women are more
susceptible to charitable donation requests and promotions regarding gift-giving.
Nonstandard
beliefs
Over-
generalization
Andrews et al.
(1998)
Recognizing a
need through
an external
signal
(advertising)
Promotion Advertising can induce consumers to form systematically biased beliefs. For example, in the context of
nutritional labeling, advertising is often a significant first step for consumers to learn about new
nutritional information. However, the authors show that consumers misinterpret (i.e., overgeneralize)
the common nutrient content claims in advertising.
Nonstandard
decision-
making
Persuasion Hui et al. (2013) Recognizing a
need through
an external
signal
(advertising)
Promotion Persuasive cues (e.g., advertising) and consumers’ contexts crucially affect the initial phase of consumer
purchase decision-making. The authors show that the manipulation of consumers’ in-store travel
distance through mobile coupons influences unplanned spending. However, rational agents are not
expected to deviate from their planned purchase behavior regardless of the path they travel in a store.
Persuasion,
framing
Cox and Cox
(2001)
Recognizing a
need through
an external
signal
(advertising)
Promotion The authors analyze the persuasive effect of advertising for health prevention services (i.e.,
mammograms). Their results show that anecdotal messages have the following interaction effect with
framing: loss-framed anecdotal advertisements have a higher perceived informational value and lead to
a greater perceived likelihood of undergoing a mammogram after viewing the ad. However, this
interaction effect is not present for advertisements with statistical information.
Social
pressure
Gardete (2015) Recognizing a
need through
an external
signal (peers)
Place The author studies social effects in the in-flight marketplace. The results show that the purchase
probability of a media item increases, on average, by 30% if a lateral neighbor (i.e., a neighbor next to
the passenger in the same row) makes a purchase. Classical social influence theories cannot sufficiently
explain these patterns. For example, the author finds cross-category effects, suggesting that a purchase
by a consumer in one category might have a negative influence on a neighbor’s purchase probability in
a different category.
Table 2.1. Relevant articles and key findings in the need recognition phase
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2.3.2 Pre-Purchase Phase
In this section, we present how nonstandard preferences, beliefs, and decision-
making affect consumers during the pre-purchase phase as they search for and
evaluate alternatives. We summarize the key findings in Table 2.2 and discuss
general insights and specifics subsequently.
In contrast to the need recognition phase, we identified numerous marketing
papers that document how behavioral biases affect consumers during the pre-
purchase phase. Across the three classes of behavioral biases, these papers are
concerned with consumers’ perceptions, assessments, and formations of attitudes
toward brands and product alternatives. Nonstandard preferences play a central
role in the evaluation of alternatives, especially through reference points (e.g.,
price and quality expectations; see Gneezy et al. 2014) and social preferences (e.g.,
fairness concerns, see Campbell 1999 and Gershoff et al. 2012).
Belief-based biases are especially important during the pre-purchase phase be-
cause they affect consumers’ evaluations and searches for alternatives. Regarding
the evaluation of alternatives, consumers often have to make forecasts about future
events and behaviors–for example, how often they will go to the gym, how many
trips they will take using car sharing, or how often they will use a specific feature
of a product (e.g., Acland and Levy 2015; Goodman and Irmak 2013; Lambrecht
and Skiera 2006). Because these situations often involve uncertainty and, therefore,
complexity for consumers, belief-based biases frequently lead to distorted outcomes
(e.g., overpaying for products in the purchase phase). Regarding searches, con-
sumers may overestimate their own private information relative to the additional
information they could acquire through increased search efforts (see Brynjolfsson
and Smith 2000 in Table 2.2 for an empirical observation that is consistent with
this argument). As a result, they may not search enough and may potentially miss
superior alternatives.
Nonstandard decision-making, particularly in the form of choice architecture
(framing/context), influences both consumers’ search behavior and their evaluation
of alternatives (see Diehl 2005; Levin and Gaeth 1988; Morwitz et al. 1998; Yang
et al. 2013).
We identify promotion and price as the key marketing instruments connecting
the three classes of behavioral biases during the pre-purchase phase. For example,
advertised prices can act as psychologically relevant reference points (nonstandard
preferences), induce biased expectations regarding future price developments (non-
standard beliefs), and affect evaluations and search efforts depending on the format
in which they are framed (nonstandard decision-making).
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Nonstandard
preferences
Reference
depen-
dence
Kalyanaram and
Winer (1995)
Evaluation of
alternatives
Price The authors document that reference prices have a consistent and significant impact on consumers’
evaluation of alternatives. Consumers react differently to price increases and decreases relative to the
reference price - they react more strongly to price increases. In addition to external reference points,
internal reference points can influence consumers’ judgments of alternatives. Empirical evidence
suggests that previous prices play an important role in the reference price formation process.
Gneezy et al.
(2014)
Formation of
expectations
Product,
Price
High prices increase the expectations against which consumers compare their experience in the context
of wine tasting and consumption. If the experience meets or exceeds this reference point, the
traditional price-quality effect is observed. However, if the price is high and the quality is relatively low,
the product falls short of the consumer’s reference point, and the price-quality relationship is reversed.
Brasel and Gips
(2014)
Product
comparison
and evaluation
Product,
Place
In contrast to touchpads and mice, touchscreens generate stronger psychological ownership, which
increases the endowment effect and the willingness-to-accept (WTA) of selected products. Therefore,
consumer preferences for alternatives may be systematically distorted due to the endowment effect
caused by differences in the input device.
Social
preferences
Campbell (1999) Price
evaluation and
perception
Price Consumers’ inferred motives for a price increase of toys and the relative profit to be made by a firm
due to the increase both affect consumers’ perceived price fairness. If participants conclude that a firm
has a negative motive (e.g., increasing profits) for a price increase, the increase is perceived as less fair
compared to the case in which the firm has a positive motive (e.g., donating additional profits to
charity).
Gershoff et al.
(2012)
Product
evaluation
Product The authors show that in the context of consumer electronics, product versioning might address
consumers’ fairness concerns and can lead to unfavorable product evaluations and brand preferences.
In particular, if consumers learn that the inferior product is produced by degrading a superior
configuration, a norm violation occurs, which is considered unfair and unethical.
Nonstandard
beliefs
Present
bias,
Projection
bias
Acland and Levy
(2015)
Usage
estimation
Price Consumers overpredict future gym attendance, which the authors attribute to consumers having a
naïve present bias such that consumers fail to predict the impact of immediate gratification in the form
of a price discount on gym attendance. The participants exhibited incorrect beliefs consistent with a
projection bias as they expected their future preferences regarding gym attendance to remain stable.
Over-
confidence
Lambrecht and
Skiera (2006)
Usage
estimation
Price Consumers may overestimate their ability to predict their future demand and precision. Here,
consumers over-(under-) estimate their future usage and are subsequently more likely to choose the
flat-rate (pay-per-use) tariff during the purchase phase, even if it is not the least costly internet tariff.
Brynjolfsson and
Smith (2000)
Price search Price The authors compare searches on competing e-commerce sites. On average, within one month,
households visit only 1.2 book sites, 1.3 CD sites, and 1.8 travel sites, reflecting very low levels of
search across all categories. A plausible explanation for the limited search is overconfidence.
Consumers might overestimate the precision of their own information regarding prices, thus
underestimating the differences that might exist across different e-commerce sites, between online and
offline channels, or over time.
Table 2.2. Relevant articles and key findings in the pre-purchase phase
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Class of Bias Author (Year) Key activity Marketing Key findings
biases instrument
Overoptimism Goodman and
Irmak (2013)
Usage
estimation of
product
features
Product Overoptimism may affect the adoption of a product as consumers can be too optimistic about the
usefulness of new product features of electronic products. Failure in the proper estimation of the future
usage of new product features can lead to situations in which many-feature products are preferred over
few-feature products.
Meyer et al.
(2008)
Usage
estimation of
product
features
Product The authors provide experimental evidence showing that while respondents are willing to pay for new
features of electronic products, the actual usage of these features after purchase is rather limited.
Law of
small
numbers
Cox and Cox
(1990)
Price
perception
regarding
stores
Price Consumers seem to generalize from a small sample of advertised prices to the overall store price image.
The authors analyze the effect of different versions of retail ads with differing price and product
representations on the perceived store’s overall price level. They show that if the advertised prices are
displayed as reductions from a previously higher price, consumers perceive the store to have overall
lower prices.
Nonstandard
decision-
making
Framing Diehl (2005) Product search Product Online environments are often assumed to offer lower search costs and the advantages of screening and
sorting products. However, the combination of ordering with lower search costs or more
recommendations can lead to lower choice quality, which can manifest itself in terms of a lower average
quality of considered options and more attention to mediocre than better options from the considered
set.
Morwitz et al.
(1998)
Price
evaluation and
price
perception
Price Partitioned prices decrease consumers’ recalled total costs and increase consumers’ product demand
compared to all-inclusive or combined prices (see experiment 2). However, consumers are unlikely to
differ in their judgments depending on how the price is presented, because the total costs remain the
same.
Levin and Gaeth
(1988)
Evaluation of
product
attributes
Product Describing ground beef as “75% lean” compared to “25% fat” increases favorability in a consumer’s
evaluation, which is not expected under standard rational decision-making, because both descriptions
report exactly the same information only differently.
Yang et al. (2013) Construction
of WTP and
WTA
Price In contrast to the predictions of the standard economic model, the authors demonstrate that labels
(e.g., lottery, raffle, coin flip, or gamble) associated with risk elicit much lower willingness-to-pay
(WTP) regardless of the amount of uncertainty involved in the offer.
Table 2.2. Relevant articles and key findings in the pre-purchase phase (continued)
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Limited
attention
Thomas and
Morwitz (2005)
Price
perception
Price Experimental evidence shows that people perceive the difference between $2.99 and $4.00 to be much
larger than the difference between $3.00 and $4.00, which can be attributed to the so-called left-digit
bias.
Meyvis and
Janiszewski
(2002)
Information
search
Product When consumers predict a product’s key benefits, they encounter both diagnostic and irrelevant
information. The authors show that irrelevant information systematically weakens consumers’ beliefs
about the product’s benefits.
Persuasion Cowley (2006) Brand
evaluation
Promotion The results indicate that although consumers can identify exaggerated claims in multiple service
categories (e.g., bar, bistro, cruise ship tour) as less credible than factual claims, their brand
evaluations are nevertheless inflated after their exposure to the exaggerated claims. According to the
standard economic model, consumers should consider that information providers have an incentive to
“oversell” their product and thus brand valuation should not be affected.
Persuasion/
social
pressure
Argo et al. (2008) Product
evaluation,
browsing
Product The authors analyze the influence of the touching of clothing by attractive consumers on other
consumers. They show that male consumers prefer products that have been previously touched by
attractive females. However, their product evaluations should not be influenced, because the quality
and value do not change..
Emotions Meloy (2000) Evaluation of
product
information
Product The author provides evidence showing that consumers’ search for and evaluation of information prior
to a purchase decision at a restaurant can be distorted. The magnitude of this distortion can be
influenced by positive affect (e.g., a good mood).
Table 2.2. Relevant articles and key findings in the pre-purchase phase (continued)
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2.3.3 Purchase Phase
In this section, we discuss how nonstandard preferences, beliefs, and decision-
making affect consumers during the purchase phase, including the choice of the
product, the quantity, and the timing of the purchase. We summarize the key
findings in Table 2.3 and discuss general insights and specifics subsequently.
Similar to the pre-purchase phase, we find a considerable number of market-
ing papers documenting the effects of behavioral biases on consumers during the
purchase phase. Considering all three classes of behavioral biases, these papers
address consumers’ choices of brands, product types (e.g., “want” versus “should”),
corresponding quantities, and purchase timing. In particular, nonstandard prefer-
ences play a paramount role and affect the whole spectrum of decisions (including
timing) during this phase. They can be driven by time-inconsistent preferences due
to the purchase-consumption time-delay and self-control issues (e.g., Milkman et al.
2009, Milkman et al. 2010), by reference dependence in the case of bundled options
(core product plus a component related to risk, e.g., probabilistic promotions–see
Kalra and Shi 2010–or warranties–see Jindal 2015), by social aspects of the pricing
mechanism (e.g., Pay what you want (PWYW), see Christopher and Machado 2019;
Schmidt et al. 2015), by offered promotions (e.g., charitable donations, see Dubé
et al. 2017), or by product features (e.g., fair trade labels, see also the meta-analysis
of Tully and Winer 2014).
Belief-based biases, such as overconfidence and overoptimism, play a role and
affect activities during the purchase phase if products are coupled with promotions
that involve some element of uncertainty (e.g., conditional rebates, see Ailawadi
et al. 2014). Additionally, when purchasing products for future consumption,
consumers must form (subjective) expectations about uncertain conditions (e.g.,
weather, see Buchheim and Kolaska 2016, but also Busse et al. 2012, Busse et al.
2015), which can lead to a projection bias. Finally, consumers’ purchase decisions
of “uncertain” products (e.g., financial products, see Johnson et al. 2005) may be
prone to the gambler’s or hot hand fallacy.
Nonstandard decision-making, especially choice architecture, plays a prominent
role in the purchase phase. Choosing a product from a set of alternatives formed in
the pre-purchase phase typically implies trading off on different product attributes
(e.g., quality, brand, packaging, price, etc.). In such situations, consumers may
be susceptible to context effects, resulting in choices that are not consistent with
standard decision-making (e.g., Dhar et al. 2000; Dhar and Simonson 2003; Kivetz
et al. 2004). The framing of information can further affect purchase decisions by
activating different consumer goals (Lee et al. 2015; Levin et al. 1998). Consumers
often pay limited attention to or ignore important product information available
28
C
H
A
PT
ER
2.
BEH
AV
IO
R
A
L
BIA
SES
IN
M
A
R
K
ET
IN
G
Class of Bias Author (Year) Key activity Marketing Key findings
biases instrument
Nonstandard
preferences
Time-
inconsistent
preferences
Milkman et al.
(2009); Milkman
et al. (2010)
Product rental
and ordering
Product When choosing between relative “want” and “should” products, consumers may exhibit present bias,
i.e., have time-inconsistent preferences depending on whether the purchase is intended for immediate or
future consumption (e.g., when renting DVDs). Whereas “want” (e.g., action movies or ice cream)
products are preferred for immediate consumption, preferences shift toward “should” products (e.g.,
documentaries or vegetables) when buying for future consumption.
VanEpps et al.
(2015)
Lunch order Product When consumers select meals in advance instead of at lunchtime, this results in healthier choices. The
time delay between order and consumption helps consumers to impose self-control and lowers lunch
calories.
Wertenbroch
(1998)
Quantity
decision
Price The author finds that consumers with a high preference for unhealthy snacks (relative “want”
consumers) may forgo quantity discounts for potato chips and cookies to ration their consumption, i.e.,
per-unit savings from buying in bulks, and, therefore, exhibit less price-sensitive behavior.
Kivetz and
Simonson (2002)
Reward choice Promotion In the context of delayed rewards (e.g., sweepstakes), consumers may commit to indulging by choosing
luxury rewards (e.g., luxury massage) over cash rewards, even though the cash rewards have a higher
value.
Vohs and Faber
(2007)
Purchase Price The authors show how the depletion of resources governing self-control may lead to higher spending for
consumer goods (e.g., gum, candy, coffee mugs) due to the inability to resist impulse buying
temptations (i.e., consumers jump from the need recognition phase to the purchase phase).
Dubé et al. (2014) Purchase
timing
Product The authors propose an experimental design that enables the simultaneous identification of both utility
and discounting functions. In the context of adoption decisions for consumer electronics (i.e., Blu-ray
players), only a small share of consumers exhibit present bias, i.e., employ (quasi-)hyperbolic versus
the standard economic models’ implied geometric discounting. However, the authors find large
heterogeneity across consumers and relatively low discount factor values.
Reference
depen-
dence
Jindal (2015) Product and
extended
warranty
choice
Product In the context of extended warranties for appliances (e.g., washing machines), the observed high price
premia for products with such insurance are mainly driven by the loss aversion experienced by
consumers (with a reference-dependent utility function).
Kalra and Shi
(2010)
Purchase Promotion Reference dependence is an essential factor for determining the optimal reward structure of
sweepstakes bundled with food products. The reward structure, which may induce brand switching
(due to the sweepstakes), will depend not only on the risk aversion of consumers but also on whether
the consumer has a high or low preference for a particular brand.
Kivetz (2003) Reward choice Promotion Reference dependence plays a crucial role in determining rewards in the context of loyalty programs. In
particular, the effort required of consumers for gaining rewards (e.g., frequent flyer miles) shifts the
reference point such that consumers prefer sure-small rewards to larger risky rewards.
Table 2.3. Relevant articles and key findings in the purchase phase
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Social
preferences
Schmidt et al.
(2015)
Purchase and
voluntary
payments
Price Social preferences, such as altruism and inequity aversion, along with strategic considerations, such as
keeping the seller in the market, are the leading explanations of consumers’ decisions to pay a positive
amount to PWYW sellers.
Jung et al. (2017) Voluntary
payments
Price Field evidence in a retailing context shows that the presence of charitable donations as a nonprice
promotion increases the amount consumers pay to PWYW sellers. However, consistent with an
“impure altruism” account, consumers seem to be insensitive to the share of their payment that is
donated to charity.
Dubé et al. (2017) Coupon
redemption
Promotion Charitable donations as a promotion also work in non-PWYW contexts and increase redemption rates
when used as a direct marketing tool (SMS coupons) for movie tickets. However, donations do not
work well together with deep price discounts because consumers update their beliefs about themselves,
and deep discounts crowd out the self-inference of altruism.
Hainmueller et al.
(2015)
Purchase Product,
Price
Social preferences may be leveraged through product features, such as fair trade labels for consumer
goods. The authors provide evidence from a large-scale field experiment in which coffee sales increased
by approximately 8% when the product carried a fair trade label.
Nonstandard
beliefs
OverconfidenceSoman (1998) Purchase Promotion Overconfidence can lead consumers to underestimate the amount of effort required to use delayed
promotions (such as mail-in rebates) for clothing (e.g., ski attire), which can lead to failure to redeem
the rebate, also known as redemption “slippage.”
Overoptimism Goldsmith and
Amir (2010)
Product choice Promotion Experimental and field evidence shows that uncertain sweepstakes (i.e., it is not clear whether the
consumer will win a higher or lower quality prize) coupled with a food product are as effective (i.e.,
lead to similar purchase likelihoods) as certain sweepstakes that offer only the higher-quality prize. In
the case of uncertain sweepstakes, consumers are overoptimistic and act as if they expect to win the
higher quality prize.
Ailawadi et al.
(2014)
Product choice Promotion Consumers are overoptimistic about receiving a “conditional rebate” for consumer electronics and
appliances, which are conditional on the occurrence of some uncertain external event (e.g., a specific
team wins a major sports event).
Projection
bias
Buchheim and
Kolaska (2016)
Purchase Place Projection bias is a leading explanation of a 40-50% increase in advanced online ticket sales for a movie
at an outdoor cinema due to sunny weather on the day of purchase even though the weather on the
day of purchase is a bad predictor of future weather conditions.
Law of
small
numbers
Johnson and
Tellis (2005)
Buying and
selling
Product Experimental evidence demonstrates that in the context of financial products, most consumers tend to
“buy a winner” (i.e., hot hand fallacy), whereas only a small share buys “a loser” (i.e., gambler’s
fallacy) in hope of a reversing trend.
Table 2.3. Relevant articles and key findings in the purchase phase (continued)
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Johnson and
Tellis (2005)
Buying and
selling
Product In the context of financial products, the hot hand fallacy seems to increase with the length of the trend.
However, after a certain threshold, the preference for buying the “winner” decreases for very long
trends.
Narayanan and
Manchanda
(2012)
Gambling Product Using observational data at the individual level about gambling behavior, the authors find that prior
wins (losses) have a negative (positive) effect on current betting behavior even though past results of a
random event should not influence the current behavior of a rational consumer.
Nonstandard
decision-
making
Choice ar-
chitecture
Kivetz et al.
(2004)
Product choice Product The authors present empirical evidence supporting the presence of a compromise effect in multiple
categories of consumer electronics in which consumers prefer a third middle option with a trade-off in
two dimensions (e.g., speed and memory for PCs and power and price for speakers).
Rooderkerk et al.
(2011)
Product choice Product The authors consider all three context effects in digital camera choice simultaneously and show that
they co-occur even after controlling for taste heterogeneity. Models accounting for context-dependent
and context-independent preferences simultaneously outperform the standard economic model.
Framing Lee et al. (2015) Product choice Product In multiple product domains (e.g., flights, software, vacation, etc.), saliency of product attributes
affects the trade-off between money- and time-related dimensions. Money considerations activate
analytical processing, whereas time considerations lead to affective processing. Interestingly, the former
leads to a larger number of violations of transitivity in choice. Additionally, framing of price
information, such that its interpretation is constrained, can mitigate the preference inconsistency.
Cheema and
Patrick (2008)
Coupon
redemption
and purchase
Promotion The framing of promotional information can influence purchase decisions at a coffee shop. Only
manipulating the wording (but not the length) of the time window in which coupons can be redeemed
affects the redemption and, therefore, purchase rates.
Limited
attention
Dickson and
Sawyer (1990)
Product choice Price The authors conducted a field study at supermarkets, and even though price is an important driver of
consumer behavior, only half of the consumers reported to have checked prices and were able to
provide an accurate price estimate of their selected products.
Balasubramanian
and Cole (2002)
Product choice Product The authors find poor results in terms of recall and accuracy for nutritional information on food
products. Additionally, consumers who consult nutrition information pay more attention to negative
(e.g., calories) rather than positive (e.g., protein) nutrient information.
Mohr et al. (2012) Product choice Product Educating consumers about how to interpret the nutritional information of food products, including
serving sizes, which are otherwise frequently ignored, affects product choice, nudging consumers toward
healthier options.
Emotions Ding et al. (2005) Bidding Price In a Priceline-like reverse auction, the authors find that the excitement of winning and the frustration
of losing affect bidding decisions for vacation packages, which is inconsistent with the standard
economic model.
Table 2.3. Relevant articles and key findings in the purchase phase (continued)
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during their purchase, including prices (e.g., Dickson and Sawyer 1990) and nutrition
labels (Mohr et al. 2012).
We identify biases related to product and price as the main area of research
in the purchase phase. In particular, time-inconsistent preferences affect many
key activities in the purchase phase. Moreover, the coupling of products (and
their features) with pricing schemes, promotional activities (e.g., sweepstakes and
lotteries), other products, or warranties and insurance creates purchase situations
in which behavioral biases are likely to play a role.
2.3.4 Post-Purchase Phase
In this section, we discuss how nonstandard preferences, beliefs, and decision-
making affect consumers during the post-purchase phase. Notably, we illustrate
how each of the three classes of behavioral biases may influence the post-purchase
activities of consumers, such as returning the product or actively recommending the
item via word-of-mouth. Table 2.4 summarizes the key findings. General insights
and specifics are discussed subsequently.
The selected articles covering behavioral biases during the post-purchase phase
reveal that the body of literature is not as rich as for the pre-purchase and purchase
phases. Although one reason for fewer papers related to the need recognition
phase is the difficulty in measuring the dependent variable, this rationale does
not necessarily apply to the post-purchase activities, such as word-of-mouth or
repurchase intention. However, most studies include these measures as independent
variables and analyze their impact on purchases. Nevertheless, as we outlined, all
classes of biases can affect the post-purchase activities of consumers. Specifically,
nonstandard preferences play a role in remote purchase environments through
reference dependence and the endowment effect and may affect product returns and
subsequent purchase decisions, e.g., of extended warranties (see, e.g., Wood 2001).
In addition, the endowment effect is also relevant considering the separate decision
for an extended warranty after the purchase decision as a post-purchase activity
(Chark and Muthukrishnan 2013). Nonstandard beliefs also affect consumers’ post-
purchase activities, such as those driven by customers underestimating their ability
to provide effective word-of-mouth (e.g., Hagenbuch et al. 2008). Nonstandard
decision-making affects post-purchase activities through emotions (e.g., Phillips and
Baumgartner 2002), including word-of-mouth, brand switching, and satisfaction
(Romani et al. 2012). A multitude of the biases identified in the post-purchase
phase is related to the marketing instrument product.
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Class of Bias Author (Year) Key activity Marketing Key findings
biases instrument
Nonstandard
preferences
Reference
depen-
dence
Wood (2001) Keep and
return decision
Place The endowment effect influences consumers’ decisions in remote purchase environments (e.g., catalog
sales or online retailing). More lenient return policies (full refund versus no refund for shipping costs)
not only positively affect ordering decisions but also lead to more positive quality ratings after a
physical examination of the product (i.e., post-purchase). Furthermore, keep/return deliberation times
(i.e., decision conflict) and return rates are not significantly influenced, and hence, the endowment
effect might mitigate the potential negative consequences of lenient return policies.
Chark and
Muthukrishnan
(2013)
WTP for
extended
warranties
after purchase
Product Touching a smartphone or notebook after delivery increases the WTP for extended warranties. Thus,
the endowment effect is relevant considering the separate decision for an extended warranty after the
purchase decision as a post-purchase activity.
Jindal (2015) WTP for
extended
warranties
after purchase
Product Loss aversion increases the WTP for extended warranties if sold separately after the purchase of a
washing machine. Compared to the bundled case, loss aversion (and its heterogeneity) is even higher,
and therefore, the price premia are also higher when consumers choose the extended warranty after the
product purchase.
Nonstandard
beliefs
Over-
estimation
Hagenbuch et al.
(2008)
WOM Product The authors analyze why even satisfied and devoted consumers of an accounting service seldom or
never offer product recommendations in the post-purchase phase and find that in addition to attitudes
toward referral-giving, related beliefs are relevant. Even though consumers have full control over giving
referrals or spreading word-of-mouth, they refrain from such activities because they underestimate
their skills or resources (i.e., perceived lack of control) to perform these tasks successfully.
Berger and
Iyengar (2013)
WOM Product Communication channels affect consumers’ word-of-mouth content. In the case of written (e.g., online,
e-mail, and text message) and oral (e.g., face-to-face and phone) communication, consumers tend to
“talk” more about interesting products and brands due to self-enhancement motives. Related to
nonstandard beliefs, consumers might engage in written word-of-mouth too often if they overestimate
their reach.
Table 2.4. Relevant articles and key findings in the post-purchase phase
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Class of Bias Author (Year) Key activity Marketing Key findings
biases instrument
Nonstandard
decision-
making
Emotions Phillips and
Baumgartner
(2002)
Judgment of
satisfaction
Product Both positive and negative emotions have been shown to drive satisfaction beyond the standard
expectation-disconfirmation effects for food products.
Zeelenberg and
Pieters (1999)
Complaint and
switching
behavior,
WOM
Product Different negative emotions can trigger different post-purchase responses in addition to dissatisfaction
in multiple service categories (e.g., transportation, repair and utility services). In particular, the
authors find that feelings of disappointment are more associated with negative word-of-mouth, whereas
feelings of regret may result in brand switching.
Romani et al.
(2012)
Complaint and
switching
behavior,
WOM
Product The authors developed a scale for six negative brand-emotions as well as support and further extend
findings of Zeelenberg and Pieters (1999). In addition to disappointment, they find that anger may also
lead to negative word-of-mouth (e.g., saying negative things about a brand and discouraging others
from buying the brand), while feelings of regret and worry may result in brand switching as a
post-purchase activity in multiple product domains. Additionally, feelings of sadness and
embarrassment prompt consumers to stay passive in their post-purchase responses.
Louro et al.
(2005)
Repurchase
intentions
Price Even positive emotions can reduce repurchase intentions for consumer electronics and clothing
products. If price discounts are framed as not losing money (i.e., the prevention of a loss), consumers
with high pride have a decreased repurchase intention because they associate the following
nonpromotion purchase with a loss.
Table 2.4. Relevant articles and key findings in the post-purchase phase (continued)
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2.3.5 Insights Across Phases and Classes of Behavioral Biases
By comparing the individual phases and classes of behavioral biases, we identify
nonobvious connections and derive additional insights. In this section, we discuss
the connections and differences across phases and classes of biases. We also present
insights into the interdependencies among the multiple phases, repeat purchases,
marketing instruments and product type, and discuss potential moderators.
2.3.5.1 Connections and Differences Across Phases and Classes of
Biases
Notably, a rich literature covers behavioral biases during the pre-purchase and
purchase phases, whereas marketing literature dedicated to behavioral biases during
the need recognition and post-purchase phases is rather scarce. Moreover, the three
classes of behavioral biases appear to be documented to different extents across
the phases. For example, nonstandard decision-making is widely relevant across
phases, whereas nonstandard preferences and nonstandard beliefs are particularly
prominent during the pre-purchase and purchase phases, as shown in Figure 2.1.
Because the four phases comprise different key consumer activities (as outlined
in section 2.2), it is evident that the three classes of behavioral biases have different
levels of importance across the phases. For example, nonstandard preferences
are particularly important during the pre-purchase and purchase phases since
consumers’ preferences are relevant for the activities performed during these two
phases. During both evaluation of and search for alternatives and the quantity and
timing of the actual purchase, consumers are heavily influenced by time-inconsistent
preferences (e.g., due to the time lag between the purchase and consumption),
preferences for other people (e.g., fairness concerns), and various reference points
(e.g., reference prices).
Nonstandard beliefs play a role when consumers must make predictions about
their future behavior, which usually involves uncertainty, which again mostly
concerns activities performed during the pre-purchase and purchase phases. During
the pre-purchase phase, consumers often form expectations about their future usage
of a product (e.g., frequency or extent of feature usage). During the purchase phase,
consumers form expectations about additional aspects of the purchase that are only
realized after the purchase has been made (e.g., uncertain promotions). However,
we argue that relative to the other phases, most activities in the pre-purchase
phase require consumers to make predictions and are therefore especially prone
to belief-based biases. However, belief-based biases can also influence activities
during the need recognition and post-purchase phases. For example, during the
need recognition phase, consumers may overgeneralize advertising claims. During
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the post-purchase phase, consumers may be overconfident about the impact on the
seller of writing a product review.
Nonstandard decision-making plays an important role in all phases of consumer
purchase decision-making. Framing and choice architecture appear to be especially
prominent during the pre-purchase and purchase phases, during which consumers
evaluate and choose from multiple alternatives. How alternatives are described
and presented can influence consumers’ WTP, search behavior, and eventually,
product choice. Nonstandard decision-making also influences consumers during the
need recognition phase. It may seem odd to encounter the term “decision-making”
during the need recognition phase. However, a consumer’s social environment also
often plays an essential role in influencing and determining perceived needs. The
class of nonstandard decision-making includes biases involving external cues that
influence consumers, such as persuasion or social pressure. For example, persuasion
through advertising can play an important role in triggering a need during the need
recognition phase. The aforementioned prevalent biases in the class of nonstandard
decision-making, such as framing, are seemingly less relevant in the post-purchase
phase. However, emotions can be of relevance in this phase. Dissatisfied customers
often experience negative emotions after a purchase, such as disappointment and
regret, that influence their post-purchase activities, such as word-of-mouth or return
behavior.
Another explanation for why the three classes of behavioral biases appear to be
documented to different extents across the phases involves measurement and issues
related to identification. Especially during the need recognition phase, biases seem
more difficult to detect. This is related to the fact that needs are “intangible” and
often difficult to articulate. Moreover, identifying biases can be methodologically
challenging. For example, to elicit subjective beliefs, researchers may rely on
unincentivized questionnaires. The resulting problem is that such unincentivized
belief measures may be biased due to socially desirable and self-serving answering
behavior (Grewening et al. 2019).
2.3.5.2 Interdependencies Among Multiple Phases and Repeat Pur-
chases
First, we observe that some biases span multiple phases. For example, behavioral
biases may originate during the pre-purchase phase but also have an effect on
behavior during the purchase and post-purchase phases. For example, Goodman
and Irmak (2013) show that consumers prefer many-feature products and pay a
higher price for such products because they overestimate their feature usage rate
or fail to estimate their usage altogether (during the pre-purchase and purchase
phases). This also has an effect on the post-purchase phase, as estimating the usage
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prior to purchase induces greater product satisfaction and a greater likelihood of
recommending the product.
Second, consumers are assumed to transition through the four phases multiple
times in the case of repeat purchases (e.g., consumables), allowing behavioral biases
to play different roles as consumers gain experience. For example, consumers
switch telephone plans by adopting the optimal plan as they gain experience
(Miravete 2003). Similarly, credit card users pay fewer fees as they gain more
experience with their card (Agarwal et al. 2013). However, experience does not
always attenuate biases. For example, cognitive dissonance theory explains why
overconfident beliefs may persist over time. Because consumers aim to avoid the
stress caused by information that challenges their beliefs, they may attempt to
avoid such belief-changing information (Malmendier and Taylor 2015).
2.3.5.3 Marketing Instruments and Product Type
Whereas behavioral biases pertaining to product are well documented across all
phases, behavioral biases concerning place are rather scarce. Notably, most studies
focusing on price document behavioral biases related to nonstandard preferences
during the pre-purchase and purchase phases, which is sensible as prices constitute
numerical information that frequently serves as an important reference point
during the pre-purchase and purchase phases. For example, even irrelevant price
information can influence consumers through anchoring and adjustment (Adaval
and Wyer 2011). The marketing instrument promotion occurs in all phases and
classes of biases. Persuasion and framing in advertisements seem to be particularly
common research topics in this regard.
Depending on the product type (e.g., consumables or durables), the individual
phases may see different weights in purchase decision-making. For example, con-
sumers might be more likely to skip phases and jump directly to the purchase
(i.e., impulse buying) in the case of consumables. In the context of durable goods
purchases, it is likely that the evaluation phase will be relatively more extensive
and thus will lead to consumers’ engagement in greater amounts of search and
deliberation.
2.3.5.4 Moderators
The moderators of behavioral biases have been widely neglected in the marketing
literature. However, our review reveals at least the following two important mod-
erators: technology and time. We present several examples in which technology
moderates the effects of biases. First, Brasel and Gips (2014) show that touch-
screens (versus mice) create stronger psychological ownership, which increases the
endowment effect. Second, Hui et al. (2013) find that mobile coupons can alter
consumers’ in-store travel paths, which can lead to increased unplanned spending.
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Third, consumers who do not understand how technology-enabled decision aids
operate may engage in harmful behavior. Diehl (2005) shows that consumers who
do not understand that they are in an ordered search environment may be tempted
to engage in more searching, which can result in choosing lower-quality options.
Time can moderate behavioral biases in various forms, e.g., as time lag (e.g.,
between purchase and consumption) and time pressure (e.g., through deadlines).
The time lag between evaluation and purchase or purchase and consumption can
either cause biases into existence or increase or attenuate existing biases. For
example, time-inconsistent preferences or belief-based biases (e.g., projection bias)
only emerge if a time lag exists. However, the time lag’s magnitude can moderate
the biases. For example, Milkman et al. (2010) show that a larger time lag
influences consumers’ self-control. The larger the time lag, the less “want” products
(relative to “should” products) consumers order. In a similar context, VanEpps
et al. 2015 demonstrate that advance meal selection (thus a larger time lag) can
promote healthier eating decisions. In addition, it is conceivable that time pressure
can moderate biases in various phases of consumer purchase decision-making.
Decisions under uncertainty (e.g., auctions) often involve time pressure. Research
investigating risky decisions under time pressure has found that time pressure can
lead to more risk aversion for losses (Kocher et al. 2013). For mixed prospects,
however, time pressure simultaneously increases loss aversion and gain seeking.
2.4 Managerial Implications and Avenues for Future Research
As previously shown, marketing scholars have made substantial contributions to
the growing body of literature on behavioral biases. Numerous biases can affect
consumer behavior across all phases of purchase decision-making. Understanding
these behavioral effects offers marketing practitioners opportunities by which to
adapt their marketing strategy accordingly. We summarize key points and specific
implications in Table 2.5, along with a detailed discussion. Additionally, the insight
generated from our review provides important avenues for future research, which
we discuss and additionally outline in Table 2.6.
2.4.1 Managerial Implications
2.4.1.1 Behavioral Biases in Digital and Digitally Enhanced Envi-
ronments
Current marketing practices already exploit some behavioral biases. For example,
firms offer uncertain sweepstakes, which utilize the potential overoptimism of
consumers (Goldsmith and Amir 2010), or offer partitioned prices, which may
increase demand through framing effects (Morwitz et al. 1998). However, as
previously explained, technology may moderate behavioral biases, and new trends
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Topic Key points Related literature Practical implications
Behavioral biases in digital
and digitally enhanced
environments
New digital technologies and resulting functionalities
(e.g., touch on mobile devices) can lead to the
endowment effect when shopping online.
Brasel and Gips (2014) Retailers may design websites such that they foster
the use of touch on mobile devices to capitalize on
the endowment effect.
Augmented reality in online channels can attenuate
overconfidence and enhance projection bias.
Yaoyuneyong et al. (2014) Retailers may consider adopting augmented reality in
online channels. Consumers potentially will make
better decisions
Lower uncertainty in the pre-purchase phase may
reduce the effects of negative emotions in the
post-purchase phase.
Romani et al. (2012) due to lower uncertainty (e.g., in the sizing of
clothing), and retailers may benefit from more
satisfied consumers and less negative word-of-mouth
in the long-run.
Shorter delivery times lead to (online) impulse buying
and increase the preference for “want” products.
Milkman et al. (2010) When reducing delivery times retailers should
consider adjusting their assortment and inventory
(i.e., stock more “want” products). Additionally, they
could help consumers make better decisions offering
options for a better planning of recurring purchases.
Big data and data analytics Big data enables precise measurement of consumer
states. Using persuasive cues and targeting
consumers at the right time and place can induce
unplanned spending.
Vohs and Faber (2007); Hui
et al. (2013)
Location-based advertising can be used to target
people stuck in traffic or when they are
resource-depleted. RFID chips and Bluetooth
beacons can be used to increase the travel distance
in-store.
Adaptive websites enable firms to capitalize on
framing effects and choice architecture.
Hauser et al. (2009) Firms may use past clicks and other information to
dynamically adjust their websites for each consumer
and help to make decisions easier, more practical,
and efficient.
André et al. (2018) When using data analytics, automation, and
targeting, firms need to be careful that consumers do
not feel like they are losing autonomy over their own
decisions.
Table 2.5. Overview of managerial implications
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Topic Key points Related literature Practical implications
Behavioral biases and
marketing instruments
Versioning as a product line strategy can lead to
adverse effects due to social preferences.
Gershoff et al. (2012) To mitigate negative effects, firms should
communicate that versioning is a common practice in
the industry.
It is essential to consider framing effects when
advertising price discounts.
Krishna et al. (2002) Firms should use price discounts in terms of
percentages rather than absolute amounts.
Uncertain promotions can have positive effects in the
purchase phase due to belief-based biases.
Goldsmith and Amir (2010) Retailers can benefit from overoptimistic consumers
by using sweepstakes as nonprice promotions.
The channel for selling durables (online vs offline)
affects the WTP for extended warranties because of
the endowment effect.
Chark and Muthukrishnan
(2013)
Retailers should use price differentiation for extended
warranties depending on whether a customer buys
online or offline, i.e., set higher prices in the case of
offline purchases.
Negative consequences of
exploiting behavioral biases
Taking advantage of behavioral biases for
profit-maximizing purposes may backfire due to
consumers’ fairness concerns (social preferences).
Thaler (2018); Gershoff et al.
(2012)
Firms should set internal boundaries and a code of
conduct for how they balance leveraging behavioral
biases and protecting their customers’ best interests.
Table 2.5. Overview of managerial implications (continued)
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and developments in marketing in the digital age may further affect consumer
behavior and their reactions to biases. In particular, digital technologies and
environments may create situations in which certain biases appear or influence the
magnitude of already occurring biases.
Augmented reality as a new technology affects consumers’ online service experi-
ences (see e.g., Hilken et al. 2017) and may, similar to the use of touch on mobile
devices (Brasel and Gips 2014), induce the endowment effect in online shopping
by helping consumers imagine items such as furniture in their actual apartments
(Javornik 2016) or vacations to distant locations (Dadwal and Hassan 2015). More-
over, as outlined in Table 2.5, augmented reality may reduce overconfidence and
enhance projection bias (e.g., booking a vacation to a warm place when the weather
is bad). As a result, augmented reality may create interactions among multiple
biases (i.e., endowment effect and overconfidence or projection bias) during the
pre-purchase phase. Furthermore, because biases can span multiple stages or even
interact across stages, the reduction in belief-based biases could help firms with
post-purchase activities, such as negative word-of-mouth triggered by emotions
(Romani et al. 2012).
Yadav and Pavlou (2014), highlight the increasing interaction between consumers
and new technologies, and in some cases, this interaction has the potential to affect
the magnitude of time-inconsistent preferences during the purchase phase. For
example, better (i.e., faster) delivery services for products, e.g., “Prime Now” by
Amazon offering delivery within the next (couple of) hour(s), allows consumers
the opportunity to immediately satisfy their needs, which is very likely to induce
consumers to engage in more (online) impulse buying as well as to increase the
consumption of “want” products driven by time-inconsistent preferences. Shorter
delivery times, therefore, might affect the firm’s inventory and assortment decisions.
However, online channels might still lead to fewer purchases of unhealthy products
than offline channels (Huyghe et al. 2017), and modern planning apps (e.g., grocery
pal) that help people organize and make recurrent decisions, such as grocery
shopping, might also reduce impulse buying. Firms can thus both exploit and help
consumers avoid biases.
Digital markets, media platforms, and the shift from desktop to mobile device
usage have changed the marketing landscape. These changes offer new ways (i.e.,
new contexts) to reach, inform, engage, and provide service to consumers in all
stages of their decision-making, possibly moderating behavioral biases. For example,
mobile devices provide more opportunities to search for information. However,
simultaneously, the smaller screens may lead to higher search costs and reduced
search activity. In such situations, salient information, e.g., top products based
on ranking lists (e.g., provided by the firm), may be more persuasive due to
impaired searching (Ghose et al. 2013). This may be due to framing, as in Diehl
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(2005), and implies relatively weaker competition if consumers are reached via
mobile devices. Therefore, firms need to adjust their pricing and recommendation
strategies accordingly.
Finally, new communication and sales channels are emerging, and consumer
behavior via these channels needs to be assessed. For example, autonomous driving
enables new activities that were not possible before to be performed inside a car
while traveling. More specifically, cars provide a new environment in which to show
ads and stimulate searching during the pre-purchase phase, induce impulse buying,
and enhance framing effects through new contexts. For firms, this implies new
opportunities for real-time targeting.
2.4.1.2 Big Data and Data Analytics
In the digital age, firms currently have access to more and better data regarding
the entire customer journey (Wedel and Kannan 2016). These data are useful not
only for predicting clicks, searches, and purchase behavior but also for measuring
behavior related to the need recognition phase (e.g., interaction with peers in social
networks) as well as the post-purchase phase (e.g., electronic word-of-mouth) and
provide a “window into consumers’ psyche” (Matz and Netzer 2017). Moreover,
automated textual analysis enables generating relevant marketing insights (Berger
et al. 2019). Understanding the psychological aspects of how consumers behave in
digital markets is crucial for firms (Lamberton and Stephen 2016).
Consumers make more impulse buying decisions when they are resource-depleted
(Vohs and Faber 2007). Thus, firms can target such consumers to increase unplanned
spending given that this consumer state is measurable (e.g., using location-based
advertising). Furthermore, mobile coupons can be used as persuasive cues to
increase the travel distance, which might lead to more impulse buying (Hui et al.
2013).
In general, individual-level data and online markets make targeting consumers
easier (Wedel and Kannan 2016). Reference-price effects related to personalized
pricing (e.g., Zhang and Krishnamurthi 2004) are particularly relevant during
the pre-purchase and purchase phases. Adaptive websites (Hauser et al. 2009)
are an example of how firms utilize new individualized digital interfaces with an
opportunity for framing and choice architecture by dynamically adjusting their
websites to each consumer based on past clicks and other information. However,
managers should be aware that this practice can also lead to negative consequences
if consumers feel that they are losing autonomy over their own decisions (André
et al. 2018). Finally, although it is challenging to combine and integrate data from
different sources (Lambrecht and Tucker 2015), tracking consumers across channels
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(i.e., online and offline) could provide managers with a more complete picture of
consumers.
2.4.1.3 Behavioral Biases and Marketing Instruments
Managers have various marketing instruments at their disposal to affect consumers
and exploit behavioral biases.
Related to product, firms should be careful when using versioning as a product
line strategy, because versioning may lead to negative attitudes of consumers during
the pre-purchase phase due to social preferences. However, firms may attenuate
the issue by informing consumers that versioning is a common practice, making
products more dissimilar in superficial characteristics (e.g., color), or using different
distribution channels (Gershoff et al. 2012). Context effects that may play a role
during the purchase phase are also important to consider when designing a product
line. For instance, considering the compromise effect (e.g., Kivetz et al. 2004), firms
may introduce a high-quality/high-price alternative or keep a low-quality/low-price
alternative on the market to increase the share of the “middle” option. Other
aspects of the product, including labels and packaging, may be framed to favorably
influence consumers’ evaluations of products (Levin and Gaeth 1988).
Price provides firms many opportunities to leverage biases, particularly during
the pre-purchase and purchase phases. For instance, firms may affect consumers’
perceived savings by framing price discounts in terms of percentages rather than in
absolute amounts (Krishna et al. 2002). Specifically, presenting the discount depth
as a comparison against the sale price increases the perception of the discount
level and thus the purchase intention of consumers (Guha et al. 2018). However,
firms should be wary of the possibility that advertised prices and frequent price
discounts may decrease reference prices and lower the overall store price image.
Retailers planning price promotions for “want” and “should” products should
consider that consumers with time-inconsistent preferences may anticipate their
self-control problems and, therefore, be less price-sensitive (Wertenbroch 1998).
Furthermore, using partitioned prices or nine-endings may increase demand due to
consumers’ poorer recall of total costs (Morwitz et al. 1998) and limited attention
to the leftmost digits (Thomas and Morwitz 2005).
Regarding promotion, firms may use anecdotal evidence in advertising messages
(e.g., Cox and Cox 2001), mobile coupons, and visual in-store cues to capitalize
on the persuasion bias (Hui et al. 2013). Consumer activities during the purchase
phase can also be strongly affected by promotion, e.g., by deploying uncertain
sweepstakes (Goldsmith and Amir 2010) or mail-in rebates (Soman 1998), which
may affect consumers’ decisions due to belief-based biases, such as overoptimism
and overconfidence.
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Place as an instrument is also relevant for managers, particularly in combination
with other instruments. For example, in their online channel, firms may induce
context effects (e.g., the compromise effect) influencing product choice during the
purchase phase by presenting different configurations of products to offer a trade-off
between features (e.g., quality and price) on the same page of their website. In
the context of durable-goods purchases during the post-purchase phase, firms may
increase consumers’ WTP for extended warranties due to the endowment effect
by offering warranties after delivery, i.e., after the consumers have received (and
touched) the product (Chark and Muthukrishnan 2013). Furthermore, firms may
capitalize on the endowment effect by offering lenient return policies in which
consumers can return products at no additional cost (Wood 2001).
Finally, managers should be aware that potential interaction effects may exist
between instruments. For example, according to Dubé et al. (2017)), deep price
discounts may negatively interact with charitable donations as a promotional tool
for exploiting social preferences.
2.4.1.4 Negative Consequences of Exploiting Behavioral Biases
Although firms may benefit from utilizing behavioral biases, such a strategy may
backfire, and firms must be aware of the potential negative consequences. On the
one hand, the understanding of behavioral biases can be used for doing good, i.e.,
to “nudge” people toward better choices related to their health, safety, and welfare
(Sunstein 2015). For example, a food company could help consumers eat more
healthfully by choosing specific alternatives, or a pharmaceutical company could
help its patients take their medicine more consistently (Conick 2017). On the other
hand, behavioral biases can be exploited for profit-maximizing purposes by firms
at the expense of consumer welfare (Thaler 2018). For example, firms may exploit
consumers’ overconfidence with mail-in rebates and benefit from the redemption
“slippage” discussed in section 2.3 (Soman 1998). This situation has recently been
termed a “sludge” (Thaler 2018), and our review already showed the potential
negative consequences on firms if consumers become aware of their practices.
Gershoff et al. (2012) highlight that the social preferences (i.e., fairness concerns)
of consumers may be affected. Furthermore, we contend that consumers might
avoid a brand if they feel outsmarted and begin spreading negative word-of-mouth.
Currently, information about pricing and general firm practices is more visible due
to online environments, and this issue is becoming even more pronounced.
Additionally, regulators and consumer protection agencies are likely to intervene
if firms are unwilling to commit to staying within reasonable boundaries. A better
understanding of behavioral biases and using this knowledge to achieve win-win
situations in which consumers’ and firms’ goals are consistent should be in firms’
long-term interests.
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2.4.2 Future Research
2.4.2.1 Phases of Consumer Purchase Decision-Making and Classes
of Behavioral Biases
Across the four phases of consumer purchase decision-making, behavioral biases
in the need recognition phase and the post-purchase phase have been studied
less extensively. In these phases, we observe that nonstandard preferences and
nonstandard beliefs have received less attention. We suggest that future research
focus on these understudied combinations of phases of decision-making and classes of
biases. For example, as outlined above, during the post-purchase phase, consumers
may be overconfident about the impact of leaving a product review on the seller,
and such topics warrant more extensive research.
We showed that interdependencies among the different phases also exist. For
example, biases influencing purchase decisions may originate during the need
recognition or post-purchase phases (e.g., in the case of repeat purchases). Moreover,
repeat purchases allow behavioral biases to play different roles as consumers gain
experience. For a complete and accurate understanding of biases within and across
phases, we suggest that future research should focus on studying the biases at the
phase where they originate and their influence on activities in subsequent phases.
For instance, as Goukens et al. (2007) show, hunger and visual food cues can induce
consumers to perceive more products as satisfying during the need recognition
phase, resulting in stronger variety seeking. As a result, consumers may consider
and evaluate a set of alternatives during the pre-purchase phase that they would
not have considered otherwise, which ultimately affects their purchase decision as
well as subsequent customer satisfaction and post-purchase activities.
Finally, moderators of behavioral biases have also received little attention in the
marketing literature. We identified technology and time as relevant moderators,
and future research could systematically explore other potential moderators. For
example, behavioral biases may playout differently in individual vs. group decisions
(e.g., household or firm decisions). Some empirical evidence suggests that behavioral
biases persist in B2B markets involving firms’ pricing (e.g., Bruno et al. 2012; Steiner
et al. 2016), and due to time pressure and limited attention, managers often rely
on heuristic decision rules (Guercini et al. 2015). It is, however, unclear whether
biases affect group (e.g., firm) decisions at a lower magnitude due to potential
learning and experience.
2.4.2.2 Marketing Instruments
Price, promotion, and product are the marketing instruments for which behavioral
biases have been heavily studied in each phase of consumers’ purchase decision-
making. Certain topics in these research areas have even received so much attention
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Research topics Future research avenues Relevant articles Next steps
Phases of consumer purchase
decision-making and classes of
Nonstandard preferences and nonstandard beliefs in
the need recognition and post-purchase phase.
Hagenbuch et al. (2008);
Berger and Iyengar (2013)
Study the effect of overconfidence on leaving a
product review during the post-purchase phase.
behavioral biases Interdependencies across phases. Goukens et al. (2007) Examine the effect of visual cues and hunger in the
need recognition phase on the downstream effects in
subsequent phases.
Moderators of behavioral biases within and across
phases.
Bruno et al. (2012); Steiner
et al. (2016); Guercini et al.
(2015)
Analyze moderators of behavioral biases beyond
technology and time, e.g., individual vs. group
decisions, systematically.
Marketing instruments Knowledge accumulation and analysis of
reproducibility, generalizability, and robustness of
behavioral biases through meta-analyses.
Neumann and Böckenholt
(2014); Tully and Winer
(2014); Tarrahi et al. (2016)
Conduct a meta-analysis on the effects of
time-inconsistent preferences on the adoption of new
products.
Behavioral biases concerning “place” as a marketing
instrument.
Study behavioral biases in the face of online-offline
convergence and newly emerging distribution
channels.
Methodology Field experiments to study behavioral biases in
marketing with high external validity.
Lambrecht and Tucker (2015);
Muchnik et al. (2013)
Analyze social influence bias on online platforms
through ratings and reviews.
Structural models to estimate key behavioral
parameters.
DellaVigna (2018); Dubé et al.
(2017)
Investigate uncertainty in the evaluation of product
features via discrete choice experiments.
Experimental designs for identifying behavioral
biases as causal mechanisms.
Dubé et al. (2014); Imai et al.
(2013)
Provide causal evidence for behavioral biases
observed in observational data but not yet shown
experimentally.
New technologies and business
models
Effects of technological developments on behavioral
biases.
Lambrecht and Tucker (2019) Examine the potential of artificial intelligence (e.g.,
ad optimizing algorithms, recommendation systems)
on inducing behavioral biases (e.g., overconfidence).
Study the potential of augmented and virtual reality
to induce the endowment effect in online shopping.
Behavioral biases in the light of new business models. Zervas et al. (2017) Analyze behavioral biases in the Sharing Economy.
New contexts creating potential new biases. Dowling et al. (2018) Conduct additional research on the pay-per-use
“bias” in the car-sharing context.
Persistence, learning, and
competition
Effects of competition on behavioral biases. Pope and Schweitzer (2011);
Hart and Moore (2008)
Study whether competition reduces or even reinforces
behavioral biases (e.g., in the context of the Sharing
Economy or taxi industry).
Effect of persistence and learning on behavioral
biases.
Miravete (2003) Explore the effects of learning on behavioral bias over
several periods, e.g., in lab experiments.
Table 2.6. Overview of future research avenues
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that empirical generalizations can be derived and established from meta-analytic
analyses. For example, Krishna et al. (2002) cover the effect of price presentations
on perceived savings, Tarrahi et al. (2016) analyze fairness perceptions of price
changes, Neumann and Böckenholt (2014) study loss aversion in product choice,
Neumann et al. (2016) study context effects, Chernev et al. (2015) summarize
research on choice overload, and Tully and Winer 2014 discuss WTP for socially
responsible products. Given the increasing volume of marketing papers studying
behavioral biases, there is demand for additional empirical generalizations and
meta-analyses. For example, related to new product adoption, time-inconsistent
preferences have been intensively studied in marketing contexts and, therefore,
seem to be promising candidates.
Assessing the multiple developments and technological advancements discussed
in the section on managerial implications, the marketing instrument place appears
to be a particularly promising area for future research. For example, whether and
how behavioral biases change could be analyzed in the context of the convergence
of online and offline channels or the continuously increasing importance of mobile
devices.
2.4.2.3 Methodology
Methodologically, the increased use of online and mobile channels offers researchers
the possibility of gaining better observational data in terms of both quantity and
quality and to more easily conduct field experiments, particularly in marketing
(Lambrecht and Tucker 2015). Behavioral biases would be interesting to study with
real consumers in field experiments. For example, most online platforms employ
ratings and reviews on their websites. Such settings are particularly suitable for
studying the effects of social influence bias (Muchnik et al. 2013). In addition, one
could study how the application of real-time analytics and real-time decisions opens
new opportunities for firms to respond directly to observed behavioral biases. We
also strongly encourage using advances in experimental designs that explicitly allow
for behavioral biases and help with identifying causal mechanisms in the future (see
e.g., Dubé et al. 2014; Imai et al. 2013). Finally, applications of structural models
are also highly valuable for future research because they allow the estimation of
key behavioral parameters and counterfactual simulations (see e.g., Chung 2019;
DellaVigna 2018; Dubé et al. 2017).
2.4.2.4 New Technologies and Business Models
New media and technologies affect behavioral biases during each of the four phases
of consumers’ purchase decision-making. Specifically, new media and technologies
affect how consumers become aware of a need (e.g., smartphones and online social
networks), their ability to search for and evaluate product alternatives (e.g., price
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comparison websites and consumer reviews), where and when they purchase (e.g.,
mobile and e-commerce), and their post-purchase behavior (e.g., reviews on social
media). Given these technological developments, new behavioral biases may emerge,
while existing behavioral distortions may play different roles in new contexts and
environments. Therefore, whether the findings regarding the three classes of
behavioral biases along the four phases need to be reevaluated in the future is
unclear. For example, Lambrecht and Tucker (2019) show that algorithms may
cause new biases. In their study, an algorithm optimizing cost-effectiveness in ad
delivery leads to more exposure to men than women, although the ad was intended
to be gender-neutral. This empirical regularity is replicated in other major online
platforms.
Furthermore, developments accompanying new business models offer the potential
for future research. For example, developments, such as the so-called “Sharing
Economy”, can change aspects of consumer behavior in each of the four phases
(Eckhardt et al. 2019; Zervas et al. 2017). The shift from sole ownership to shared
consumption renders other aspects of the transaction, such as interactions, trust,
and flexibility, more important. Researchers could assess how behavioral biases
could be used to help explain the unknown consumption patterns elicited by new
business models. For example, prior research has provided substantial evidence that
in many contexts, consumers prefer a flat-rate over a pay-per-use tariff, although
they would have been better off under a pay-per-use tariff (flat-rate “bias”; e.g.,
Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). However, in support of our above argument, recent
research indicates that consumers in a car-sharing context are rather prone to a
so-called pay-per-use “bias” (Dowling et al. 2018).
2.4.2.5 Competition, Learning, and Persistence
Additionally, questions concerning the existence and persistence of behavioral
biases in competitive environments are currently neglected. Some economists claim
that behavioral biases are irrelevant because they cannot survive in competitive
markets (Pope and Schweitzer 2011). However, behavioral economists argue that
some biases may not only survive but may even be reinforced by competition
(e.g., Hart and Moore 2008). In addition, because most markets are competitive,
we believe that the behavioral biases discussed in the marketing literature also
persist. Furthermore, this question would be interesting to combine with previously
outlined research gaps, such as new business models through developments, such
as those introduced by the Sharing Economy, or increased competition in several
industries, such as the taxi industry. Therefore, these industries might be promising
avenues for investigation. The same logic applies to the analysis of the persistence
of biases, i.e., whether biases can exist over a longer period or whether learning
occurs after several periods and biases are extinguished or attenuated. We discussed
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that experience must not necessarily result in less biased decisions. Although we
are aware of situations in which experience leads consumers closer to the optimal
decision (e.g., in tariff choice decisions; Miravete 2003), biases may persist when
consumers attempt to avoid the stress caused by information that challenges their
beliefs. It would be interesting to analyze the persistence of biases on a broader
scale (especially biases with potentially large detrimental effects on consumers,
such as overconfidence).
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we reviewed previous marketing research documenting behavior
that deviates from the standard economic model and aggregated the findings
using a structure that involves elements from both marketing and economics. We
synthesized instructive marketing papers demonstrating how each class of behavioral
biases can affect each phase of consumer purchase decision-making. By identifying
nonobvious connections and differences within and across the four phases and three
classes, we derive implications for marketing practice and future research.
We find a rich literature covering behavioral biases during the pre-purchase and
purchase phases, whereas the marketing literature dedicated to behavioral biases
during the need recognition and post-purchase phases is relatively scarce. We
discuss possible explanations. We further note that the three classes of behavioral
biases appear to be important to a different extent across phases. Nonstandard
preferences play an important role in the pre-purchase and purchase phases. Sim-
ilarly, nonstandard beliefs are also prominent during these phases, with an even
greater relevance in the pre-purchase phase. Nonstandard decision-making seems
to be relevant in all phases. Although we observe that some biases span multiple
phases, we did not find any paper that systematically studies the interconnections
or patterns of behavioral biases across all phases. This observation is surprising
given that (1) relationships among biases across phases exist, (2) consumers can
loop through the four phases multiple times (e.g., in the case of repeat purchases),
and, depending on the product type, (3) the individual phases exert different
weights of importance in purchase decision-making (e.g., consumables or durables).
Similarly, the moderators of behavioral biases are under-researched in the marketing
literature. We identified technology and time as moderators of biases. Regarding
marketing instruments, we find that price and promotion are the two marketing
instruments for which behavioral biases have been heavily studied in several phases
of consumer purchase decision-making.
We presented specific implications for marketing practice and directions for
future research. In particular, we debated behavioral biases (1) in digital and
digitally enhanced environments, (2) in the context of big data and data analytics,
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(3) with regard to marketing instruments, and (4) with respect to the potential
negative consequences of exploiting them. Moreover, we proposed and discussed five
different streams of future research. Specifically, we identified research directions
and opportunities related to (1) the phases of consumer purchase decision-making
and the classes of behavioral biases, (2) marketing instruments, (3) methodology,
(4) new technologies and business models, and (5) competition, learning, and
persistence. Marketing scholars possess the methods, tools, access to data, and
relationships with companies to adequately examine the outlined research directions.
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2.6 Appendix
For the interested reader, we provide a more detailed explanation of different biases
within each of the three classes of deviations from the standard economic model
(DellaVigna 2009): nonstandard preferences, nonstandard beliefs, and nonstandard
decision-making. In particular, for each class of behavioral biases, we present
corresponding tables (i.e., Table 2.7, Table 2.8, and Table 2.9), which provide
examples of biases, direct readers to prominent articles on specific biases, as well
as include a nonformal definition and an illustration of the respective biases (see
e.g., Dhami 2016) for more formal and extended explanations of the behavioral
biases). We further note that while we follow DellaVigna (2009) in separating the
three classes of deviations, they are often interrelated.
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Bias Example Paper Definition Illustration
Time-
inconsistent
preferences
Present bias;
Hyperbolic
discounting
Laibson (1997);
Loewenstein and Prelec
(1992); Thaler (1981)
Outcomes of near vs. distant
future are more steeply
discounted.
Choosing an apple today over two apples in two
days, but two apples in a year and one day over an
apple in a year.
Reference
dependence
Reference points Kahneman and Tversky
(1979)
The utility function is defined
relative to a reference point.
The value is derived from gains and losses rather
than from final outcomes.
Loss aversion Kahneman and Tversky
(1979)
The value function for losses is
steeper than for gains.
People dislike losing 100e more than they like
gaining the same amount.
Endowment effect Thaler (1980); Kahneman
et al. (1991)
Mere possession of an object
increases its valuation.
People, initially given a product, have on average a
higher valuation for it than people without the
product.
Nonlinear
probability
weighting
Allais (1953); Kahneman
and Tversky (1979)
Small (large) probabilities are
over- (under-)weighted.
Choosing to win 3,000e with certainty over
4,000e with a 0.8 chance, but choosing a lottery
with a 0.2 chance of winning 4,000e over a lottery
with a 0.25 chance of winning 3,000e.
Social
preferences
Other-regarding
preferences
DellaVigna et al. (2012) Individual value functions also
depend on payoffs of others.
People engage in prosocial behavior, e.g., charitable
giving or volunteering.
Fairness concerns Camerer and Thaler
(1995); Fehr and Schmidt
(1999); Fehr and Gächter
(2000)
Individuals’ decisions are often
affected by fairness concerns,
even if they reduce one’s own
payoffs.
In ultimatum games, where one player offers a
portion of the money to another player, offers of less
than 20% are deemed unfair and often rejected, so
that neither player receives a payoff.
Table 2.7. Biases related to nonstandard preferences
52
C
H
A
PT
ER
2.
BEH
AV
IO
R
A
L
BIA
SES
IN
M
A
R
K
ET
IN
G
Bias Example Paper Definition Illustration
OverconfidenceOverestimation Weinstein (1980);
Camerer and Lovallo
(1999)
One’s own actual capabilities,
knowledge, or chances of success
are systematically overestimated.
People tend to overestimate how much money they
will save in the future or CEOs overestimate their
ability to make good decisions.
Overplacement Svenson (1981); Larrick
et al. (2007)
Relative to others, people think
they are better.
In an experiment, in which subjects rated their
driving skills, 93% indicated to be above the median.
Overprecision Daniel et al. (1998);
Odean (1999)
The degree of certainty in one’s
own beliefs, predictions, and
capabilities is too high.
Excessive rates of asset trading are potentially
caused by the high degree of certainty investors have
in their estimates of an asset’s value.
Projection
bias
Projection bias Gilbert et al. (1998);
Loewenstein (1996);
Loewenstein et al. (2003)
Current preferences are
projected into future states.
People project their current state of hunger into the
future, ordering too much and unhealthy food for
the next week.
Law of
small
numbers
Representativeness Tversky and Kahneman
(1971)
Small random samples are
perceived as representative as
large samples.
People tend to think that both a large and a small
hospital will have an equal likelihood of reflecting the
population proportion of 50% boys and girls born.
Gambler’s fallacy Tversky (1974) The belief that negative
correlation exists in random
processes.
In a coin toss, people think that after several
occurrences of heads, tails will be more likely to
occur next.
Hot hand fallacy Gilovich et al. (1985) The belief that positive
correlation exists in random
processes.
People tend to believe that a basketball player’s
chance of hitting a shot are greater following a hit
than following a miss.
Table 2.8. Biases related to nonstandard beliefs
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Bias Example Paper Definition Illustration
Choice ar-
chitecture
Framing effects Loewenstein (1988);
Meyerowitz and Chaiken
(1987); Rabin (1998)
Equivalent decision problems
that are framed differently, elicit
different responses.
Women are more likely to conduct a breast
self-examination when negative rather than positive
consequences are stressed.
Context effects Huber et al. (1982);
Huber and Puto (1983);
Simonson (1989);
Simonson and Tversky
(1992); Tversky (1972)
The composition of the choice
set affects consumer decisions by
violating the assumptions of
independence of irrelevant
alternatives, regularity, and
betweenness inequality.
In a two-product setting, the (relative) choice share
of one focal product can be increased by introducing
a third option, which is 1) an extreme option,
making the focal product the middle option
(compromise effect/extremeness aversion); 2) inferior
to the focal option (attraction/asymmetric
dominance/decoy effect); or 3) very similar to the
competing option (similarity effect).
Limited
attention
Inattention;
Left-digit bias
Lacetera et al. (2012);
Payne et al. (1992)
Some of the available
information at no (or low) cost is
over- (under-) weighted or
ignored.
People tend to ignore the rightmost digits of numeric
information, for example, when processing the
mileage of used cars.
Persuasion
and social
pressure
Persuasion Cain et al. (2005) Beliefs of the information
provider may have an excessive
influence on individuals’
attitudes and behavior.
Patients often do not account for their physician’s
conflict of interest in prescribing medication of a
firm that finances their research, despite the
disclosure of this information.
Social pressure Akerlof (1991); Milgram
(1963)
Individuals may conform to the
preferences of the relevant
reference group (e.g., peers,
family).
Cashiers in a supermarket are more productive if
they know that high-productivity cashiers can
observe them.
Emotions Emotions Ariely and Loewenstein
(2006); Loewenstein
(1996)
Emotions play a crucial role in
individual decision-making but
are not considered in the
standard model.
Mood affects the amount of tipping in restaurants,
hunger affects purchase behavior, and sexual arousal
affects the likelihood of engaging in (morally)
questionable behavior.
Table 2.9. Biases related to nonstandard decision-making
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3 | When Zeros Count: Confounding
in Preference Heterogeneity and At-
tribute Non-attendance 1
Narine Yegoryan, Daniel Guhl, Friederike Paetz
Abstract
Consumer heterogeneity has been a prominent topic in choice modeling in marketing
for many years. While the main focus has been on accounting for preference het-
erogeneity, few studies have recognized the importance of attribute non-attendance,
i.e., when consumers consider only a subset of attributes in a purchase decision.
We use a latent class model with continuous parameter distributions in each class
to account for both attribute non-attendance and preference heterogeneity. Re-
strictive cases of this model, ignoring either attribute non-attendance or preference
heterogeneity, enable us to investigate their possible confounding. Additionally, we
contrast the model with models that allow more flexible forms of heterogeneity.
Ten empirical applications indicate that biases arise in both cases, resulting in
an overestimation of attribute non-attendance or biases in uncovered preference
distribution. Furthermore, the magnitude of the bias depends on the share of
indifferent consumers and ignored attributes. We find that the particular direction
of the biases also depends on the type of the attribute, whether it is a feature
allowing vertical or horizontal differentiation.
Keywords
Discrete choice modeling, Heterogeneity, Attribute non-attendance
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3.1 Introduction
Understanding consumer heterogeneity and identifying the distribution of consumer
preferences is of utmost importance for marketers in a wide variety of decisions,
including market segmentation and targeting, new product development, as well as
pricing (Allenby and Rossi 1998; Allenby et al. 2014).
Most of the efforts in marketing literature have been focused on the development
of models that accommodate consumer preference heterogeneity. First, the latent
class model by Kamakura and Russell (1989) and later, the mixed multinomial
logit (MMNL) model (e.g., McFadden and Train 2000) superseded the multinomial
logit (MNL) model (McFadden 1974) as the new standard (Gilbride and Lenk
2010). Further advances have been made to account for even more flexible forms of
preference heterogeneity by using a mixture of normals distribution (e.g., Allenby
et al. 1998, Rossi et al. 2005, Burda et al. 2008), Dirichlet process prior, and more
recently, Dirichlet process mixture (e.g., see Voleti et al. 2017). These models aim
to accommodate multi-modal parameter distribution.
Nevertheless, consumers may differ not only in how much they value specific
product attributes (i.e., preference heterogeneity) but also how they make decisions
(Kamakura et al. 1996), and in particular, whether they value these attributes at
all. The latter is of particular importance for marketers to understand and leverage.
Consider a laptop manufacturer thinking about introducing a feature that allows
the user to switch off the camera in its new model. Privacy concerned consumers
should find this feature valuable. We would hardly expect anyone to derive a
negative utility from this feature. However, some consumers may not care about
this feature and ignore it when making a purchase decision. Consumers ignoring
attribute information is commonly referred to as “attribute non-attendance” (ANA)
in fields of transportation science and health economics2. Let us assume that
around 20% of consumers do not care about the camera off switch (i.e., around
20% of ANA). We illustrate the potential distribution of preference parameters for
this feature in the left-hand panel of Figure 3.1. The dashed black line represents
the mean partworth utility (excluded zeros) and the solid black line – the density
of the actual preference distribution.
If we neglect the fact that some consumers do not care about the feature, the
uncovered (normal) distribution of preference parameters will be shifted, such that
the mean will be biased towards zero and the variance – overstated (the red line in
Figure 3.1). For simplicity, let us assume that all consumers have the same price
sensitivity. The preference distribution in Figure 3.1 will then directly represent the
distribution of consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP). Consequentially, the laptop
2As much of the relevant literature comes from these fields, for the rest of the paper, we adopt
this terminology.
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Figure 3.1. Potential biases when ignoring attribute non-attendance
manufacturer may overestimate the demand (as there is more mass on the positive
domain under the red line) but underestimate the average WTP. At the same time,
due to fatter tails of the implied distribution, the upper bound of the WTP may be
overestimated. It is easy to imagine that if the actual parameter distribution would
be further located to the right (i.e., further away from zero), we could expect an
increase in the magnitude of the bias in both the mean and the variance of implied
distribution when neglecting ANA. Similarly, an increase in the amount of ANA
may lead to an increase in the magnitude of the bias.
Now consider that the laptop manufacturer is also interested in understanding
preferences for display size of 14′′ vs. 15′′. Some consumers may prefer a smaller
screen, while others – a larger one. We illustrate this example by plotting preference
values on both positive and negative domains in the right-hand panel of Figure 3.1.
Again, let us assume around 20% of ANA that is captured by precisely zero utility
estimates. In this case, we do not observe much difference in the mean of the
implied distribution that neglects ANA (the red line) and the actual distribution
(the black line). However, the implied distribution has flatter tails and smaller
variance. With an increase in the amount of ANA, we can expect the the tails of
the implied distribution to get more flat, and the variance to get even smaller. As
a result, the manufacturer may underestimate the overall amount of heterogeneity
in preferences. Moreover, in efforts to target consumers with the highest WTP3 for
a particular display size (i.e., consumers on the tails of the preference distribution;
Allenby and Ginter 1995), the manufacturer might underestimate how much these
consumers are actually willing to pay.
ANA may arise due to various reasons. Consumers may ignore subsets of
product attributes as they do not find them relevant (Gilbride et al. 2006), or
they may be simplifying their decision due to its complexity and limited cognitive
resources (Payne et al. 1992). In any case, ANA violates one of the underlying
3Again, assuming that all consumers have the same price sensitivity, the preference distribution
in Figure 3.1 is a direct representation of the WTP distribution up to scale.
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assumptions we make when modeling choice behavior, the assumption of full
information processing. As different consumers may care about different subsets
of attributes, this leads to differences in the composition of the utility function
on the individual level. Identifying ANA and accounting for it in choice models is
important. As we illustrate in the simple example above, otherwise, the estimated
parameter distribution may be biased, leading to suboptimal marketing decisions.
Several approaches have been put forward that explicitly model ANA in marketing
literature and adjacent fields of operation research, transportation science, and
health economics. Some of these approaches only account for ANA but ignore
preference heterogeneity (e.g., Hole 2011). Others simultaneously account for both
ANA and preference heterogeneity (e.g., Gilbride et al. 2006; Hole et al. 2013). For
example, Gilbride et al. (2006) propose a heterogeneous variable selection model in
the Bayesian estimation framework. Hole et al. (2013) and Hess et al. (2013) apply
a latent class approach similar to the consideration set model by Swait and Ben-
Akiva (1987). Here, as many latent classes are defined as potential combinations of
subsets of attributes that may be ignored. Hence, each class describes a specific
attribute processing strategy. Maldonado et al. (2015) and Maldonado et al. (2017)
apply feature selection tools from machine learning, particularly support vector
machine algorithms, for inferring ANA.
In all these applications, models that account for ANA outperform their “stan-
dard” counterparts that operate under the assumption of full information processing.
Several applications have reported biases in the estimates that may arise when
models neglect ANA (e.g., Gilbride et al. 2006; Hess et al. 2013; Hole et al. 2013). In
particular, all the applications find that mean estimates of preference distribution
are biased towards zero in line with our simple illustration in Figure 3.1. Regarding
the biases in the variance, findings in previous literature do not allow any general-
izations. In a marketing application, Gilbride et al. (2006) find that the amount of
heterogeneity is predominantly understated. Due to the proprietary nature of the
data, we do not have information on the specific product category or attributes
in this application. By contrast, in applications in the field of transportation
science, where ANA is a much more prominent topic, often an overestimation of
the amount of heterogeneity is reported (e.g., Hess et al. 2013; Collins 2012). These
applications commonly deploy attributes for which a clear preference direction
can be expected (e.g., price or time). In marketing applications, these are often
attributes (as our example of the camera off switch feature for laptops) that allow
firms to differentiate their products vertically (Draganska and Jain 2006). However,
marketing applications also include such attributes as the brand, color, or as in our
example, display size for laptops, for which parameter distribution can span both
positive and negative domains. Such attributes allow firms to differentiate their
products horizontally (Draganska and Jain 2006). We expect that for these at-
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tributes, we would observe the variance and, therefore, the amount of heterogeneity
to be underestimated when neglecting ANA, as illustrated in our simple example
for display size of laptops (the right-hand panel in Figure 3.1). Therefore, this
paper aims to examine the direction and the magnitude of biases in the estimated
mean and variance of parameter distribution when ANA is neglected.
Furthermore, Hess et al. (2013) and Hole et al. (2013) outline that biases may
also arise when models account for ANA but neglect preference heterogeneity. In
particular, they find that assuming homogeneous preferences across respondents
may lead to an overstatement of ANA, as consumers with low sensitivity to an
attribute might be treated as having zero sensitivity. Hess et al. (2013) and Hole
et al. (2013), in their applications in the context of route choice and prescription
drug choice, respectively, find that after accounting for preference heterogeneity, the
amount of uncovered ANA either considerably decreases or completely diminishes.
By contrast, Gilbride et al. (2006), in an unknown product choice context, and
Yegoryan et al. (2020), in their application in the context of choices for coffee
makers and laptops, find probabilities of ANA that exceed 45%. Due to the limited
number of applications, it remains a question if ANA prevails in different marketing
contexts. In particular, there is a considerable variation when it comes to consumer
involvement, the stakes or financial risk of the purchase, and the complexity of
the decisions in marketing contexts. Hence, this paper aims to understand ANA’s
prevalence in different contexts, settings, and attributes.
In summary, in this paper, we aim at a deeper understanding of the potential
confounding of preference heterogeneity and ANA. In particular, our objective is
to shed more light on the direction and the magnitude of biases we can expect for
different types of attributes. Building upon previous literature and as outlined in
the illustrative example, we expect that the amount of ANA and the location of
the actual preference distribution with respect to zero will affect the magnitude of
the bias in the mean and both the direction and the magnitude of the bias in the
variance of preference distribution. For this purpose, we set out to compare various
models that account for neither preference heterogeneity nor ANA, only ANA or
preference heterogeneity, or both in different empirical applications. Our primary
focus is understanding the different patterns of preferences different models can
identify.
We utilize ten different datasets from choice-based conjoint (CBC) studies
conducted in the context of durable products (e.g., laptops), fast-moving-consumer
goods (e.g., packaged orange juice), as well as entertainment and experiential goods
and services (e.g., video-streaming services). Purchase decisions in these various
contexts carry different financial risks (choosing a package of orange juice is a low
stake decision compared to choosing a laptop). The datasets also include a different
number of attributes and therefore vary in the complexity of the decision. Consumer
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involvement and the stakes of the choice decision have long been recognized to affect
consumers’ information search (e.g., Laurent and Kapferer 1985), and, therefore,
may drive ANA. Furthermore, complexity and information overload may also
prompt consumers to ignore some information in the decision-making (e.g., Payne
et al. 1992, Bettman et al. 1998, Orquin et al. 2013). Hence, differences in these
characteristics of the datasets also enable us to examine the prevalence of ANA in
various purchase situations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe
the methodology, including the models we are interested in comparing and the
estimation procedure. In section 3.3, we start by presenting in more detail our
ten empirical applications and their characteristics. We then discuss our findings,
including the comparison of in- and out-of-sample model fit and the effects of
ignoring either preference heterogeneity or ANA. Finally, we outline managerial
implications and conclude with a summary and an outline of avenues for future
research.
3.2 Methodology
We start this section by describing the standard multinomial logit (MNL) model
(McFadden 1974). We then proceed to describe the models that build upon and
extend the MNL model to account for (flexible) forms of unobserved preference
heterogeneity and ANA (see Elshiewy et al. 2017 for a comprehensive review on
MNL models in marketing). We conclude the section by discussing the estimation
procedure.
3.2.1 Multinomial Logit Model
The utility individual i (i = 1, . . . , I) obtains from alternative j (j = 1, . . . ,J) in
choice task t (t= 1, . . . ,T ) is given by:
Uijt = xijt ·β+ ϵijt, (3.1)
where xijt is a K-dimensional row vector of attribute values describing alternative
j in choice task t for individual i, β is a column vector of corresponding preference
parameters, which are homogeneous across consumers, and ϵijt ∼ i.i.d type I
extreme value error term. Given the distributional assumptions of the error term,
the probability of individual i choosing alternative j in choice task t has the
following closed-form:
Pijt =
exp(xijt ·β)∑︁
j′∈J exp(xij′t ·β)
, (3.2)
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leading to the following likelihood function for individual i:
Li =
T∏︂
t=1
J∏︂
j=1
P
yijt
ijt , (3.3)
where yijt is a dummy indicating whether individual i chose the alternative j in
choice task t.
3.2.2 Models Accounting for Preference Heterogeneity
To account for unobserved preference heterogeneity, we can extend the MNL
model by assuming that preference parameters are individual-specific, which can
be denoted by adding the i index to βi in Equation (3.1). Assuming that βi
are draws from a particular continuous distribution (e.g., normal, log-normal,
truncated; McFadden and Train 2000, Train 2009) and retaining the distributional
assumptions on the error term, the mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model
is derived. As commonly done (Keane and Wasi 2013), we assume that βi is
distributed multivariate normal with mean β¯ and covariance Σ, i.e., βi ∼N(β¯,Σ)
with coefficients being constant over T .
In the MMNL model, choice probabilities are defined as
Pijt =
∫︂ exp(xijt ·βi)∑︁
j′∈J exp(xij′t ·βi)
ϕ(βi|β¯,Σ)dβi, (3.4)
and the likelihood function can be written as
Li =
∫︂ T∏︂
t=1
J∏︂
j=1
P
yijt
ijt ϕ(βi|β¯,Σ)dβi. (3.5)
Note that by setting all the elements of Σ to zero, the MMNL model reduces to
the standard MNL model with homogeneous preferences. The first applications
of the MMNL became only possible after the development of simulation methods
(McFadden and Train 2000). Since then, the MMNL model has replaced the MNL
model as the standard and become one of the most popular models used (Elshiewy
et al. 2017).
Further extensions of the model have been proposed that allow capturing even
more flexible forms of heterogeneity. We will mainly focus on the “mixed-mixed”
multinomial logit (MMMNL) model4, which assumes that the mixing distribution
of βi is a discrete mixture of normals, i.e., βi ∼N(β¯q,Σq) with wq as the probability
of class q (q = 1, . . . ,Q), ∑︁Qq=1wq = 1 and wq > 0 ∀q. Class probabilities wq can be
4We adopt the terminology used by Keane and Wasi (2013).
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modeled as:
wq =
exp(w∗q)
1+∑︁Qq=2 exp(w∗q) . (3.6)
where w∗q is a vector of class specific intercepts. Note that this specification ensures
that ∑︁Qq=1wq = 1 (Keane and Wasi 2013).
In the MMMNL model, the choice probability of individual i for alternative j in
the choice task t is a weighted sum across classes:
Pijt =
Q∑︂
q=1
wq ·
∫︂ exp(xijt ·βi|q)∑︁
j′∈J exp(xij′t ·βi|q)
ϕ(βi|q|β¯q,Σq)dβi|q, (3.7)
where ϕ(βi|q|β¯q,Σq) is the normal density with mean β¯q and Σq in class q. Hence,
the likelihood function for individual i is given by
Li =
Q∑︂
q=1
wq ·
∫︂ T∏︂
t=1
J∏︂
j=1
P
yijt
ijt ϕ(βi|q|β¯q,Σq)dβi|q. (3.8)
Note that the MMMNL model necessitates estimating additional (Q−1) class
parameters. If wq for all but one class tends to zero, the MMMNL model reduces
to the MMNL model. In general, the MMMNL can approximate any distribution
arbitrary well (Keane and Wasi 2013). It has been shown to outperform the MMNL
model both in- and out-of-sample (e.g., Keane and Wasi 2013, Rossi et al. 2005,
Burda et al. 2008, as well as Voleti et al. 2017). Moreover, Keane and Wasi (2013)
find that the MMMNL model can capture more “extreme” patterns of consumer
behavior, such as the use of lexicographic rules, as well as “random” behavior.
3.2.3 Models Accounting for Attribute Non-attendance
In this section, we describe the models that account for ANA. In particular, we start
with the endogenous attribute attendance (EAA) model proposed by Scarpa et al.
(2009) and Hole (2011). The EAA model is a confirmatory latent class approach
(Hess et al. 2013). It builds upon the MNL model but introduces a structure by a
priori defining latent classes, which describe all potential combinations of attribute
processing strategies, that can account for people ignoring some information. Given
K attributes, 2K latent classes are defined. In each class s (s = 1, . . . ,S), the
specific attribute processing strategy can be described by a K-dimensional column
vector λs= [λs1, . . . ,λsK ]′, where λsk is a dummy indicating whether class s included
attribute k (λsk =1) or not (λsk =0). Accordingly, the model implies a class-specific
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utility function:
Uijt|s = xijt ·βs+ ϵijt, (3.9)
with βs = λs ◦β, τs as the probability of class s, ∑︁Ss=1 τs = 1, and τs > 0 ∀s. As in
Equation (3.1), β is a column vector of preference parameters. However, through the
elementwise multiplication (denoted by ◦) with the indicator vector λs, parameters
for attributes that are not included in class s are set to zero, resulting in a class-
specific vector of parameters βs. For accommodating categorical attributes, effects
coding should be used5. Moreover, as now multiple elements in xijt will be related
to an attribute, the λs vector should be extended and mapped onto the correct
parameter dimensions. If attribute k is ignored, then all its mk levels are ignored,
and all the corresponding λs elements should be set to zero.
As parameters are switched on and off, a different linear (additive) utility function
characterizes each class. The EAA model accommodates several decision rules,
including full compensatory, when all attributes are attended, semi-compensatory,
when two or more but not all attributes are attended, (a probabilistic version of)
lexicographic rule, when only one attribute is attended, and the random choice,
when none of the attributes is attended.
Retaining the distributional assumptions of the error term, the choice probability
of individual i of alternative j in choice task t is now conditional on class s:
Pijt|s =
exp(xijt ·βs)∑︁
j′∈J exp(xij′t ·βs)
. (3.10)
We can, of course, define the submodel of class probabilities as in Equation (3.6).
However, it would require estimating (S − 1) additional class parameters. As
S = 2K , it is increasing exponentially with the increase in the number of attributes.
Already with K = 6 attributes, a typical case in CBC studies (Rao 2014), we would
end up with 63 additional parameters. Such operationalization may reduce model
stability and result in only marginal improvements in fit due to loss of parsimony
(Hess et al. 2013).
In contrast, we follow Hole (2011) and make a more restrictive assumption that
the probability of attending one attribute is independent of the probability of
attending another attribute. While such an assumption, which Hole (2011) refers to
as independence of attribute attendance (IAA) assumption, may seem restrictive,
it results in a more parsimonious model. More specifically, by utilizing the IAA
5Note that dummy coding for categorical attributes is not appropriate in these types of models
(Gilbride et al. 2006). The zero value of the preference parameter has a particular meaning in
the EAA model, which is the attribute is ignored. In the case of dummy coding, though, the
estimate of the base level is automatically set to zero.
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assumption, we can model the class probabilities τs as a mapping from attribute
attendance probabilities πk, which are parametrized as a logistic function:
τs =
K∏︂
k=1
πλskk · (1−πk)1−λsk , with πk =
exp(γ)
1+exp(γ) , (3.11)
where γ is a K-dimensional row vector of attribute-specific intercepts. The specifi-
cation in Equation (3.11) is closely related to the model of choice set heterogeneity
of Swait and Ben-Akiva (1987), as well as to concomitant latent class models of
Kamakura et al. (1994). In general, it is possible to include individual-specific
covariates in the submodel of class probabilities. For example, Hole et al. (2013)
and Collins et al. (2013) use the respondents’ stated measure of ANA, Yegoryan
et al. (2020) use a visual attention measure derived from eye tracking.
We can write the unconditional choice probability as a weighted sum of class-
specific choice probabilities defined in Equation (3.10):
Pijt =
S∑︂
s=1
τs ·Pijt|s, (3.12)
and the likelihood of individual i as
Li =
S∑︂
s=1
τs ·
T∏︂
t=1
J∏︂
j=1
P
yijt
ijt|s. (3.13)
By setting τs = 1 for the class where all attributes are attended, the EAA model
reduces to the MNL. Hence, the EAA model nests the MNL at the boundary
condition γ→∞.
The EAA model can be further extended to account for both attribute non-
attendance and preference heterogeneity. In particular, we follow Hess et al. (2013)
and Hole et al. (2013), and assume that preference parameters are distributed
multivariate normal (i.e., βi ∼ (β¯,Σ)) across the latent classes.
While the parameter distribution is common across the latent classes, each class
is related to a different subset of attended attributes and, therefore, has a different
vector of parameters due to elementwise multiplication with γs: βi|s= βi◦γs. Hence,
the choice probabilities can be written as
Pijt =
S∑︂
s=1
τs ·
∫︂ exp(xijt ·βi|s)∑︁
j′∈J exp(xij′t ·βi|s)
ϕ(βi|β¯,Σ)dβi, (3.14)
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and the likelihood of individual i as
Li =
S∑︂
s=1
τs ·
∫︂ T∏︂
t=1
J∏︂
j=1
P
yijt
ijt|sϕ(βi|β¯,Σ)dβi. (3.15)
Note that by setting all elements of Σ to zero, the MEAA model reduces to the
EAA model. By setting τs = 1 for the class where all attributes are included, the
MEAA model reduces to the MMNL model. Lastly, applying both restrictions,
reduces the MEAA model to the bare bones MNL model, with neither type of
heterogeneity accommodated. The MEAA model has some similarities to the
MMMNL model, as both should be able to capture lexicographic and random
choice behavior. However, the MMMNL and the MEAA models may excel at
capturing different patterns in preference distribution. The MEAA model is
specifically designed to capture and disentangle the genuinely zero estimates. On
the other hand, the MMMNL may be better at identifying cases where the preference
distribution is multi-modal.
3.2.4 Estimation Procedure
We split all the datasets into estimation (training) and holdout (validation) samples.
More specifically, for each respondent in each dataset, we randomly selected two
choice tasks as holdout tasks. For each of the datasets, we estimated five models,
MNL, EAA, MMNL, MEAA, and MMMNL, using the corresponding training
sample. For statistical inference, we employed maximum likelihood estimation
with sample log-likelihood LL(θ) =∑︁i∈I ln(Li), where Li denotes the likelihood of
individual i given by Equation (3.3), (3.13), (3.5), (3.15), and (3.8) for the MNL,
EAA, MMNL, MEAA, and MMMNL models, respectively. θ represents the vector
of parameters to be estimated. To retain parsimony, for heterogeneous models,
we used a diagonal specification of Σ. For MMMNL models, we specified Q =
2 classes6. Note that in the case of heterogeneous models, an integration over
the density of taste parameters is required for which we adopted the simulated
maximum likelihood approach using 500 Halton draws and gradient-based Broyden-
Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm (Train 2009).
We have tested multiple starting values for the models and report the one with
the best log-likelihood value. As MMMNL models are prone to pick up extreme
behavior and result in unrealistically large parameter values (Keane and Wasi
2013), we applied similar constraints to the parameter values as in Keane and Wasi
(2013) post estimation. More specifically, we consider only the subset of the models
estimated based on different starting values, in which absolute values of the utility
6We have tested the Q = 3 specification as well. However, we did not find improvements in BIC
for any of the datasets. Also Keane and Wasi (2013) find that in many other applications of the
MMMNL two-class specification usually results in better BIC.
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estimates (both mean and standard deviation) do not exceed 20 and class weights
are within (−5,5) interval (i.e., the class probability is at least around 1%).
For the out-of-sample predictions, we use individual-level conditional estimates
in all models, except for the MNL. In the MNL model, all preference parameters are
homogeneous across the sample. For the heterogeneous models, we employ Bayes’
rule to condition on the observed choices and compute the posterior means of the
individual-level preference parameters βpost.i (see Train 2009, ch.11 for details).
Correspondingly, for the MMNL model, individual-level parameters are given by
βpost.i =
∫︁
βi
∏︁T
t=1
∏︁J
j=1P
yijt
ijt ϕ(βi|β¯,Σ)dβi∫︁ ∏︁T
t=1
∏︁J
j=1P
yijt
ijt ϕ(βi|β¯,Σ)dβi
, (3.16)
and in the MMMNL model by
βpost.i =
Q∑︂
q=1
wiq ·
∫︁
βi|q
∏︁T
t=1
∏︁J
j=1P
yijt
ijt|qϕ(βi|q|β¯q,Σq)dβi|q∫︁ ∏︁T
t=1
∏︁J
j=1P
yijt
ijt|qϕ(βi|q|β¯q,Σq)dβi|q
. (3.17)
In the case of the EAA and the MEAAmodels, the vector of preference parameters
is (also) conditional on the individual’s class allocation:
τpost.is =
τs ·Li|s∑︁
s′∈S τs′ ·Li|s′
. (3.18)
As the central behavioral assumption of the ANA models (i.e., the EAA and the
MEAA), is that each individual has a specific attribute processing strategy, we
opt for a nonoverlapping segmentation and assign each individual to the class s∗
with the highest value of τpost.is (cf. Desarbo et al. 1995). We then compute the
individual-level conditional estimates as
βpost.i = λis∗ ◦ β¯, (3.19)
for the EAA model. For the MEAA model:
βpost.is∗ =
∫︁
βis∗
∏︁T
t=1
∏︁J
j=1P
yijt
ijt|s∗ϕ(βi|β¯,Σ)dβi∫︁ ∏︁T
t=1
∏︁J
j=1P
yijt
ijt|s∗ϕ(βi|β¯,Σ)dβi
. (3.20)
Yegoryan et al. (2020) show that such “crisp” segmentation works rather well:
despite the high number of classes, most of the time, the posterior probabilities
strongly favor one class for an individual.
For the MMNL, MMMNL, and MEAA models, we again employ simulation
methods with Halton draws to approximate the integrals in Equations (3.16), (3.17),
and (3.20), respectively.
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3.3 Empirical Applications
3.3.1 Data
For the empirical application, we utilize a broad set of ten different datasets from
CBC studies on different product categories, including fast-moving consumer goods
(FMCG) such as smoothies and packaged orange juice, entertainment and experi-
ential products and services such as video-streaming services, basketball tickets,
(student) parties, and holiday destinations, as well as consumer electronics such as
electric kettles, laptops, tablets, and cameras.7 These studies differ significantly
in terms of the financial risk or stakes of the decision in question. For example,
in the case of electronic goods in our set, laptops, tablets, and cameras are more
expensive: priced up to $749, 550e, and $279 in the studies, respectively. On the
other hand, electric kettles are priced up to $80 in the study. Hence, we classify
the former three as relatively high-risk categories, and the latter as a relatively
low-risk category. In a similar vein, the choice of holiday destinations, which costs
up to $1200 in the study, is a high-stake decision.
In contrast, smoothies and orange juices, which are priced up to 1.99e and
1.89e in the studies, respectively, we consider being relatively low-risk categories.
Regarding entertainment goods, we argue that the choice of a video-streaming
service, with alternatives priced up to $12.99, and which party to attend, with
alternatives priced up to 7e, is a relatively low-stake decision. In contrast, basketball
tickets are priced up to 30e in the study. We, therefore, are more inclined to
classify the latter as a relatively high-risk category.
Our classification provides us with more context to investigate the patterns of
ANA across different datasets. Moreover, price, which indicates the financial risk
of the purchase, is related to product category involvement (Laurent and Kapferer
1985). Several of the developed scales for measuring involvement that account for
its multifaceted nature, e.g., in Laurent and Kapferer (1985), Jain and Srinivasan
(1990), and McQuarrie and Michael (1986), include risk as an essential dimension.
Furthermore, within each (high or low) risk or stake classification, the studies
vary in the number of attributes ranging from 3 to 8. The number of attributes
serves as an indicator of the degree of complexity of the decision task (Dellaert
et al. 2012). Of course, other important factors contribute to the complexity of the
decision task, such as the number of alternatives, the number of attribute levels,
the similarity of the alternatives (Dellaert et al. 2012). However, as in CBC studies
7Please note that except for Parties and Electric kettles, all other datasets have been formerly
published. For more details on these studies, we kindly refer the reader to the respective source
highlighted in Table 3.1.
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Category Source Risk/Stake Attributes (No. levels) ANA- No. Alt. Obs. = id × cs
Classes
1. Smoothies Paetz and Steiner (2017) low 3 attr.: brand (4), price (4), 8 3 + none 8910 = 495×18
packaging (4)
2. Orange juice Paetz and Guhl (2017) low 4 attr.: brand (4), price (4), 16 3 + none 5472 = 342×16
packaging (2), fairtrade label (2)
3. Video-stream- Glasgow and Butler (2017) low 5 attr.: privacy policy (3), price (4), 32 4 + none 2860 = 260×11
ing services catalog size (3), fast content (2),
commercials shown (2)
4. Parties our dataset low 6 attr.: location (6), drinks (3), 64 3 + none 2120 = 212×10
dress code (2), specials (3),
music (4), price (2)
5. Electric our dataset low 7 attr.: brand (3), capacity (3), 128 3 + none 2624 = 164×16
kettles material (3), power (2),
variable temperature (2),
Amazon rating (3), price (4)
6. Basketball Schlereth and Skiera (2017) high 3 attr.: price category (4), price (4), 8 4 + none 1920 = 160×12
tickets additional features (3)
7. Laptops Liu and Tang (2015) high 4 attr.: display size (3), memory (3), 16 3 1800 = 120×15
hard drive (3), price (3)
8. Tablets Schlereth and Skiera (2017) high 6 attr.: brand (3), price (4), 64 3 + none 2484 = 207×12
display size (2),
battery (2), resolution (2),
storage capacity (3)
9. Cameras Allenby et al. (2014) high 7 attr.: brand (4), pixel (2), zoom (2), 128 4 + none 5312 = 332×16
video (2), swivel (2), WiFi (2),
price (5)
10. Holiday Keane and Wasi (2013) high 8 attr.: airline (2), local tours (2), 256 2 5296 = 331×16
destinations destination (2), length of
stay (2), meal inclusion (2),
peak season (2), price (2),
accommodation (2)
Table 3.1. Sources and characteristics of the datasets
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using 3-4 alternatives is rather common (Rao 2014), we focus on the number of
attributes as one primary driver of complexity8.
In summary, the ten datasets allow us to descriptively investigate whether ANA
prevails and how it varies across different product categories and settings. We
summarize the main characteristics and the sources of the datasets in Table 3.1
(for details on the attribute levels see Appendix A).
Both CBC studies, on choices of parties and electric kettles, have been designed
and administered using Sawtooth Software.9 The CBC study on parties was
conducted in 2010 at a large German university using a convenience sample of
students. The CBC study in the context of electric kettles was conducted in
December 2019 - January 2020, using a crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical
Turk.10 To ensure the quality of the responses, in the case of the Electric kettles
dataset, we have used a qualification question, which required the respondents to
solve a simple math problem at the very beginning of the questionnaire, as well as
three attention questions evenly distributed across the questionnaire. We have only
included respondents who passed the qualification question, answered correctly to
all three attention questions, and took more than one minute (the 5%-Quantile in
the response time) to complete all the choice tasks.
For formerly published datasets, we have used the data pruning steps reported
by the authors where this was necessary. Note that some but not all datasets
include holdout tasks. To ensure we retain consistency across datasets, we have
only included the main tasks in our analysis. Furthermore, in all datasets, we have
additionally excluded respondents who have selected the “none” option in all the
main tasks.11 In Table 3.1, we report the number of respondents after the data
pruning and the number of main choice tasks (initial holdout tasks excluded).
8From hereon, we use complexity and the number of attributes as equivalents.
9In both cases, we used complete enumeration as a method for generating random tasks, which
ensures minimal overlap between concepts in a task and strives for the most nearly orthogonal
design (Sawtooth Software 2017). Additionally, multiple versions have been generated and
randomized between respondents.
10We recruited participants on this platform that resided in the US and had more than 1000
HITs approved with a 95% approval rating. The respondents have been paid fair compensation
for their time computed based on an $8 hourly wage.
11Accordingly, we excluded one respondent in the Electric kettles and Parties datasets, two
respondents in the Smoothie dataset, and seven respondents in the Tablets dataset.
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3.3.2 Model Comparison
We compare the estimated models’ in-sample performance in terms of the log-
likelihood (LL) values and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC)12, which
penalizes for model complexity. We summarize the results in Table 3.2.
In all datasets, as expected, the MNL is the worst performing model in terms of
both LL and BIC. Accounting for either ANA or preference heterogeneity substan-
tially increases the in-sample model performance: both EAA and MMNL models
outperform the MNL model indicated by both LL and BIC. However, accounting
only for preference heterogeneity yields greater in-sample improvements than ac-
counting only for ANA across our ten datasets: the MMNL model outperforms
the EAA model for all datasets. Nevertheless, accommodating both ANA and
preference heterogeneity is essential: the MEAA model outperforms both the EAA
model and the MMNL model. In particular, the MEAA model outperforms the
MMNL in terms of LL in all ten and BIC in 8 out of 10 datasets. For the datasets
Parties and Laptops, the BIC of the MEAA model is only respectively 1.280 and
5.158 points higher than the BIC of the MMNL model. According to Raftery
(1995), only a difference of more than 10 points provides evidence to favor the
model with better BIC.
Even when considering the MMMNL model, which accommodates a more flexible
pattern of preference heterogeneity, we see that 8 out of 10 times the MEAA model
is the best based on BIC and 2 out of 10 times also based on LL. It is notable
that while the MMMNL model is mostly the best in LL, the difference in LL
between the MMMNL and the MEAA models is not large. Considering the small
improvements in LL and a rather substantial increase in the number of parameters
in the MMMNL model, it is no surprise that the MEAA model does much better
on BIC, i.e., when we penalize for model complexity.
Furthermore, the out-of-sample predictive validity measured by hit rate and hit
probability is presented in Table 3.3. The results uncover some interesting patterns.
First, the models that account for ANA (i.e., the EAA and the MEAA), considerably
outperform their counterparts that only account for preference heterogeneity (i.e.,
the MNL and MMNL). In particular, the EAA model has a much higher hit rate
(mean difference of 17 percentage points (PP)) and hit probability (mean difference
of 10PP) in all datasets compared to the MNL model. Also, the MEAA model
mostly outperforms the MMNL: in 8 out of 10 times in hit rate (mean difference
of 4PP) and in all cases in hit probability (mean difference of 3PP). Second, the
EAA model outperforms all the models in two datasets in the hit rate (Laptops
12Note that BIC can be used for the comparison of non-nested models. As MEAA model nests
MNL, EAA, MMNL at the boundary of the parameter space, and MEAA and MMMNL are
not nested, the log-likelihood ratio test is not applicable (McLachlan and Peel 2000).
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Dataset MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Smoothies LL −7931.836 −6945.037 −6233.871 −5863.345 −5806.924
BIC 15935.457 13988.779 12611.311 11897.179 11909.960
(8) (11) (16) (19) (33)
Orange juice LL −5083.525 −4575.238 −4049.225 −3880.148 −3836.181
BIC 10226.366 9243.689 8217.085 7912.826 7918.105
(7) (11) (14) (18) (29)
Video-streaming LL −3591.151 −3278.248 −3264.935 −3167.175 −3161.749
services BIC 7244.365 6657.350 6653.997 6497.266 6579.509
(8) (13) (16) (21) (33)
Parties LL −2016.365 −1924.861 −1771.785 −1750.117 −1713.113
BIC 4144.269 4005.879 3766.651 3767.931 3879.824
(15) (21) (30) (36) (61)
Electric LL −2380.627 −1963.627 −1870.294 −1753.577 −1780.361
kettles BIC 4854.121 4074.293 3926.323 3747.061 3939.930
(12) (19) (24) (31) (49)
Basketball LL −1959.438 −1561.666 −1370.051 −1350.408 −1303.796
tickets BIC 3976.114 3202.033 2854.576 2836.755 2843.694
(8) (11) (16) (19) (33)
Laptops LL −1239.081 −1034.992 −992.023 −979.897 −969.003
BIC 2529.628 2150.861 2086.979 2092.137 2151.227
(7) (11) (14) (18) (29)
Tablets LL −2414.468 −2142.529 −1952.786 −1926.379 −1846.543
BIC 4897.653 4399.588 4043.007 4036.004 3975.592
(9) (15) (18) (24) (37)
Cameras LL −5701.867 −4958.032 −4341.663 −4131.948 −4145.621
BIC 11488.175 10059.614 8852.210 8491.890 8637.455
(10) (17) (20) (27) (41)
Holiday LL −2686.871 −2395.588 −2262.399 −2172.046 −2160.810
destinations BIC 5441.272 4926.234 4659.856 4546.680 4600.179
(8) (16) (16) (24) (33)
Frequency:
Best LL 0 0 0 2 8
Best BIC 0 0 2 7 1
Notes: The number of parameters in each model for each dataset is presented in parentheses.
Values in bold indicate the best performing model for a given dataset based on a given criterion
(LL or BIC).
Table 3.2. Model comparison: In-sample measures
and Holiday destinations). Potentially, such a result indicates that in these cases
understanding whether an attribute is ignored or not, i.e., whether the parameter
is zero or not, is more informative than trying to estimate the precise values of
non-zero parameters. This could happen if the actual amount of heterogeneity is
rather small. Third, the MEAA model mostly remains the best performing model
out-of-sample: it outperforms all the models in hit rate and hit probability in 5
and 7 out of 10 cases, respectively. In six cases, when the MEAA is superior to
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Dataset MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Smoothies hit rate 0.582 0.756 0.740 0.787 0.765
hit probability 0.466 0.556 0.662 0.704 0.700
Orange juice hit rate 0.572 0.658 0.734 0.778 0.753
hit probability 0.436 0.528 0.655 0.697 0.689
Video-streaming hit rate 0.356 0.740 0.481 0.760 0.483
services hit probability 0.236 0.329 0.360 0.408 0.388
Parties hit rate 0.498 0.594 0.623 0.594 0.597
hit probability 0.356 0.431 0.520 0.558 0.532
Electric hit rate 0.543 0.683 0.729 0.768 0.726
kettles hit probability 0.423 0.540 0.639 0.678 0.650
Basketball hit rate 0.316 0.659 0.662 0.647 0.678
tickets hit probability 0.230 0.411 0.584 0.592 0.613
Laptops hit rate 0.633 0.767 0.746 0.758 0.746
hit probability 0.528 0.654 0.700 0.712 0.713
Tablets hit rate 0.536 0.606 0.664 0.667 0.679
hit probability 0.378 0.480 0.576 0.598 0.611
Cameras hit rate 0.489 0.616 0.700 0.732 0.732
hit probability 0.362 0.464 0.607 0.645 0.638
Holiday hit rate 0.701 0.831 0.802 0.816 0.811
destinations hit probability 0.603 0.690 0.751 0.769 0.766
Frequency:
Best hit rate 0 2 1 5 3
Best hit probability 0 0 0 7 3
Notes: Values in bold indicate the best performing model for a given dataset based on
a given criterion (hit rate or hit probability).
Table 3.3. Model comparison: Out-of-sample measures
the MMMNL model, it offers an average of 6PP better hit rate – a considerably
larger margin than the 1PP average improvement of the MMMNL model in the
other four cases. A similar pattern holds for the comparison of the MEAA and the
MMNL models.
Furthermore, the models accounting for ANA are superior both in- and out-
of-sample in categories we have classified as low-risk/stake, except for Parties,
where the MMNL outperforms the MEAA model. For categories of high-risk/stake,
the ANA models outperform in cases of higher complexity (Cameras and Holiday
destinations). It appears that understanding which attributes are, in fact, in
the utility function is more critical for low-stake as well as high-stake and high-
complexity settings. This result is in line with our expectations, as consumers
may search for less information in low-stake settings (Laurent and Kapferer 1985)
and simplify their decisions by ignoring attribute information in high-complexity
settings (Payne et al. 1992).
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3.3.3 Effects of Ignoring Preference Heterogeneity
To investigate possible biases due to ignoring preference heterogeneity while
accommodating ANA, we compare the average attribute attendance probabilities,
and the probability distribution of the number of attributes attended within the
EAA and MEAA models computed based on Equation (3.11). These, along with
corresponding confidence intervals, for both models are presented in Figure 3.2 and
3.3, respectively.13
First, from Figure 3.2, it is apparent that across all datasets, none of the attributes
has exactly 0% or 100% attendance probability. This is in line with finding in
Yegoryan et al. (2020) but in contrast to the results in Hess et al. (2013) and Hole
et al. (2013). We observe some attributes with tiny attendance probabilities for
more complex decisions (e.g., in Electric kettles and Holiday destinations datasets).
Moreover, similar attributes (e.g., price or brand) in different applications have
somewhat different attendance probabilities (i.e., they are application-specific).
However, in most of the applications, price is one of the attributes with the highest
attendance probabilities (50% or more according to the MEAA model).
Second, in line with previous literature (e.g., Hess et al. 2013, Hole et al. 2013,
Yegoryan et al. 2020), ignoring preference heterogeneity results in a downward
bias of attribute attendance probabilities. On average, the difference in attribute
attendance probabilities between the MEAA and the EAA models across all datasets
is 18.25PP (p < 0.001). However, in some cases, we do not observe a significant
difference in particular attribute attendance probabilities between the two models
(illustrated by very close mean values and overlapping confidence intervals). For
example, the latter holds for all attributes but the price in the Video-streaming
services dataset, or for three attributes (brand, capacity, and power) in the Electric
kettles dataset. Nevertheless, in contrast to Hess et al. (2013) and Hole et al.
(2013) (applications in the context of route and prescription medication choice,
respectively), and, in line with Yegoryan et al. (2020) (application in the context
of laptop and coffee-makers choice), in neither of our ten applications does ANA
completely diminish after accounting for preference heterogeneity.
Also, the downward bias in the attribute attendance probabilities results in a
shift of the probability distribution of the number of attributes attended to the
right when we account for preference heterogeneity (see Figure 3.3). The only two
cases where we do not observe such a shift are in the datasets of Video-streaming
services and Electric kettles. On average, the mode of the distribution increases
from the EAA to the MEAA model by 1.1 (p < 0.01), and the ratio of the average
13We have used parametric bootstrapping using 10.000 draws to generate the average attribute
attendance and the average probability of attending a certain number of attributes based on
the asymptotic distribution of class parameters γˆ presented in Appendix A.
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Figure 3.2. Average attribute attendance probabilities
number of attributes considered to the number of available attributes increases by
18.45PP (p < 0.01) across all datasets.
As we have established that not accounting for preference heterogeneity results in
biases in the amount of identified attribute non-attendance, we focus on the results
of the MEAA model. Several critical observations can be made from Figure 3.3.
First, across all datasets, only a very small proportion of respondents relies on
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Figure 3.3. Probability of attending a certain number of attributes
random choice. The only exception is the Video-streaming services dataset, where
we see around 18.13% probability of a random choice. Second, a much larger share
of respondents incorporates all the available attributes in the decision in datasets
of low versus high complexity (average of 28.88% vs. 3.69%). We also see that the
proportion of respondents incorporating all attributes into the decision-making is
substantially higher for the low complexity and high-risk/stake categories (average
of 37.26% across the datasets of Basketball tickets and Laptops) vs. low complexity
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and low-risk/stake categories (average of 12.12% across the datasets of Smoothies
and Orange juice). However, we do not observe a substantial difference when we
consider the high-complexity settings.
Second, the average ratio of the number of attributes attended to the number
of the available attributes substantially decreases in the high complexity settings
(average difference of 70.78% vs. 47.75%, p < 0.05). On average, this ratio is also
higher in high-risk/stake settings (60.26% vs. 46.25%). However, the difference in
means is not statistically significant. The latter is mainly driven by the Parties
dataset, for which the MMNL was the best fitting model and for which the
preference heterogeneity potentially plays a more critical role. We can observe this
descriptively in the probability distributions of the number of attributes attended
in Figure 3.3.
Third, a slightly larger proportion of respondents tends to use lexicographic rule
(i.e., consider only one attribute) in low- vs. high-risk/stake settings (right vs. left
panel in Figure 3.3). The probability of attending only one attribute is particularly
high in the Video-streaming services (42.73%) and Smoothies (31.11%) datasets,
followed by the Electric kettles (19.77%), Basketball tickets (16.61%), and Orange
juice (12.42%). For the rest of the datasets, the probability of attending only one
attribute ranges between 1-5%.
3.3.4 Effects of Ignoring Attribute Non-attendance
Next, we turn to the de facto standard situation in current marketing literature
when preference heterogeneity is accounted for while the analyst ignores ANA. To
understand the potential consequences of ignoring ANA, we compare the mean
and the standard deviation of the preference parameters implied by the MMNL
and the MEAA model. Due do differing fit, and therefore, differing scales, we
cannot directly compare the estimates of these models (Huber and Train 2001). To
circumvent this issue, we regress the individual-level conditional estimates in the
MEAA model on those of the (M)MMNL model (e.g., Frischknecht et al. 2014) and
use the slope parameter as a rescaling factor (for details see Appendix B), which
we apply for both population- and individual-level estimates.
First, we seek to examine the potential biases that may arise due to ignoring
ANA on the population level. Here, we only compare the MEAA and the MMNL
models, as the first moments of the MMMNL distribution are not informative in
such comparison.14 In particular, we check in how many cases we encounter biases
in our hypothesized direction. Recall, we hypothesized that the direction of the
bias would depend on the share of ANA and the true preference distribution. We
14We will include a comparison with the MMMNL model when we examine the distribution of
individual-level conditional estimates.
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expect that failing to accommodate ANA, contingent upon ANA occurring (i.e.,
a share of respondents ignoring some attributes in the decision-making) would
bias 1) the mean estimate of the preference distribution towards zero regardless of
the characteristics of the true distribution, 2) the estimated variance (or standard
deviation) upwards when the true distribution lies further away from zero, leading
to an overestimation of the amount of preference heterogeneity in the population,
3) bias the estimated variance (or standard deviation) downwards when the true
distribution includes zero (i.e., spans on both positive and negative domains),
leading to an underestimation of the amount of preference heterogeneity in the
population.
While we do not know the true preference distribution in the population, we
acknowledge that the MEAA model, which accounts for both preference hetero-
geneity and ANA, outperforms the MMNL model in the majority of the empirical
applications (see section 3.3.2). Subsequently, we treat the results of the MEAA
model to be closer to the truth and use it as a benchmark. To understand the
direction of the bias in the variance (or standard deviation), we use the estimates
of the mean and the standard deviation of the MEAA model to classify where the
zero lies with respect to the implied preference distribution: within first and third
quartiles, between the quartiles and the whiskers, or outside the whiskers15 (for a
simulated example see Figure 3.4).
We summarize the frequency and the percentage of occurrence of each of the
expected biases in Table 3.416. In the majority of cases, we do indeed see that the
mean preference parameters in the MMNL are biased towards zero (column 2 in
Table 3.4), which is very much in line with the previous findings (e.g., Collins 2012).
There are only a few exceptions to this rule across our empirical applications. Four
occur when the zero lies within the first and third quartiles of the “true” (MEAA)
distribution, and one – when the zero is between the quartiles and the whiskers.
Notably, the amount of ANA in all the five cases is not too large: ranging from
11.67% - 32.87%, with an average of 23.87%. In comparison, for the rest of the
cases, the amount of ANA ranges from 9.70% - 97.23%, with an average of 50.09%.
Our results provide further support that ignoring ANA results in biased estimates
of the mean of the preference distribution. While we cannot generalize, we do
see some (descriptive) indication that not only the amount of ANA but also the
location of the true preference distribution with respect to zero affect the magnitude
of the bias in the mean. More specifically, the closer the true mean to zero, the
lower the bias in the MMNL mean estimate.
15The whiskers are computed as the distance of 1.5 times the interquantile range above (below)
of the upper (lower) quartile.
16The plots of the MEAA estimates against the MMNL estimates for each of the datasets are
presented in Appendix C.
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Figure 3.4. Classification of the location of the distribution with respect to zero
Regarding the bias in the variance, the results in Table 3.4 provide support
for at least one of our hypothesized directions. In 100% of the cases where zero
lies within the first and third quartiles, we see a downward bias in the standard
deviations of preference distribution in the MMNL. The ANA probability varies
in these cases from 11.67%-91.18%, with an average of 49.77%. If the zero lies
outside of quartiles (rows 5 and 6 in Table 3.4), the results are split. For 19 out of
57 parameters (33.33% of cases), the estimates of the standard deviation in the
MMNL have an upward bias (compared to the MEAA model results). These cases
are consistent with our expected direction of the bias. However, for most of the
parameters (66.67%), we observe a downward bias in the MMNL estimates of the
standard deviation.
Parameter In MEAA, 0 lies... Downward bias Upward bias
(|MMNL|< |MEAA|) (|MMNL|> |MEAA|)
Mean ...within quartiles 23 (85.19%) 4 (14.81%)
...between quartiles 41 (97.62%) 1 (2.38%)and whiskers
...outside of whiskers 15 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%)
SD ...within quartiles 27 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%)
...between quartiles 29 (69.05%) 13 (30.95%)and whiskers
...outside of whiskers 9 (60.00%) 6 (40.00%)
Table 3.4. Frequency and the direction of biases when ignoring attribute non-
attendance
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To better understand the various patterns we observe in the population-level
estimates, we now turn to examine the distribution of the individual-level estimates
across different models. This is particularly helpful in understanding the differences
in the uncovered preference patterns across the models (Keane and Wasi 2013). As
we are more specifically interested in understanding the different cases of under-
and overestimation of the preference heterogeneity when ignoring ANA, we plot
the distribution of the individual-level estimates for selected cases in Figure 3.5.
In addition to the MMNL and the MEAA models, we also include the MMMNL
results17.
All three attributes presented on the left panel have a relatively higher share of
ANA (as identified by the MEAA model) relative to those presented on the right
panel. The upper panel contains continuous attributes, which is the price in all ten
applications. While, economically speaking, all else being equal, consumers should
prefer lower prices, in the two presented cases in the upper panel of Figure 3.5, we
observe some individuals with a positive price coefficient in the MMNL and the
MMMNL models. This is a common problem that can arise for several reasons,
including design errors in the CBC study, use of price as a proxy for quality, or
due to normality assumption coupled with only limited data available for each
individual (Allenby et al. 2014). One possible way to circumvent the issue is to
impose sign constraints (Allenby et al. 2014). By contrast, instances of positive
price coefficients are either completely diminished or substantially reduces in the
MEAA model. This is a general pattern across our applications. More specifically,
the MMNL and the MMMNL produce positive price coefficients in 9 out of 10, while
the MEAA only in 5 datasets. On average, 6.94% and 7.78% of the sample have
a positive price coefficient in the MMNL and the MMMNL models, respectively,
compared to only 1.07% in the MEAA model. Hence, some of the resulting positive
price coefficients in models accounting only for preference heterogeneity (MMNL
and MMMNL) may be driven by people simply ignoring price when making choices
in CBC settings. The MEAA model identifies, on average, 32% and 10% probability
of ignoring price in the datasets of Smoothies and Cameras presented in Figure 3.5.
In both cases, the disregard of ANA results in an overestimation of the amount of
heterogeneity in the MMNL and the MMMNL models. We also observe a more
substantial difference in the range of the distribution between the MEAA and the
(M)MMNL models in Smoothies vs. Cameras. In the case of Smoothies, both ANA
probability is higher, and the distribution is further away from the zero. Both
factors may drive the magnitude of the bias.
The pattern of the distribution in the middle panel of Figure 3.5 is very similar
to the one discussed above. However, here we present product features, which
allow vertical differentiation. For such features, one could expect a clear direction
17Both the MMNL and the MMMNL estimates are rescaled. For details see Appendix B.
80 CHAPTER 3. WHEN ZEROS COUNT
of preferences. For instance, in the case of video-streaming services, no rational
consumer should prefer commercials to be shown (the left-hand middle panel in
Figure 3.5). The MEAA model clearly identifies such a pattern. We find that a
large proportion is indifferent: the average probability of ANA is 83%. The rest
derives disutility from commercials.
The suggested pattern of preference distribution is different in the MMNL model.
The large share of respondents that do not pay attention to this attribute has
shifted the whole preference distribution towards zero. As a result, according to the
MMNL model, we find people that have positive estimates, i.e., prefer commercials
to be shown. Allowing for more flexibility also does not resolve the issue. The
MMMNL fits two distributions: for one larger class tightly distributed around zero
(with mean = -0.03 and sd = 0.27, see Table 3.7 in Appendix A) and another
smaller class with a flatter distribution away from zero (with mean = -1.15 and sd
= 1.33). As a result, we still see a substantial amount of individual estimates on
the positive domain implying a preference for commercials to be shown.
This example is also a case where the MMNL estimate of the standard deviation
exhibits a downward bias compared to the MEAA. However, the standard deviation
estimated in the MEAA is not statistically significant (see Table 3.7 in Appendix A).
As the amount of ANA increases, we lose precision in identifying the heterogeneity
estimates (the mean estimate, however, is significant). We find other such examples
across different features in our datasets. In particular, out of 9 cases where we
observe that the zero lies further away from the distribution of the MEAA (outside
of whiskers) and we find a downward bias in heterogeneity estimates in the MMNL
(row 6 and column 3 in Table 3.4), six have an insignificant standard deviation
estimate in the MEAA. In 27 out of 29 such cases where the zero lies between
the quartiles and whiskers in the MEAA (row 5 and column 3 in Table 3.4),
the estimates of standard deviation are, in fact, significant. Insignificant results,
however, come along with a large share of ANA.
In contrast, in the case of the fairtrade label in the Orange juice dataset (the
right-hand middle panel in Figure 3.5), where the ANA probability is much lower
(average of 32%), and the distribution in the MEAA is somewhat closer to zero,
we see a clear upward bias in the heterogeneity estimates in the MMNL. Both
estimates of the mean and standard deviation in the MEAA model are significant
(see Table 3.6 in Appendix A). Therefore, we offer two potential explanations of
observing a downward bias in the MMNL estimates of the heterogeneity compared
to the MEAA. First, as the amount of ANA increases and tends to 100%, the
subsample based on which the mean and standard deviations in the MEAA are
estimated shrinks. As a result, we lose precision and cannot read too much into
the identified downward bias. Second, due to a smaller subsample, the MEAA
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may need to fit a much flatter distribution, necessitating much larger estimates of
standard deviation.
Moreover, the Video-streaming dataset provides some interesting insights. It
includes three (out of five) features of vertical differentiation, including commercials
shown, privacy policy (not sharing any information, sharing usage information,
or sharing usage and personal information), as well as fast content. For all these
features, the MEAA model identifies a substantial amount of ANA (see Figure 3.2).
We see similar patterns for all these features as for commercials shown presented
in the left-hand middle panel in Figure 3.5. Hence, it comes as no surprise that
not only the MEAA but also the EAA, which does not account for preference
heterogeneity, outperforms the MMNL and the MMMNL models out-of-sample
(see Table 3.3).
We now turn to discuss the uncovered preference patterns for features of horizontal
differentiation, e.g., brand, which is included in many of our empirical applications.
For such attributes, preference distribution may span both positive and negative
domains or, following our classification, zero may be included within the quartiles.
Recall that for these cases, we found that failing to accommodate ANA results in
an underestimation of the amount of heterogeneity in preferences. We illustrate
this in the lower panel of Figure 3.5.
Once again, we present an example with a substantially high amount of identified
ANA on the left-hand panel: brand in Orange juice dataset with around 60% of
ANA, and a lower amount – on the right-hand panel: brand in Tablets dataset
with approximately 27% of ANA. In both cases, we obtain positive and negative
partworth utilities for various brands in all models. Nevertheless, the preference
distribution in the MMNL model is tighter compared to the MEAA model and
much more so for brands in Orange juice than in Tablets datasets, which may be
explained by many respondents ignoring the brand attribute in the former datasets.
In the example of the Orange juice dataset (the left-hand lower panel in Figure 3.5),
the MMMNL model does not necessarily perform better. In both classes, the
implied distributions for brands do not differ much (see Table 3.6 in Appendix A).
As a result, the preference distribution in the MMMNL model looks very much
like one normal distribution.
We also find an underestimation of preference heterogeneity in the MMNL model
for brands in Tablets dataset (the right-hand lower panel in Figure 3.5). However,
as the ANA probability is much lower, the magnitude of the bias is also lower. In
general, we see similar patterns in many other cases of attributes allowing horizontal
differentiation, including additional features (free public transport, parking, or VIP
parking) in Basketball tickets dataset, brand in Cameras and Smoothies, packaging
in Orange juice and Smoothies, location, type of music, as well as specials in
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Figure 3.5. Parameter distribution of selected attributes for selected datasets
Parties, and catalog size (which included more TV or more movies content) in
Video-streaming services.
Unlike the example of the Orange juice datasets, though, the MMMNL model
uncovers an interesting pattern in the example of the Tablet dataset (the right-hand
lower panel in Figure 3.5). More specifically, the MMMNL model identifies two
classes with distinct preferences leading to a bimodal distribution. In one class,
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respondents have a very high preference for Apple and are less price-sensitive. In the
second class, they prefer other brands and are relatively more price-sensitive. There
are no substantial differences between these two classes on other attributes (for
details on parameter estimates, see Table 3.12 in Appendix A). The MEAA model
cannot deal with such bimodality of preference distribution, as after disentangling
the zeros, it still enforces a normal distribution on the rest of the sample. As a
result, while the MEAA slightly outperforms the MMNL both in- and out-of-sample,
it is inferior to the MMMNL (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3).
3.3.5 Managerial Implications
Overall, our analysis and detailed comparison of the different preference dis-
tributions implied by the models reveals that neglecting ANA in the model may
result in considerable biases in the estimates. As a result, substantive decisions
on optimal product design, market segmentation, demand estimation, (individual)
pricing and targeting may be impaired.
To illustrate, in Figure 3.6, we present a comparison of individual-level WTP
across the models for not showing commercials in the Video-streaming dataset and
brand Granini vs. Hohes-C in the Orange juice dataset. For example, consider the
potential decisions that can be made regarding offering consumers a video-streaming
service with no commercials shown when ANA is neglected in the model. We find
a larger mass with a positive valuation for this feature in the MMNL and the
MMMNL models, i.e., the overall demand is considerably overstated in both these
models (see the upper panel in Figure 3.6. Moreover, according to the MMNL
and the MMMNL models, there is a share of consumers willing to pay more than
$14 (the upper bound of WTP in the MEAA model) for a video-streaming service
with no commercials shown. Hence, it may still seem profitable to introduce the
option. In contrast, the MEAA model suggests that there is a much lower demand
for this feature, and respondents are not willing to pay more than $14 for it. It
is unclear whether the revenue that can be made from this limited number of
consumers would cover the opportunity cost that could have been made by showing
commercials.
Similarly, if a considerable share of consumers does not care about attributes
that allow differentiating products horizontally (e.g., brands), the firm’s pricing
decisions may be impaired. For example, consider brand Granini vs. Hohes-C in
the Orange juice dataset. We present the WTP distribution across models in the
lower panel in Figure 3.6. The analyst neglecting ANA and basing decisions on the
MMNL or MMMNL models again might overestimate the overall demand (larger
mass with positive valuation compared to the MEAA model). Because of ANA,
the average WTP in the MMNL and the MMMNL models is lower compared to
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the MEAA model (zeros excluded). This may lead to suboptimal pricing decisions
and loss of potential profits for the firm.
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Notes: One respondent with unrealistically high WTP in the MMNL model
in the Video-streaming dataset has been dropped. Respondents with non-
negative price coefficients are excluded.
Figure 3.6. Willingness-to-pay distribution for selected attributes
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we set out to 1) investigate the confounding between preference
heterogeneity and ANA, 2) gain a deeper understanding of potential biases in
uncovered preference distributions when either preference heterogeneity or ANA is
neglected, and 3) examine the prevalence of ANA in a broader set of applications.
The model comparison across ten empirical applications indicates that significant
biases arise when preference heterogeneity or ANA is not accommodated. In
particular, ignoring potential differences in individual preferences results in an
overstatement of the amount of ANA. In the opposite case, not accounting for ANA
leads to biases in preference estimates (both mean and variance). The magnitude of
the bias depends on the location of the true preference distribution and the amount
of ANA. We find that there is a higher likelihood of overestimating the amount of
preference heterogeneity in the presence of ANA for attributes that allow firms to
differentiate among products vertically. On the other hand, an underestimation of
the preference heterogeneity can be expected for attributes that allow horizontal
differentiation such as brands. Biases in the uncovered preference distribution lead
to biases in demand estimation and may impair the firm’s decisions on optimal
product design, introductions of new products and features, segmentation and
targeting, as well as pricing (e.g., Gilbride and Lenk 2010, Allenby and Ginter
1995).
Moreover, we find that explicitly accounting for ANA in choice models is critical
in categories involving low risk/stakes as well as more complex settings that require
consumers to make trade-offs on many attributes. As both factors may drive
consumers to ignore attribute information when making choices, accommodating
such behavior becomes critical. Notably, models that impose more flexible forms
of preference heterogeneity cannot necessarily deal with existing ANA patterns in
the data.
Several limitations of the existing approach for modeling both preference hetero-
geneity and ANA, namely the MEAA model, should be outlined. First, the MEAA
model is not equipped to deal with multi-modal preference distribution. While
it may sufficiently identify consumers that ignore the particular attribute, it still
imposes one normal distribution for the rest of the sample. From this perspective,
the MEAA and the MMMNL model seem to be complementary to each other.
Future research could focus on further extensions of the MEAA model to allow for
multi-modal distribution of preferences. Second, we have imposed the assumption
of independence of attribute attendance in the models that account for ANA (EAA
and MEAA). While this assumption is critical for retaining parsimony, it comes
at a cost. More specifically, it does not allow for any correlation in the attribute
attendance probabilities. On the other hand, relaxing this assumption results in a
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sharp increase in the number of parameters. Further research is necessary to find
new approaches to accommodate this issue.
Another avenue for future research is to investigate the drivers of ANA. In our
ten applications, we found that the risk/stakes and the complexity of the choice
situation may lead to a higher ANA. It would be essential to understand how these
factors affect consumers’ attribute processing strategies. Furthermore, while we
only looked at the risk/stakes of the decision, other facets of consumer involvement
may affect the observed ANA patterns.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Appendix A
In this Appendix, we present the estimation results of all the models for each of
the ten datasets. Statistically significant estimates at a 5% significance level are
indicated in bold. For all the datasets, we use dummy coding for the “none” option,
linear coding for the price, and effect coding for other attributes. The omitted
levels are indicated in a footnote of the corresponding table.
MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Class 1 Class 2
Utility paramaters
None β -4.06 (0.07) -6.08 (0.12) -9.55 (0.30) -11.81 (0.47) -16.17 (0.84) -5.49 (0.35)
σ 5.87 (0.28) 8.70 (0.35) 6.73 (0.45) 3.06 (0.25)
Brand:
A β 0.30 (0.02) 1.13 (0.10) 0.55 (0.04) 1.49 (0.15) 0.20 (0.06) 1.21 (0.11)
σ 0.68 (0.06) 1.49 (0.13) 0.28 (0.09) 1.22 (0.11)
B β -0.03 (0.03) -0.63 (0.10) -0.06 (0.04) -0.28 (0.11) 0.40 (0.07) -0.49 (0.07)
σ 0.35 (0.06) 1.28 (0.11) 0.46 (0.07) 0.12 (0.20)
C β 0.06 (0.03) 1.02 (0.09) 0.06 (0.05) 0.60 (0.16) -0.43 (0.07) 0.84 (0.10)
σ 0.92 (0.06) 2.78 (0.21) 0.58 (0.08) 1.37 (0.11)
Packaging:
Glass bottle β 0.54 (0.02) 1.50 (0.06) 0.79 (0.05) 1.74 (0.11) -0.06 (0.10) 1.74 (0.10)
σ 0.85 (0.05) 1.37 (0.10) 0.75 (0.10) 0.85 (0.07)
Tetrapak β -0.79 (0.03) -2.09 (0.09) -1.30 (0.06) -2.50 (0.14) -0.62 (0.11) -2.34 (0.16)
σ 1.06 (0.07) 1.57 (0.11) 0.93 (0.11) 1.23 (0.11)
Plastic cup β -0.42 (0.03) -0.87 (0.07) -0.63 (0.05) -1.14 (0.10) -0.37 (0.08) -0.98 (0.11)
σ 0.87 (0.06) 1.48 (0.09) 0.80 (0.09) 1.08 (0.10)
Price β -2.02 (0.05) -4.07 (0.09) -3.83 (0.16) -6.25 (0.25) -7.23 (0.38) -2.06 (0.18)
σ 3.53 (0.14) 3.09 (0.21) 5.23 (0.34) 1.84 (0.16)
Class paramaters
Brand -1.15 (0.14) -0.46 (0.12)
Packaging -0.05 (0.10) 0.69 (0.12)
Price 0.57 (0.10) 0.75 (0.13)
Class 2 0.03 (0.03)
LL −7931.836 −6945.037 −6233.871 −5863.345 −5806.924
BIC 15935.457 13988.779 12611.311 11897.179 11909.960
No. parameters (8) (11) (16) (19) (33)
Note: The omitted levels are Brand: D, Packaging: plastic bottle.
Table 3.5. Estimation results for the dataset: Smoothies
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MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Class 1 Class 2
Utility parameters
None β -3.63 (0.10) -5.12 (0.14) -8.23 (0.32) -9.31 (0.44) -18.13 (1.28) -3.12 (0.31)
σ 5.77 (0.33) 5.95 (0.27) 3.89 (0.39) 2.81 (0.27)
Brand:
Granini β 0.24 (0.06) 1.28 (0.13) 0.25 (0.10) 1.10 (0.40) -0.08 (0.23) 0.50 (0.17)
σ 1.35 (0.11) 4.58 (0.53) 1.52 (0.23) 1.59 (0.16)
Hohes-C β 0.74 (0.05) 2.58 (0.13) 1.25 (0.11) 3.13 (0.26) 1.05 (0.22) 1.44 (0.17)
σ 1.55 (0.11) 3.16 (0.28) 1.43 (0.21) 2.09 (0.17)
Valensina β 0.23 (0.06) 1.05 (0.13) 0.24 (0.10) 0.31 (0.35) 0.01 (0.22) 0.24 (0.17)
σ 1.16 (0.11) 4.13 (0.33) 1.41 (0.26) 1.57 (0.15)
Fairtrade label:
Yes β 0.86 (0.04) 2.20 (0.11) 1.76 (0.10) 2.67 (0.20) 2.76 (0.28) 1.46 (0.13)
σ 1.60 (0.11) 1.73 (0.12) 2.41 (0.21) 1.42 (0.14)
Packaging:
Carton β 0.38 (0.04) 2.40 (0.15) 0.78 (0.12) 1.88 (0.25) 1.20 (0.25) 0.72 (0.18)
σ 2.07 (0.11) 3.83 (0.27) 2.42 (0.27) 2.21 (0.15)
Price β -2.69 (0.07) -4.05 (0.10) -5.06 (0.18) -6.50 (0.23) -12.22 (0.84) -2.49 (0.18)
σ 2.72 (0.15) 2.35 (0.15) 1.54 (0.20) 0.87 (0.12)
Class parameters
Brand -0.45 (0.16) -0.42 (0.14)
Fairtrade label -0.24 (0.16) 0.75 (0.23)
Packaging -1.22 (0.18) 0.01 (0.17)
Price 1.95 (0.19) 2.20 (0.24)
Class 2 0.12 (0.04)
LL −5083.525 −4575.238 −4049.225 −3880.148 −3836.181
BIC 10226.366 9243.689 8217.085 7912.826 7918.105
No. parameters (7) (11) (14) (18) (29)
Notes: The omitted levels are Brand: Albi, Fairtrade label: No, Packaging: PET.
Table 3.6. Estimation results for the dataset: Orange juice
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MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Class 1 Class 2
Utility paramaters
None β -1.42 (0.12) -2.61 (0.19) -4.17 (0.37) -4.81 (0.52) -5.15 (0.63) -4.22 (0.85)
σ 3.07 (0.37) 4.21 (0.52) 3.98 (0.55) 1.92 (0.45)
Privacy policy:
Share usage β 0.05 (0.03) 0.67 (0.20) 0.10 (0.04) 1.07 (0.38) 0.07 (0.04) 0.30 (0.18)
σ 0.11 (0.17) 0.36 (0.53) 0.11 (0.10) 0.65 (0.19)
Share all β -0.19 (0.03) -2.19 (0.39) -0.27 (0.05) -3.04 (0.74) -0.06 (0.05) -1.77 (0.31)
σ 0.47 (0.06) 0.86 (0.86) 0.20 (0.09) 1.71 (0.29)
Commercials:
Shown β -0.11 (0.02) -1.36 (0.17) -0.17 (0.04) -1.81 (0.32) -0.03 (0.04) -1.15 (0.22)
σ 0.40 (0.04) 0.60 (0.42) 0.27 (0.06) 1.33 (0.25)
Fast content:
Yes β 0.20 (0.02) 1.70 (0.23) 0.24 (0.04) 2.08 (0.56) 0.11 (0.03) 1.59 (0.29)
σ 0.36 (0.05) 1.09 (0.33) 0.11 (0.09) 1.83 (0.31)
Catalog size:
More TV β -0.11 (0.03) -1.70 (0.32) -0.09 (0.05) -0.85 (0.40) -0.06 (0.05) -0.35 (0.25)
σ 0.33 (0.07) 2.24 (0.40) 0.00 (0.28) 2.53 (0.42)
More movies β 0.22 (0.03) 1.69 (0.21) 0.28 (0.04) 2.00 (0.29) 0.13 (0.05) 1.64 (0.31)
σ 0.35 (0.06) 0.54 (0.25) 0.12 (0.13) 1.85 (0.33)
Price β -0.08 (0.01) -0.38 (0.02) -0.13 (0.02) -0.30 (0.05) -0.09 (0.03) -0.53 (0.10)
σ 0.26 (0.02) 0.39 (0.04) 0.27 (0.03) 0.28 (0.06)
Class parameters
Privacy policy -1.76 (0.28) -1.63 (0.28)
Commercials -1.72 (0.24) -1.61 (0.28)
Fast content -1.88 (0.24) -1.62 (0.29)
Catalog size -1.73 (0.25) -1.27 (0.22)
Price -0.54 (0.16) 0.39 (0.31)
Class 2 -0.94 (0.06)
LL −3591.151 −3278.248 −3264.935 −3167.175 −3161.749
BIC 7244.365 6657.350 6653.997 6497.266 6579.509
No. parameters (8) (13) (16) (21) (33)
Notes: The omitted levels are Privacy policy: No sharing, Commercials: Not shown, Fast content:
No, Catalog size: 5000 movies, 2500 TV episodes.
Table 3.7. Estimation results for the dataset: Video-streaming services
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MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Class 1 Class 2
Utility paramaters
None β -0.55 (0.07) -0.40 (0.08) -0.55 (0.16) -0.46 (0.18) 0.37 (0.71) -0.69 (0.18)
σ 1.61 (0.16) 1.85 (0.20) 9.07 (1.89) 1.48 (0.18)
Location:
Image β 0.00 (0.07) 0.83 (0.43) -0.06 (0.12) 0.42 (0.33) 1.60 (0.62) -0.19 (0.15)
σ 0.33 (0.21) 0.80 (0.46) 5.68 (1.26) 0.32 (0.24)
Cafe Madrid β 0.15 (0.07) 1.36 (0.40) 0.41 (0.12) 1.87 (0.43) 4.24 (1.00) 0.24 (0.15)
σ 0.41 (0.19) 0.63 (0.32) 2.23 (0.69) 0.25 (0.24)
B9 β -0.24 (0.08) -1.78 (0.67) -0.34 (0.12) -1.78 (0.46) -1.91 (0.79) -0.38 (0.15)
σ 0.38 (0.32) 0.57 (0.72) 3.19 (0.82) 0.28 (0.24)
Westbhf β -0.19 (0.08) -1.72 (0.65) -0.31 (0.13) -1.27 (0.50) -4.36 (0.99) -0.31 (0.16)
σ 0.57 (0.20) 1.92 (0.57) 3.57 (0.80) 0.80 (0.24)
Apollo β 0.13 (0.07) 0.31 (0.40) 0.31 (0.13) 0.82 (0.39) -2.72 (0.94) 0.62 (0.15)
σ 0.78 (0.14) 1.86 (0.43) 8.73 (1.95) 0.42 (0.21)
Drinks:
Cheap prices β 0.63 (0.04) 1.39 (0.13) 1.17 (0.10) 2.03 (0.23) 2.57 (0.66) 1.36 (0.13)
σ 1.02 (0.11) 1.03 (0.18) 4.68 (1.02) 0.92 (0.14)
Normal prices β 0.07 (0.05) 0.27 (0.10) 0.23 (0.07) 0.35 (0.12) -0.74 (0.44) 0.33 (0.10)
σ 0.30 (0.13) 0.45 (0.19) 1.73 (0.52) 0.51 (0.14)
Music:
Mix β 0.28 (0.05) 0.47 (0.15) 0.80 (0.10) 1.13 (0.16) 2.47 (0.66) 0.86 (0.12)
σ 0.44 (0.16) 0.60 (0.20) 4.61 (1.00) 0.40 (0.18)
R&B/Hip hop β -0.48 (0.06) -1.05 (0.23) -1.06 (0.16) -1.34 (0.24) -1.62 (0.73) -1.21 (0.17)
σ 1.65 (0.16) 2.31 (0.28) 11.76 (2.45) 1.03 (0.19)
House β 0.36 (0.05) 2.09 (0.19) 0.60 (0.13) 1.10 (0.23) 6.50 (1.45) 0.42 (0.17)
σ 1.59 (0.14) 2.34 (0.28) 10.69 (2.26) 1.66 (0.20)
Dress code:
No sneakers β -0.18 (0.03) -0.90 (0.31) -0.33 (0.06) -0.90 (0.34) -0.57 (0.30) -0.43 (0.08)
σ 0.47 (0.09) 0.79 (0.19) 1.84 (0.47) 0.51 (0.11)
Specials:
None β -0.11 (0.05) 2.32 (0.93) -0.12 (0.07) -0.23 (0.18) -2.19 (0.65) -0.02 (0.09)
σ 0.39 (0.12) 0.57 (0.27) 0.75 (0.46) 0.23 (0.17)
Happy hour β 0.17 (0.04) 3.14 (1.03) 0.24 (0.08) 0.50 (0.29) 1.86 (0.54) 0.26 (0.09)
σ 0.36 (0.12) 0.91 (0.34) 4.18 (0.87) 0.25 (0.14)
Price β -0.17 (0.01) -0.31 (0.03) -0.31 (0.02) -0.45 (0.05) -0.35 (0.11) -0.39 (0.04)
σ 0.12 (0.03) 0.16 (0.06) 0.47 (0.12) 0.18 (0.04)
Class paramaters
Location -1.73 (0.48) -0.62 (0.32)
Drinks 0.31 (0.25) 1.18 (0.38)
Music -0.76 (0.20) 2.14 (0.56)
Dress code -1.24 (0.61) -0.24 (0.64)
Specials -3.44 (0.52) 0.65 (1.78)
Price 1.00 (0.29) 1.79 (0.64)
Class 2 1.12 (0.07)
LL −2016.365 −1924.861 −1771.785 −1750.117 −1713.113
BIC 4144.269 4005.879 3766.651 3767.931 3879.824
No. parameters (15) (21) (30) (36) (61)
Notes: The omitted levels are Location: Abendrot, Drinks: expensive, Music: Rock/Alternative,
Dress code: None, Specials: Go-go dancers.
Table 3.8. Estimation results for the dataset: Parties
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MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Class 1 Class 2
Utility parameters
None β -2.21 (0.09) -3.14 (0.13) -4.61 (0.29) -4.99 (0.45) -1.76 (0.40) -6.07 (0.52)
σ 2.32 (0.19) 3.53 (0.32) 1.50 (0.57) 3.14 (0.34)
Brand:
Ovente β -0.03 (0.04) -1.96 (0.54) -0.12 (0.06) -3.50 (0.74) -0.08 (0.14) -0.14 (0.07)
σ 0.34 (0.08) 0.01 (0.47) 0.18 (0.16) 0.34 (0.09)
Hamilton Beach β -0.01 (0.04) 1.28 (0.45) 0.05 (0.06) 2.12 (0.53) -0.01 (0.13) 0.11 (0.07)
σ 0.17 (0.07) 0.22 (0.35) 0.26 (0.24) 0.15 (0.11)
Capacity:
1.2 liter β -0.09 (0.04) -2.22 (0.68) -0.19 (0.06) -2.24 (2.53) -0.30 (0.14) -0.14 (0.07)
σ 0.16 (0.08) 0.22 (1.04) 0.42 (0.13) 0.16 (0.11)
1.5 liter β 0.07 (0.04) 1.38 (0.55) 0.08 (0.06) 1.18 (1.69) 0.15 (0.12) 0.07 (0.07)
σ 0.16 (0.07) 0.59 (0.54) 0.13 (0.16) 0.07 (0.12)
Material:
Glass β 0.27 (0.04) 1.19 (0.12) 0.62 (0.08) 1.78 (0.30) 1.97 (0.27) 0.19 (0.07)
σ 0.87 (0.08) 1.80 (0.29) 2.94 (0.80) 0.06 (0.14)
Stainless steel β 0.28 (0.04) 1.14 (0.12) 0.51 (0.08) 1.74 (0.29) 2.39 (0.28) 0.20 (0.08)
σ 0.83 (0.08) 1.55 (0.22) 1.59 (0.21) 0.28 (0.09)
Variable temp.:
Yes β 0.12 (0.03) 2.17 (0.38) 0.23 (0.05) 1.28 (0.38) 0.73 (0.14) 0.06 (0.05)
σ 0.37 (0.06) 1.19 (0.30) 0.93 (0.16) 0.16 (0.10)
Power:
1100 Watts β -0.01 (0.03) -1.38 (0.44) -0.02 (0.04) -2.26 (1.13) 0.08 (0.11) -0.03 (0.05)
σ 0.16 (0.07) 3.33 (0.99) 0.45 (0.11) 0.14 (0.09)
Amazon rating:
3 stars β -0.84 (0.05) -2.60 (0.18) -1.70 (0.12) -3.68 (0.32) -1.59 (0.22) -1.95 (0.18)
σ 1.47 (0.12) 0.76 (0.21) 1.35 (0.22) 1.41 (0.15)
4 stars β 0.11 (0.04) 0.62 (0.09) 0.33 (0.06) 0.92 (0.14) 0.31 (0.14) 0.39 (0.07)
σ 0.17 (0.09) 0.48 (0.14) 0.30 (0.14) 0.02 (0.28)
Price β -0.30 (0.01) -0.77 (0.03) -0.53 (0.04) -1.00 (0.08) -0.53 (0.08) -0.72 (0.07)
σ 0.64 (0.05) 0.51 (0.05) 0.36 (0.06) 0.56 (0.05)
Class parameters
Brand -3.11 (0.60) -2.96 (0.45)
Capacity -3.20 (0.75) -2.53 (1.85)
Material -0.52 (0.19) -0.18 (0.21)
Variable temp. -2.87 (0.44) -1.65 (0.42)
Power -3.83 (0.91) -3.82 (0.75)
Rating 0.29 (0.18) 0.47 (0.18)
Price 0.52 (0.17) 1.16 (0.26)
Class 2 0.58 (0.05)
LL −2380.627 −1963.627 −1870.294 −1753.577 −1780.361
BIC 4854.121 4074.293 3926.323 3747.061 3939.930
No. parameters (12) (19) (24) (31) (49)
Notes: The omitted levels are Brand: Cuisinart, Capacity: 1.7 liters, Material: Plastic, Variable
temperature: No, Power: 1500 Watts, Amazon rating: 5 stars.
Table 3.9. Estimation results for the dataset: Electric kettles
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MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Class 1 Class 2
Utility Parameters
None β -2.45 (0.31) -5.63 (0.45) -5.52 (0.69) -6.31 (0.67) -6.63 (1.16) -4.89 (1.00)
σ 2.80 (0.54) 1.82 (0.42) 1.43 (0.37) 1.92 (0.50)
Price category:
Category 1 β 0.5 (0.13) 2.76 (0.23) 0.62 (0.35) 1.33 (0.45) -0.06 (0.50) 1.02 (0.48)
σ 3.01 (0.43) 4.20 (0.47) 1.78 (0.34) 3.20 (0.41)
Category 2 β 0.14 (0.07) 1.53 (0.19) 0.60 (0.21) 1.77 (0.34) 0.23 (0.43) 0.56 (0.33)
σ 1.93 (0.22) 2.60 (0.37) 2.34 (0.50) 3.12 (0.44)
Category 3 β -0.31 (0.08) -1.16 (0.19) 0.45 (0.15) 0.31 (0.27) 0.60 (0.27) 0.00 (0.28)
σ 0.76 (0.17) 1.62 (0.28) 1.16 (0.30) 0.70 (0.22)
Additional features:
Free parking β -0.23 (0.06) -8.35 (2.33) -0.83 (0.19) -1.26 (0.35) 1.25 (0.41) -2.40 (0.36)
σ 1.77 (0.18) 2.92 (0.38) 1.40 (0.30) 0.90 (0.30)
Free VIP β 0.08 (0.06) 2.99 (0.82) 0.26 (0.14) 0.29 (0.24) -0.67 (0.28) 0.98 (0.22)
parking σ 1.28 (0.16) 1.77 (0.29) 1.17 (0.28) 1.23 (0.24)
Free public β 0.04 (0.06) 3.01 (0.79) 0.20 (0.10) 0.43 (0.20) -0.68 (0.25) 0.81 (0.19)
transport σ 0.32 (0.20) 1.04 (0.21) 0.42 (0.25) 0.50 (0.19)
Price β -0.11 (0.02) -0.36 (0.03) -0.25 (0.03) -0.39 (0.04) -0.33 (0.06) -0.26 (0.05)
σ 0.15 (0.02) 0.11 (0.02) 0.12 (0.03) 0.18 (0.03)
Class Parameters
Price category -0.64 (0.20) 0.88 (0.28)
Additional features -1.39 (0.23) 0.73 (0.37)
Price 0.55 (0.18) 1.38 (0.34)
Class 2 0.47 (0.10)
LL −1959.438 −1561.666 −1370.051 −1350.408 −1303.796
BIC 3976.114 3202.033 2854.576 2836.755 2843.694
No. parameters (8) (11) (16) (19) (33)
Notes: The omitted levels are Price category: 4, Additional feature: None.
Table 3.10. Estimation results for the dataset: Basketball tickets
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MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Class 1 Class 2
Utility parameters
Hard drive:
500GB β -0.47 (0.05) -1.19 (0.15) -0.81 (0.11) -1.31 (0.16) -4.45 (1.94) -0.75 (0.12)
σ 0.66 (0.11) 0.31 (0.17) 3.48 (1.39) 0.56 (0.12)
750GB β 0.03 (0.05) 0.08 (0.09) 0.06 (0.07) 0.08 (0.09) -1.04 (0.50) 0.15 (0.08)
σ 0.01 (0.14) 0.17 (0.17) 1.66 (0.92) 0.03 (0.12)
Memory:
4GB β -0.71 (0.05) -1.77 (0.20) -1.22 (0.14) -1.66 (0.23) -8.51 (3.46) -1.04 (0.15)
σ 0.98 (0.12) 1.00 (0.14) 6.17 (2.48) 0.82 (0.13)
6GB β 0.11 (0.05) 0.16 (0.10) 0.21 (0.08) 0.24 (0.10) 0.84 (0.54) 0.20 (0.08)
σ 0.35 (0.11) 0.35 (0.14) 3.10 (1.44) 0.21 (0.14)
Dispaly size:
12 inch β -0.85 (0.06) -2.71 (0.21) -1.74 (0.17) -2.38 (0.30) -8.97 (3.74) -1.50 (0.20)
σ 1.39 (0.14) 1.52 (0.19) 7.32 (2.84) 1.27 (0.18)
14 inch β 0.14 (0.05) 0.59 (0.10) 0.40 (0.09) 0.56 (0.13) 2.41 (1.14) 0.37 (0.09)
σ 0.49 (0.09) 0.58 (0.15) 3.60 (1.34) 0.16 (0.16)
Price β -0.79 (0.05) -2.12 (0.14) -1.51 (0.15) -2.02 (0.25) -2.42 (0.93) -1.72 (0.19)
σ 1.45 (0.16) 1.56 (0.21) 3.19 (1.23) 1.31 (0.15)
Class parameters
Hard drive 0.44 (0.36) 0.89 (0.38)
Memory 0.22 (0.30) 1.68 (0.69)
Display size 0.14 (0.21) 1.51 (0.45)
Price 0.25 (0.22) 1.40 (0.47)
Class 2 1.06 (0.08)
LL −1239.081 −1034.992 −992.023 −979.897 −969.003
BIC 2529.628 2150.861 2086.979 2092.137 2151.227
No. parameters (7) (11) (14) (18) (29)
Notes: The omitted levels are Hard drive: 1 TB, Memory: 8 GB, Screen size: 15.6 inch.
Table 3.11. Estimation results for the dataset: Laptops
94 CHAPTER 3. WHEN ZEROS COUNT
MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Class 1 Class 2
Utility paramaters
None β -1.53 (0.07) -1.88 (0.09) -2.81 (0.22) -3.08 (0.26) -3.46 (0.25) 0.12 (0.71)
σ 2.40 (0.22) 2.72 (0.26) 2.29 (0.21) 3.70 (1.00)
Brand:
Apple β 0.02 (0.04) 2.92 (0.22) 0.12 (0.13) 0.18 (0.27) -0.93 (0.11) 5.53 (1.18)
σ 1.75 (0.13) 2.58 (0.35) 1.01 (0.11) 0.92 (0.40)
Samsung β 0.00 (0.05) -1.00 (0.21) 0.16 (0.08) 0.13 (0.13) 0.51 (0.08) -3.40 (0.90)
σ 0.61 (0.11) 1.01 (0.21) 0.44 (0.12) 2.02 (0.69)
Display size:
7 inch β -0.30 (0.03) -1.04 (0.19) -0.52 (0.06) -1.11 (0.31) -0.70 (0.08) -0.29 (0.25)
σ 0.60 (0.08) 0.80 (0.16) 0.64 (0.08) 0.87 (0.33)
Battery:
7 hours β -0.17 (0.03) -0.35 (0.13) -0.33 (0.05) -0.76 (0.30) -0.39 (0.06) -0.18 (0.19)
σ 0.24 (0.10) 0.44 (0.16) 0.43 (0.08) 0.36 (0.24)
Resolution:
1280×800px β -0.20 (0.03) -1.07 (0.15) -0.37 (0.06) -1.49 (0.33) -0.42 (0.07) -0.41 (0.20)
σ 0.56 (0.07) 0.75 (0.25) 0.60 (0.08) 0.48 (0.27)
Storage capacity:
16GB β -0.24 (0.05) -5.93 (2.42) -0.37 (0.08) -1.37 (0.73) -0.53 (0.10) -0.39 (0.34)
σ 0.38 (0.13) 1.02 (0.48) 0.52 (0.14) 1.37 (0.41)
32GB β 0.22 (0.04) 3.11 (1.27) 0.21 (0.06) 0.48 (0.23) 0.29 (0.08) -0.13 (0.24)
σ 0.11 (0.14) 0.59 (0.37) 0.21 (0.15) 0.14 (0.39)
Price β -0.47 (0.02) -0.80 (0.03) -0.87 (0.05) -1.12 (0.08) -1.06 (0.07) -0.52 (0.17)
σ 0.49 (0.04) 0.38 (0.08) 0.54 (0.05) 0.84 (0.20)
Class paramaters
Brand -1.52 (0.20) 1.04 (0.50)
Size -0.72 (0.40) 0.28 (0.66)
Battery 0.78 (1.26) -0.15 (0.87)
Resolution -0.94 (0.30) -0.65 (0.38)
Storage capacity -3.56 (0.61) -0.98 (0.74)
Price 1.38 (0.21) 1.84 (0.43)
Class 2 -1.42 (0.06)
LL −2414.468 −2142.529 −1952.786 −1926.379 −1846.543
BIC 4897.653 4399.588 4043.007 4036.004 3975.592
No. parameters (9) (15) (18) (24) (37)
Notes: The omitted levels are Brand: Smarttab, Display size 10 inch, Battery: 11 hours,
Resolution: 2560×1600px, Storage capacity: 64GB.
Table 3.12. Estimation results for the dataset: Tablets
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MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Class 1 Class 2
Utility parameters
None β -1.83 (0.06) -2.62 (0.08) -4.46 (0.19) -4.92 (0.27) -7.86 (0.52) -2.43 (0.23)
σ 3.50 (0.19) 3.80 (0.27) 4.54 (0.35) 1.82 (0.17)
Brand:
Sony β -0.04 (0.04) -1.20 (0.40) -0.04 (0.05) -0.13 (0.26) 0.02 (0.11) -0.02 (0.08)
σ 0.44 (0.07) 1.69 (0.23) 0.73 (0.12) 0.35 (0.14)
Nikon β 0.06 (0.03) 1.54 (0.28) 0.11 (0.06) 0.85 (0.28) 0.39 (0.10) -0.07 (0.08)
σ 0.58 (0.06) 1.97 (0.24) 0.88 (0.09) 0.25 (0.11)
Panasonic β -0.22 (0.04) -1.84 (0.32) -0.29 (0.05) -1.66 (0.34) -0.56 (0.12) -0.20 (0.08)
σ 0.28 (0.10) 1.92 (0.28) 1.07 (0.12) 0.16 (0.18)
Pixel:
High β 0.38 (0.02) 1.58 (0.11) 0.60 (0.05) 1.69 (0.17) 0.08 (0.06) 1.18 (0.09)
σ 0.69 (0.05) 0.86 (0.14) 0.22 (0.08) 0.85 (0.08)
Zoom:
High β 0.42 (0.02) 1.46 (0.09) 0.68 (0.05) 1.39 (0.15) 0.20 (0.06) 1.35 (0.09)
σ 0.71 (0.05) 0.94 (0.12) 0.23 (0.10) 0.65 (0.07)
Video:
Yes β 0.31 (0.02) 1.27 (0.11) 0.53 (0.04) 1.25 (0.16) 0.42 (0.07) 0.73 (0.07)
σ 0.48 (0.05) 0.54 (0.15) 0.38 (0.10) 0.65 (0.08)
Swivel:
Yes β 0.17 (0.02) 1.62 (0.17) 0.25 (0.04) 0.63 (0.13) 0.19 (0.06) 0.45 (0.08)
σ 0.49 (0.05) 1.13 (0.15) 0.46 (0.08) 0.77 (0.09)
WiFi:
Yes β 0.28 (0.02) 1.29 (0.11) 0.47 (0.04) 1.06 (0.16) 0.53 (0.08) 0.57 (0.07)
σ 0.61 (0.06) 0.94 (0.11) 0.84 (0.11) 0.61 (0.08)
Price β -1.48 (0.03) -2.55 (0.06) -2.66 (0.11) -3.71 (0.17) -4.72 (0.35) -1.92 (0.12)
σ 1.80 (0.12) 1.72 (0.14) 2.49 (0.21) 1.29 (0.10)
Class parameters
Brand -2.17 (0.32) -1.36 (0.22)
Pixel -0.97 (0.17) -0.30 (0.20)
Zoom -0.58 (0.16) 0.49 (0.32)
Video -0.97 (0.19) -0.09 (0.28)
Swivel -1.86 (0.23) -0.10 (0.32)
WiFi -0.98 (0.19) 0.15 (0.33)
Price 1.46 (0.15) 2.27 (0.30)
Class 2 0.08 (0.04)
LL −5701.867 −4958.032 −4341.663 −4131.948 −4145.621
BIC 11488.175 10059.614 8852.210 8491.890 8637.455
No. parameters (10) (17) (20) (27) (41)
Notes: The omitted levels are Brand: Canon, Pixels: Low, Zoom: Low, Video: No, Swivel: No,
WiFi: No.
Table 3.13. Estimation results for the dataset: Cameras
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MNL EAA MMNL MEAA MMMNL
Class 1 Class 2
Utility parameters
Destination:
Overseas β 0.09 (0.02) 1.64 (0.16) 0.18 (0.08) 0.29 (0.22) -0.96 (0.43) 0.22 (0.05)
σ 1.16 (0.08) 2.39 (0.32) 14.56 (4.26) 0.48 (0.07)
Airline:
Virgin β -0.01 (0.02) 2.44 (1.06) -0.03 (0.04) -0.24 (0.33) 0.49 (0.26) -0.07 (0.04)
σ 0.35 (0.05) 1.11 (0.57) 0.70 (0.36) 0.38 (0.06)
Length of stay:
12 days β 0.27 (0.02) 1.21 (0.12) 0.53 (0.05) 0.94 (0.16) 1.49 (0.45) 0.53 (0.05)
σ 0.58 (0.06) 0.70 (0.09) 3.95 (1.14) 0.36 (0.07)
Meal:
Included β 0.26 (0.02) 1.53 (0.18) 0.53 (0.05) 1.09 (0.18) 1.22 (0.38) 0.54 (0.05)
σ 0.47 (0.05) 0.57 (0.11) 0.42 (0.31) 0.48 (0.06)
Local tours:
Available β 0.09 (0.02) 1.16 (0.25) 0.19 (0.04) 0.70 (0.28) -0.13 (0.31) 0.20 (0.04)
σ 0.32 (0.06) 0.53 (0.15) 3.02 (0.92) 0.25 (0.07)
Peak season:
Peak β 0.04 (0.02) 1.97 (0.60) 0.05 (0.04) 0.50 (0.46) 0.90 (0.37) 0.02 (0.04)
σ 0.32 (0.06) 2.00 (0.62) 2.22 (0.65) 0.06 (0.11)
Accomodation:
4-star β 0.43 (0.02) 1.56 (0.10) 0.87 (0.06) 1.53 (0.16) 2.10 (0.79) 0.91 (0.07)
σ 0.79 (0.06) 0.88 (0.11) 2.26 (0.82) 0.77 (0.07)
Price β -0.17 (0.02) -1.00 (0.17) -0.33 (0.04) -0.76 (0.17) 0.01 (0.21) -0.39 (0.04)
σ 0.34 (0.05) 0.44 (0.11) 0.11 (0.21) 0.39 (0.06)
Class parameters
Destination -1.09 (0.19) 0.12 (0.26)
Airline -4.14 (0.65) -1.35 (0.91)
Length of stay -0.29 (0.19) 1.11 (0.54)
Meal included -0.92 (0.20) 0.33 (0.36)
Tours -1.87 (0.39) -0.60 (0.63)
Season -3.49 (0.63) -2.45 (0.54)
Accommodation -0.07 (0.14) 0.87 (0.29)
Price -1.07 (0.32) 0.09 (0.51)
Class 2 1.09 (0.04)
LL −2686.871 −2395.588 −2262.399 −2172.046 −2160.810
BIC 5441.272 4926.234 4659.856 4546.680 4600.179
No. parameters (8) (16) (16) (24) (33)
Notes: The omitted levels are Destination: Australia, Airline: Qantas, Length of stay: 7 days,
Meal: Not included, Local tours: Not available, Peak season: Off-peak, Accomodation: 2-star
Table 3.14. Estimation results for the dataset: Holiday destinations
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3.5.2 Appendix B
In this Appendix, we plot the individual-level estimates in the MEAA model against
those in the MMNL and MMMNL model along with the results of the fitted linear
regression of the form: βMEAAi = a+ b ·β(M)MMNLi + ϵi. The estimated slopes bˆ
serve as a rescaling coefficient for the (M)MMNL model, which we apply for both
population- and individual-level estimates. For each, we report the estimates,
R-squared, and the significance of the estimates. * denotes significance at 5%, ** –
at 1%, and *** – at 0.1% significance level.
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Figure 3.7. Individual-level estimates: Smoothies
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Figure 3.8. Individual-level estimates: Orange juice
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Figure 3.9. Individual-level estimates: Video-streaming services
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Figure 3.10. Individual-level estimates: Parties
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Figure 3.11. Individual-level estimates: Electric kettles
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Figure 3.12. Individual-level estimates: Basketball tickets
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Figure 3.13. Individual-level estimates: Laptops
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Figure 3.14. Individual-level estimates: Tablets
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Figure 3.15. Individual-level estimates: Cameras
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Figure 3.16. Individual-level estimates: Holiday destinations
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3.5.3 Appendix C
In the following Appendix, we present scatterplots with the population-level esti-
mates of the parameters for the MEAA and the MMNL models against each other.
The MMNL estimates are rescaled using the slope parameters in Appendix B. The
left panel plots the estimate of the mean and the right panel – the estimates of the
standard deviation.
Colors of the dots represent where the zero lies in the MEAA model according to
our classification: black - within quartiles, grey - between quartiles and whiskers,
white - outside of whiskers.
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Figure 3.17. Population-level estimates: Smoothies
Brand: Granini
Brand: Hohes−C
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Figure 3.18. Population-level estimates: Orange juice
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Figure 3.19. Population-level estimates: Video-streaming services
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Figure 3.20. Population-level estimates: Parties
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Figure 3.21. Population-level estimates: Electric kettles
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Figure 3.22. Population-level estimates: Basketball tickets
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Figure 3.23. Population-level estimates: Laptops
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Figure 3.24. Population-level estimates: Tablets
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Figure 3.25. Population-level estimates: Cameras
Accommodation: 4−star
Airline: Virgin
Destination: overseas
Meal: included
Price
Peak season: yes
Length of stay: 12 days
Local tours: available
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Figure 3.26. Population-level estimates: Holiday destinations
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Abstract
Traditionally, choice-based conjoint analysis relies on the assumption of rational
decision makers that use all available information. However, several studies suggest
that people ignore some information when making choices. In this paper, we build
upon recent developments in the choice literature and employ a latent class model
that simultaneously allows for attribute non-attendance (ANA) and preference
heterogeneity. In addition, we relate visual attention derived from eye tracking
to the probability of ANA to test, understand, and validate ANA in a marketing
context. In two empirical applications, we find that a) our proposed model fits
the data best, b) the majority of respondents indeed ignore some attributes, which
has implications for willingness-to-pay estimates, segmentation, and targeting, and
c) even though the latent class model identifies ANA well without eye tracking
information, our model with visual attention helps to better understand ANA and
individual-level behavior.
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4.1 Introduction
Choice-based conjoint (CBC) analysis is a popular tool in marketing used to elicit
consumer preferences, predict consumers’ response to new product introductions,
identify segments that similarly value product attributes, and optimize product
design, targeting and pricing strategies (Rao 2014). The basis for analyzing the
observed choices from CBC is the random utility maximization (RUM) model,
with consumer “rationality” as its key behavioral pillar (McFadden 2001). More
explicitly, under RUM, consumers are considered to have stable preferences, process
all available information, and select the option that maximizes their utility. However,
the validity of these assumptions has been widely challenged (e.g., DellaVigna
2009). In particul, with respect to the assumption of full information processing,
it has long been argued that due to limited cognitive capacity, individuals often
simplify their choices (e.g., Payne et al. 1992) and ignore some information about
product attributes or alternatives (e.g., Orquin and Loose 2013).
The marketing literature has been mainly interested in the case where consumers
neglect some of the available alternatives, which is conventionally labeled as “choice
set” formation (e.g., Swait and Ben-Akiva 1987; Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker
1996). This issue is specifically common in revealed preference data (i.e., market
data), where consumers face dozens or even hundreds of product options. In typical
CBC settings, alternatives are usually restricted to a manageable number, e.g.,
three to four, and include a higher number of attributes (Rao 2014). However, some
respondents may not deem all the attributes to be relevant or may tend to ignore
them due to choice task characteristics, e.g., complexity (Hensher 2014). Hence, in
CBC, it seems more plausible that respondents ignore attributes, conventionally
termed “attribute non-attendance” (ANA)2, rather than alternatives. In turn,
in a given context, non-attended attributes do not contribute to the utility of a
particular individual, implying that the corresponding preference parameters in the
utility specification should be zero. In light of ANA, models assuming the use of all
attributes in decision-making (hereafter “full (attribute) attendance”3) may result
in biases in parameter estimates and, subsequently, in the derived willingness-to-pay
(WTP) and welfare estimates (e.g., Gilbride et al. 2006; Scarpa et al. 2009). Given
the plausibility and implications of ANA, in the following paper, we focus on its
prevalence in a marketing context.
One of the most promising ideas for tackling ANA, mainly issuing from fields
such as transportation, environmental, and health economics, is the use of a
2Note that the term “non-attendance” comes mainly from transportation science and in this context
is used as a synonym for “ignoring” or “not considering” an attribute in the decision-making.
To avoid being at odds with the main body of ANA literature, we adopt the corresponding
terminology.
3Note that as we assume all alternatives are considered, “full (attribute) attendance” is equivalent
to full information processing or full compensatory decision rule.
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latent class model, where each a priori defined class represents a specific attribute
attendance/non-attendance pattern (hereafter “attribute processing strategy”) and
hence a different utility specification (e.g., Hole 2011; Hess et al. 2013). The main
advantage of this approach is that ANA can be inferred based on the observed
choices alone instead of relying on auxiliary information such as respondents’ self-
stated measures (e.g., Hensher 2006) or proxies of ANA derived from process tracing
techniques (e.g., Currim et al. 2015; Meißner et al. 2011). Such information can
still be useful, and using it to augment the models for inferring ANA is a promising
strategy for obtaining a better understanding of the underlying individual behavior.
For example, Hole et al. (2013) and Hess et al. (2013) demonstrate the benefits of
using a stated ANA measure coupled with the latent class model. Nevertheless, an
open question remains: how useful are process tracing measures, specifically eye
tracking, within such a modeling framework for identifying ANA? This question is
precisely the focus of the current paper.
We build on Hole et al. (2013) and use a latent class approach that allows for
the simultaneous inference of ANA and preference heterogeneity and, in addition,
integrates information from eye tracking. In doing so, our objective is to better
understand and capture different attribute processing strategies individuals may
apply when making choices. Measures derived from eye tracking, which are
representative of underlying cognitive processes (Wedel and Pieters 2008) and
indicate the relevance of information (Meißner and Oll 2017), are best suited for
this purpose. Moreover, as Meißner et al. (2016) demonstrate, individuals become
more efficient and selective in how they look at information during CBC tasks.
Thus, eye tracking can be particularly informative in uncovering ANA in CBC.
Furthermore, eye movements are driven by both top-down (e.g., consumers’ goals,
traits) and bottom-up (e.g., salience, location, features of the stimuli) factors
(Wedel and Pieters 2008). As such, they may allow different drivers of ANA, i.e.,
person- (e.g., true irrelevance) and task-related (e.g., complexity), to be captured.
Our second objective is to understand the effect of visual attention on consumers’
actions, i.e., choice. We model this relationship so that visual attention affects the
likelihood of attending an attribute. Subsequently, the attended attributes enter
the utility function, are traded-off against each other and affect choice. Additionally,
we investigate whether this relationship varies across attributes.
Third, we aim to understand the prevalence of ANA in a marketing context,
where typically we observe varying levels of task complexity (e.g., many product
features and alternatives), consumer involvement, knowledge, and risks associated
with the product category (e.g., buying a car involves higher stakes than buying
a pen). Additionally, we aim to assess the consequences of neglecting ANA for
managerially relevant measures, such as WTP.
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In two empirical applications, we indeed find evidence that individuals ignore
attributes, with the majority attending to only three to four out of six available and
almost no one attending to all. We demonstrate that neglecting ANA results in
substantial biases in preference parameters and, accordingly, in derived aggregate
and individual-level measures such as the relative importance of attributes and
WTP. Moreover, we find a positive and significant effect of visual attention on the
likelihood of attending an attribute and demonstrate that eye tracking is helpful
in determining the allocation of individuals into segments and the sizes of those
segments, which describe specific attribute processing strategies.
We, therefore, contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we provide
further empirical evidence of ANA in two different marketing contexts and outline
the implications of the strict assumption of full attribute attendance. Second, we
contribute by proposing a novel framework of how visual attention might affect
choices through its implicit link to the relevance of and subsequent attendance
to attributes. This further allows investigating attribute-specific differences in
how attention translates into attendance. Third, we provide further validation of
methods for inferring ANA based on the observed choices. We find that relying
only on the observed choices can be sufficient for recovering general patterns in
applied attribute processing strategies and the distribution of WTP.
The rest of the manuscript is structured as follows. In section 4.2, we review
the related literature on existing approaches to incorporating ANA as well as on
the use of eye tracking in studying decision-making and choice. Subsequently,
we describe the methodology, including our main models as well as benchmark
models, the derivation of the visual attention measure, the estimation procedure
as well as measures of interest derived from the obtained parameter estimates. In
section 4.4, we present and discuss the results of two empirical applications. The
paper concludes with a summary and an outline of avenues for future research.
4.2 Related Literature
Our study links eye tracking with discrete choice models that account for ANA.
Therefore, in the following section, we concisely review the literature on methods
that explicitly account for ANA, outline general trends and recent developments in
this area, and provide an overview of eye tracking research in relation to decision-
making and choice.
4.2.1 Methods to Account for Attribute Non-attendance
To date, in the existing literature, two main approaches accommodating ANA can
be outlined (Hensher 2014). One approach, which we will refer to as exogenous,
solely relies on supplementary data collected during an experiment such as stated
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ANA (e.g., Hensher 2006), attribute importance ranking (e.g., Hess and Hensher
2013) from debriefing questions, click data from Mouselab experiments (Currim et al.
2015) and measures derived from eye tracking (e.g., Balcombe et al. 2015; Meißner
et al. 2011). The preference parameters in the random utility specification are then
conditioned on these measures by setting them to zero (e.g., Hensher et al. 2005),
rescaling them downwards (“shrinking”; e.g., Balcombe et al. 2015), or estimating
a separate set of parameters for non-attenders (e.g., Hess and Hensher 2010). Each
of the auxiliary measures used has certain limitations. In particular, stated ANA
is a subjective measure and depends on the recall, belief, and motivation of the
respondents (Hess and Hensher 2010). On the other hand, Mouselab experiments
may influence the respondents’ information search process (Glöckner and Betsch
2008). In contrast, in the case of the more objective eye tracking measure (Meißner
and Oll 2017), one needs to derive a discrete measure for use as a proxy for ANA.
For example, Balcombe et al. (2015) use fewer than two fixations as an indicator
of ANA in a given choice task. If the attribute was not attended to in more
than half of the choice tasks, it is considered non-attended throughout the choice
experiment. However, the choice of the cutoff in each and across all choice tasks
may influence the model outcomes. Moreover, attribute-specific cutoffs might be
more suitable, as some attributes may require more “looking,” depending on how
they are presented (e.g., as a picture or text)4. In the case ofFor all those measures,
a common limitation of the exogenous methods remains their deterministic use
(i.e., assuming a one-to-one relationship with ANA).
To address this limitation, several scholars have proposed inferring ANA from the
observed choices rather than solely relying on additional data (Hensher 2014). We
refer to this class of approaches as endogenous methods. Within this framework, e.g.,
Hess and Hensher (2010) suggested inferring ANA on the basis of high dispersion
of the individual-level conditional parameter distribution. By contrast, Scarpa et al.
(2009) and Hole (2011) propose a latent class approach probabilistically allocating
individuals into a priori defined classes that are based on (many or) all possible
attendance/non-attendance combinations, i.e., attribute processing strategies. This
approach was shown to outperform the exogenous approach relying on the stated
ANA measure (Scarpa et al. 2013). Endogenous models were further developed
to simultaneously accommodate heterogeneity in individual preferences (Gilbride
et al. 2006; Hess et al. 2013; Hole et al. 2013). As Hess et al. (2013) and Hole
et al. (2013) demonstrate, neglecting preference heterogeneity may result in an
overstatement of the amount of ANA, as the model may not correctly distinguish
between zero and low sensitivity.
4One way of identifying optimal cutoffs could be by, e.g., employing a grid-search. However, the
optimization problem can become rather complex in the case of attribute-specific cutoff values.
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A few scholars have proposed further augmenting these models by conditioning
class allocation on auxiliary information. For example, Swait et al. (2016) have used
complexity measures, potentially capturing task-driven ANA. However, Alemu et al.
(2013), using debriefing questions, establish that true irrelevance of the attributes
is a common reason for ANA. By contrast, Hole et al. (2013) and Collins et al.
(2013) use stated ANA as a covariate, which should capture different drivers of
ANA. Nevertheless, the objectivity and reliability of this measure remain an issue.
We build upon the outlined developments in the ANA literature and adopt
an endogenous approach for incorporating ANA. We simultaneously account for
heterogeneity in preferences (Hole et al. 2013) and, in contrast to the existing
literature, condition the class allocation on a measure of visual attention derived
from eye tracking. Notably, the main body of research on ANA streams from other
fields, including transportation, environmental and health economics. However,
ANA has practical relevance and importance in marketing, given the large variation
in characteristics for the choice situations consumers face.
4.2.2 Eye Tracking, Decision-making and Choice
Eye tracking has a long history in psychology and marketing research and has
been used in diverse settings to understand attentional processes, search behavior
and choice (Wedel and Pieters 2008). As eye movements are considered to be
representative of covert attention and cognitive processes (Wedel and Pieters 2008),
it has been paramount in studying consumer decision-making (see Orquin and
Loose 2013 for a comprehensive review).
For example, Shi et al. (2013) study the information acquisition of consumers on
comparison websites. Notably, they find that not all alternatives and attributes
receive attention or are discarded at the decision stage. Meißner et al. (2016)
explore attentional processes in CBC. They show that repeated choices reinforce
the ease of finding relevant information and that through the sequence of choice
tasks, respondents become more selective and faster at acquiring information.
Orquin et al. (2018) further demonstrate that predictability of the location of
the information, which is the case in CBC, increases (decreases) the likelihood of
looking at information of high (low) relevance. That is, while eye movements are
generally a result of both bottom-up (e.g., size of the stimuli) and top-down (e.g.,
consumer goals) factors, due to the learning that occurs in repeated choices, the
latter prevails (Orquin et al. 2013).
Other studies use eye tracking to relate attention to preferences (e.g., Toubia
et al. 2012), consideration set formation (e.g., Chandon et al. 2009), as well as
choice (e.g., Pieters and Warlop 1999). Furthermore, eye tracking has been essential
in studying and modeling consumer search behavior (e.g., Van der Lans et al. 2008;
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Reutskaja et al. 2011; Liechty et al. 2003). Notably, several studies have proposed
joint models of information search and choice. For example, Stüttgen et al. (2012)
jointly model search with a satisficing choice rule, i.e., where consumers stop the
evaluation process as soon as they find a satisfactory product. Yang et al. (2015)
propose a dynamic search model, in which information acquisition represents a
cognitive cost that must be compensated.
In contrast, we do not model information search. Instead, we are interested in
the link between visual attention and the underlying attribute processing strategy.
From this perspective, the studies of Balcombe et al. (2015), Meißner et al. (2011),
Krucien et al. (2017), and Van Loo et al. (2018) use eye tracking in the ANA context.
However, they adopt an exogenous approach of accounting for ANA, which suffers
from the limitations outlined in section 4.2.1. Conversely, we use an endogenous
approach that allows us to link eye fixations as a measure of visual attention that
is indicative of the relevance of the attribute information (Meißner and Oll 2017)
to the underlying ANA strategies in a probabilistic manner. Hence, we avoid any
explicit assumptions about a causal effect of eye movements on preferences as
outlined by Orquin and Loose (2013).
4.3 Methodology
We start this section by describing our main model – the mixed endogenous
attribute attendance (MEAA) model – which explicitly allows us to accommodate
both ANA and preference heterogeneity as well as to connect visual attention from
eye tracking to the consumers’ applied attribute processing strategy. We will also
discuss how we derive the measure of visual attention and explain the calculation
of the measures (e.g., the relative importance of attributes, WTP) and quantities
(e.g., posterior probabilities) that are obtained as a transformation of the parameter
estimates and used to generate insights in the empirical application.
4.3.1 Mixed Endogenous Attribute Attendance Model
The MEAA model (Hole et al. 2013) is a confirmatory latent class approach
(Hess et al. 2013) that relaxes the assumption of full information processing. In
particular, individuals can ignore any number and combination of attributes. Given
K attributes, there exist 2K possible attendance/non-attendance combinations or
attribute processing strategies (e.g., Hess et al. 2013). In the MEAA model, for
each of the possible attribute processing strategies, we have a corresponding latent
class s (s = 1, . . . ,S) that can be described by a K-dimensional column vector
λs = [λs1, . . . ,λsK ]′ of zeros and ones, indicating the attributes that are (λsk = 1)
and are not included (λsk = 0) in the specific class s.
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In this model, the utility individual i (i = 1, . . . , I) obtains from alternative j
(j = 1, . . . ,J) in choice task t (t= 1, . . . ,T ) is class-specific:
Uijt|s = xijt ·βis+ ϵijt, (4.1)
where xijt is a K-dimensional row vector of attribute values describing alternative
j in choice task t for individual i, βis is a column vector of corresponding preference
parameters, and ϵijt is an identically distributed type I extreme value error term.
The subscripts i and s indicate that the vector of preference parameters is individual-
and class-specific. The former allows incorporating preference heterogeneity, assum-
ing the individual parameters βi are distributed multivariate normal: βi ∼N(β,Σ).
The class-specific parameters are obtained via the elementwise multiplication of λs
with the individual-specific vector of parameters: βis = λs ◦βi. For the attributes
not included in class s, the corresponding elements in λs set the preference param-
eters to zero. We use effects coding for all categorical attributes (e.g., brand) and
linear specification for price-related attributes.5 If multiple elements in xijt are
related to an attribute (“attribute-levels”), we map the λs vector onto the correct
parameter dimension, such that if attribute k is not attended all mk attribute-levels
are not attended.
To illustrate the different utility functions in each of the classes, we provide
a simple example, in which products are described by three attributes, resulting
in S = 23 = 8 possible classes. As the parameter estimates are switched on and
off, each class is characterized by a different linear (additive) utility function,
presented in Table 4.1. As a result, several decision rules are incorporated: (class
1) full compensatory (i.e., full attendance), (class 8) random choice, (classes 5-7)
(a probabilistic version of) lexicographic, and (classes 2-4) semicompensatory, i.e.,
the compensatory rule applies only within the subset of attended attributes.
Even though we allow for ANA, we assume that individuals are utility maximiz-
ers. In doing so, we follow the bounded rationality literature, which states that
individuals can still act rationally by maximizing their utility but do so based on
partial and imperfect information (Rasouli and Timmermans 2015). Given the
distribution of the error term, within each class s, the probability of individual i
choosing alternative j in choice task t is
Pijt|s =
exp(xijt ·βis)∑︁
j′∈J exp(xij′t ·βis)
. (4.2)
Following Hole (2011), we assume that likelihood of attending a particular
attribute is independent of attending other attributes (IAA). Thus, the class
5Note that dummy coding is not an option here because then the reference level of an attribute
has a utility of zero and cannot be differentiated from ANA (Gilbride et al. 2006).
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Utility function Decision rule
Class 1: Uijt|1 = β1i ·x1ijt + β2i ·x2ijt + β3i ·x3ijt + ϵijt Full compensatory
Class 2: Uijt|2 = β2i ·x2ijt + β3i ·x3ijt + ϵijt Semicompensatory
Class 3: Uijt|3 = β1i ·x1ijt + β3i ·x3ijt + ϵijt Semicompensatory
Class 4: Uijt|4 = β1i ·x1ijt + β2i ·x2ijt + ϵijt Semicompensatory
Class 5: Uijt|5 = β1i ·x1ijt + ϵijt Lexicographic
Class 6: Uijt|6 = β2i ·x2ijt + ϵijt Lexicographic
Class 7: Uijt|7 = β3i ·x3ijt + ϵijt Lexicographic
Class 8: Uijt|8 = ϵijt Random choice
Notes: The upper notation indicates the preference parameter for a particular attribute
(variable): βki
Table 4.1. Class characteristics in case of 3 attributes
probabilities τis (where 0 ≤ τis ≤ 1 and ∑︁Ss=1 τis = 1) are modeled as a mapping
from the attribute attendance probabilities, πik, which are parametrized as a logistic
function:
τis =
K∏︂
k=1
πλskik · (1−πik)1−λsk , with πik =
exp(zik ·γ)
1+exp(zik ·γ) , (4.3)
where zik is a row vector with K attribute-specific intercepts and (possibly) E
attribute-specific individual-level variables (e.g., revealed or stated ANA) with
corresponding parameter vector γ. Note that the additional variables entering
zik are optional, and the MEAA model can be estimated without any extra
information. In this case, the attribute attendance probabilities πik and respective
class probabilities τis are common across individuals, and the subscript i can be
dropped. The submodel in Equation (4.3) is closely related to the model proposed
by Swait and Ben-Akiva (1987) for modeling choice set heterogeneity and to the
concomitant latent class models of Kamakura et al. (1994). Although the IAA
assumption seems restrictive, it ensures parsimony and the practicality of the model
because the number of parameters rises linearly with K, not S, as would be the
case if we use a multinomial logit model for τis with S−1 class-specific intercepts
(Hole 2011). In addition to the loss of parsimony, relaxing the IAA assumption may
reduce model stability (i.e., issues with local maxima) while offering only marginal
improvements in fit (Hess et al. 2013).
The unconditional probability of individual i choosing alternative j in choice
task t can be derived by combining Equations (4.2) and (4.3), where τis can be
interpreted as the size of class s and is the prior probability of finding individual i
in class s:
Pijt =
S∑︂
s=1
τis ·Pijt|s. (4.4)
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The utility function in Equation (4.1) allows a straightforward derivation of
restricted models, which do not include either ANA, preference heterogeneity or
both. For example, by setting τ1 = 1 (i.e., everyone belongs to class 1 with full
attendance), the MEAA model is reduced to the mixed multinomial logit (MMNL)
model. By setting Σ = 0 while retaining all S classes, the MEAA reduces to
the endogeneous attribute attendance (EAA) model proposed by Hole (2011).
Combining both restrictions leads to the multinomial logit (MNL) model. Hence,
the MNL, EAA, and MMNL models are all special cases of the MEAA model and
will serve as benchmarks in the empirical application.
4.3.2 Estimation Procedure
For statistical inference, we employ maximum likelihood estimation with sample
log-likelihood LL(θ) =∑︁i∈I ln(Li) where Li is the likelihood of individual i, and
θ denotes the vector of unknown parameters θ = [β,vec(Σ),γ]′. For the MEAA
model, Li is the weighted sum of the respective class-specific likelihoods, i.e.,
Li =
∑︁S
s=1 τis ·Li|s. The latter represents the sequence of observed choices for
individual i conditional on class s because the data have a panel structure (i.e., t
choice tasks for each individual i), and we assume that individuals do not change
the attribute processing strategy across tasks:
Li|s =
∫︂ T∏︂
t=1
J∏︂
j=1
P
yijt
ijt|sϕ(βi|β,Σ)dβi, (4.5)
where yijt is a dummy indicating whether alternative j was chosen by individual i
in choice task t, and ϕ is the density of the normal distribution. For the MMNL
model, no weighting by class probabilities is necessary. For the EAA model,
preference parameters are homogeneous, and therefore no integration over the
parameter distribution is required. For the MNL model, neither integration over
the parameter distribution nor weighting by class probabilities is required.
As the integral over the density of βi in Equation (4.5) has no closed-form
solution, we adopt the simulated maximum likelihood approach and approximate it
using 500 Halton draws (Train 2009). We estimate all parameters simultaneously
using the gradient-based Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm (see
Train 2009, p. 225). Because latent class models may have multiple local optima
(see Wedel and Kamakura 2000), multiple starting values were tested to find the
global optimum (Dayton and Macready 1988).
4.3.3 Postestimation Measures
Based on the estimated parameters, we derive several quantities that are essential
for our analysis. In the (M)EAA models, we can segment respondents into the
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specific classes of attribute processing strategies, and for this, we use the estimated
parameters θˆ in Equations (4.3) and (4.5) to obtain posterior class probabilities
via Bayes’ rule (Wedel and Kamakura 2000):
τˆpost.is =
τˆ is ·Li|s∑︁S
s′=1 τˆ is′ ·Li|s′
, (4.6)
Here, the prior class probabilities are reweighted by the estimated likelihood of each
individual i conditional on class s. The resulting posterior class probabilities repre-
sent a “fuzzy” segmentation criterion, and individuals can be fractional members of
(multiple) attribute processing strategy segments. Given our assumption that each
individual has a specific attribute processing strategy, we opt for a nonoverlapping
segmentation and assign individuals to the class where the value of τˆpost.is is the
highest (cf. Desarbo et al. 1995). To assess the degree of overlap, we use the
entropy (Wedel and Kamakura 2000):
entropy= 1+
∑︁I
i=1
∑︁S
s=1 τˆ
post.
is · ln(τˆpost.is )
I · ln(S) . (4.7)
This measure is bound between 0 and 1, with values of zero indicating complete
overlap between class allocations (i.e., all posterior class probabilities are equal)
and values close to one implying a more certain class assignment with minimal
overlap.
Furthermore, we derive some key measures that represent a transformation of
the estimated preference parameters such as the relative importance of attributes
and WTP, which have practical significance for marketing managers (Rao 2014).
We base these measures on the conditional individual-level estimates βˆis; i.e., we
utilize all the available information (e.g., observed choices and other individual-level
information) in a submodel of class probabilities in Equation (4.3) to increase the
accuracy of the preference estimate for a given individual (Hensher et al. 2015).
After obtaining the class for each individual with the highest value of τˆpost.is ,
denoted by sˆ, for models with preference heterogeneity (i.e., MMNL, MEAA, and
MEAA(va)) we employ Bayes’ rule again to condition on the observed choices
and compute the posterior means of the parameters on the individual level (Train
2009):
βˆ
post.
isˆ =
∫︁
βˆisˆ
∏︁T
t=1
∏︁J
j=1P
yijt
ijt|sˆϕ(βi|β,Σ)dβi∫︁ ∏︁T
t=1
∏︁J
j=1P
yijt
ijt|sˆϕ(βi|β,Σ)dβi
, (4.8)
where we again employ a simulation method with Halton draws to approximate
the integrals. We use this definition of individual estimates because it preserves
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the value zero on the individual level if i is classified as a non-attender. This
feature is essential in marketing applications because it also translates into the
derived measures, such as relative importance and WTP (as described next). For
the MMNL model, we do not have to condition on a specific class.
The relative importance of an attribute is the ratio of its utility range to the
sum of the utility ranges of all attributes (Rao 2014). We compute the utility
ranges on the individual level from βˆpost.isˆ . Furthermore, we use two aggregate
measures for the (M)EAA model (similar to Gilbride et al. 2006). First, we
calculate the mean across all individuals, including individuals who did not attend
to attribute k and have a corresponding relative importance of zero. Second, we
are interested in assessing this measure for individuals who, in fact, attended to the
specific attribute; hence, we compute the average for this subset of individuals. For
targeting specific segments, this measure of relative importance entails essential
and relevant information for managers.
We compute individual WTP values from βˆpost.isˆ by dividing the parameters
(respectively, the differences in attribute-level related parameters) of nonprice
related attributes by the negative price parameter. Hence, conveniently, we rescale
the utility of each attribute in monetary units (Rao 2014). Following a similar logic
as that used for the relative importance computation, we derive an average WTP
for an attribute across all and one across the subset of individuals who attended to
the attribute.
4.3.4 Measure of Visual Attention
Subsequently, we use a continuous measure of visual attention derived from eye
tracking as additional individual-level information, which enters zik in Equation (4.3)
in the (M)EAA model specification. This is similar to the inclusion of consumer
descriptors (concomitant variables) in latent class models (Kamakura et al. 1994;
Wedel and Kamakura 2000). For example, Gupta and Chintagunta (1994) use
demographics in the context of brand choice using scanner panel data and Swait
and Adamowicz (2001) employ complexity measures when modeling choices in a
stated choice experiment. Generally, the additional information used as a covariate
in the submodel of class probabilities proves to increase model fit and aids with
the identification of the latent classes (Dayton and Macready 1988).
We use eye fixations as an input for our metric. This choice from among the
possible eye tracking metrics is motivated by the fact that the number of fixations
is one of the most commonly used proxies indicating information acquisition and
attention (Wedel and Pieters 2008) and has been previously used in the context of
ANA (e.g., Balcombe et al. 2015). Furthermore, in line with previous literature, we
also find it to be highly correlated with fixation duration. In CBC, the information in
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each choice task is presented in matrix form, where attributes are typically presented
as rows and alternatives as columns. Given K attributes and J alternatives, this
results in a K×J matrix, with each (k,j) element characterizing attribute k for
alternative j. We define each of the (k,j) elements as a separate area of interest. In
a given task t for each individual i, we count the number of fixations on each area
of interest, i.e., the (k,j) element. As non-attendance is defined for an attribute
(and not its levels), we the sum the number of fixations for each row k across
all J alternatives, and as we are interested in the overall attention pattern, we
further sum across all T choice tasks. Next, we standardize this measure within
each individual to control for potential heterogeneity and label it as vaik. Our
motivation for standardization is similar to that in Pieters and Warlop (1999),
where the visual attention measure is centered for each individual to control for
differences in experimental conditions.
Using vaik as additional information in zik should help to model πik and, therefore,
τis. In particular, we expect a positive effect of vaik on πik. Nevertheless, the
probabilistic relationship between visual attention and the particular attribute
processing strategy, in contrast to exogenous approaches to accommodating ANA,
allows for the possibility that looking at given information does not guarantee that
it is deployed in decision-making.
4.4 Empirical Application
We start the following section by describing the two datasets we chose for our
empirical application. We then continue with a detailed discussion of the estimation
results, e.g., model fit, parameter estimates, including the effect of visual attention,
as well as the differences in subsequent individual class memberships, the relative
importance of attributes and WTP.
4.4.1 Data
We employ two studies involving choices in different durable product categories:
coffee makers and laptops, conducted by Meißner et al. (2016) and Yang et al.
(2015), respectively. Both combine a CBC study with an eye tracking experiment,
i.e., eye movements of the respondents were simultaneously tracked while they
completed the choice tasks (for details on the eye tracking devices used and the
experimental setup, we kindly refer the reader to the respective articles). We chose
these two datasets because they represent typical CBC studies used in marketing
research. Therefore, the results of our analysis are relevant to a broader marketing
audience. However, they differ in terms of the product category and some features
of the experimental setup and design presented in Table 4.2, which enables us to
validate that the general patterns we find hold across contexts.
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Study Coffee makers Laptops
Number of respondents: I = 59 I = 70
Number of choice tasks: T = 12 T = 20
Number of alternatives: J = 3 + none J = 4
Number of attributes: K = 6 K = 6
Attributes (number of levels): Brand (4), material (3),
system (2), design (4),
price per cup (3), price (4)
Speed (4), size (4),
capacity (4), support (4),
antivirus (4), price (4)
Number of potential classes: S = 64 S = 64
Choice task design: Orthogonal and level
balanced
Random design
Randomization across subjects: Yes No
Incentive alignment: No Yes
Source: Meißner et al. (2016) Yang et al. (2015)
Table 4.2. Description of datasets
In both cases, the respondents were sampled from students of European universi-
ties. After excluding responses with incomplete data or a straight-lining pattern,
we obtain samples of 59 (coffee makers) and 70 (laptops) respondents, which is a
typical sample size for eye tracking experiments. The studies vary in the number of
choice tasks: 12 in coffee maker study and 20 in the laptop study. A “none” option
was included in the coffee maker study, with an average choice share of 15.4%. The
rest of the choice shares were equally distributed among the three alternatives. In
the laptop study, the average choice share distribution was slightly less balanced,
ranging from 21 to 30%. Additionally, the laptop study was incentive-aligned, but
without a “none” option, which makes it inappropriate for WTP calculation (Al-
lenby et al. 2014). The studies further differ in presentation format. In particular,
the attributes in the coffee maker study vary in terms of information type: pictorial
(e.g., design and system), numeric (e.g., price) or textual (e.g., brand), font size,
and color (see Figure 1 in Meißner et al. 2016, p. 5). By contrast, the laptop study
uses a standardized information presentation format that contains mainly numeric
information and uses similar font sizes and colors across attributes (see Figure 1
in Yang et al. 2015, p. 168). Both studies include six attributes, resulting in 64
possible attribute processing strategies. Therefore, we can investigate how well the
models can identify the particular strategy applied by an individual given these
many possibilities.
Regarding the eye tracking information, we observe that on average, respondents
fixate 41 (58) times per choice task in the coffee maker (laptop) study, with
substantial variation across respondents (standard deviation (SD) of 25 (34) in
the coffee maker (laptop) study). We also observe differences in the number of
fixations across attributes. In particular, on average price and price per cup receive
the highest number of fixations per task in the coffee maker study (approx. 8.40),
followed by system (6.80), material (6.21), design (6.16), and brand (4.77). In the
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laptop study, speed receives the highest (15) number of fixations per task, followed
by size, capacity, and price (10-12) and support and antivirus (approx. 5). The per
task fixations on a given attribute range from 0 up to 32 for design and up to 89 for
price per cup in the coffee maker study, up to 41 for antivirus and as much as up
to 82 for speed in the laptop study. However, across choice tasks, all respondents
fixate on all attributes. Considering that we define non-attendance for an attribute
and not its levels and that we are interested in the overall pattern of attention
across tasks, we derive our person-attribute specific measure of visual attention as
described in section 4.3.4. In both datasets, the measure varies substantially across
attributes (mean ranging from −0.70 to 0.53 for coffee makers and from −0.95
to 1.13 for laptops), across individuals (SD ranging from 0.75 to 0.89 for coffee
makers and 0.24 to 0.79 for laptops), as well as within individuals (average range
across individuals of 2.59 for coffee makers and 2.51 for laptops). This variation,
therefore, allows identification of the parameter estimates, and hence we conclude
that both datasets are well suited for our analysis.
4.4.2 Model Comparison
For each of the datasets, we have estimated six models, MNL, MMNL, EAA,
EAA(va), MEAA, and MEAA(va), where “va” indicates that the models include
the visual attention measure. In the initial solutions, the MEAA and MEAA(va)
models had very large and positive intercept estimates in the submodel of the
class probabilities in Equation (4.3) for the attributes price (coffee makers) and
support (laptops). Note that this is not an issue and only shows that there is
no ANA for these attributes after controlling for preference heterogeneity (Hole
et al. 2013). Hence, we simply re-estimated the models setting these attributes to
100% attendance. Thus, for both datasets, 25 = 32 possible attribute processing
strategies (or classes) are available. We also included a dummy variable for the
“none” option in the coffee maker study but did not allow for ANA here, as “none”
is not a product attribute. Additionally, we estimated the heterogeneous models
with a diagonal specification of Σ for reasons of parsimony. We report the final
estimation results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.
In general, we are interested in several comparisons. First, by contrasting models
with and without heterogeneity, we aim to validate the importance of accounting for
preference heterogeneity, primarily due to potential confounding with ANA. Second,
by comparing the models that assume full attendance with those including ANA,
we outline the implications of neglecting the latter in a marketing context. Third,
we compare models that include the measure of visual attention (i.e., EAA(va) and
MEAA(va)) vs. “regular” ANA models (i.e., EAA and MEAA).
For the comparison of in-sample fit across models, we use log-likelihood (LL)
and McFadden’s R2 (ρ2) (see Wedel and Kamakura 2000). ρ2 offers an intuitive
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MNL EAA EAA(va) MMNL MEAA MEAA(va)
Utility Parameters
None β -0.19 (0.11) 0.33 (0.13) 0.30 (0.14) -2.46 (0.87) -2.53 (0.96) -2.64 (0.91)
σ 4.39 (0.78) 4.48 (0.85) 4.67 (0.81)
Brand: Braun β 0.06 (0.09) 1.51 (0.49) 0.60 (0.50) 0.08 (0.14) 0.52 (0.47) 0.43 (0.32)
σ 0.39 (0.16) 0.55 (0.37) 0.63 (0.33)
Brand: Krups β 0.01 (0.09) 0.69 (0.49) 0.38 (0.38) -0.02 (0.12) 0.15 (0.39) 0.33 (0.41)
σ 0.05 (0.26) 0.88 (0.45) 0.62 (0.33)
Brand: Philips β 0.23 (0.09) 0.99 (0.54) 0.62 (0.33) 0.38 (0.12) 0.90 (0.34) 0.68 (0.28)
σ 0.26 (0.18) 0.16 (0.48) 0.71 (0.35)
Material: β 0.51 (0.07) 1.52 (0.19) 1.43 (0.19) 0.78 (0.11) 1.87 (0.30) 1.70 (0.22)
Stainless steel σ 0.40 (0.13) 0.36 (0.26) 0.30 (0.19)
Material: β -0.51 (0.08) -1.67 (0.25) -1.51 (0.24) -0.80 (0.12) -2.01 (0.35) -1.78 (0.27)
Plastic σ 0.41 (0.16) 0.60 (0.40) 0.53 (0.27)
System: Pad β 0.22 (0.05) 1.73 (0.24) 1.50 (0.20) 0.33 (0.12) 1.99 (0.28) 1.90 (0.28)
σ 0.79 (0.14) 0.16 (1.07) 0.51 (0.40)
Design: A β -0.29 (0.09) -2.20 (0.75) -1.81 (0.53) -0.48 (0.13) -2.61 (1.09) -2.06 (0.58)
σ 0.01 (0.21) 0.02 (0.84) 0.05 (0.48)
Design: B β 0.03 (0.09) 0.32 (0.37) 0.25 (0.34) 0.05 (0.12) 0.31 (0.43) 0.23 (0.36)
σ 0.09 (0.17) 0.17 (0.53) 0.19 (0.44)
Design: C β 0.13 (0.09) 1.40 (0.41) 1.26 (0.30) 0.24 (0.12) 1.73 (0.72) 1.43 (0.35)
σ 0.20 (0.28) 0.47 (0.52) 0.07 (0.40)
Price per cup β -0.80 (0.07) -1.76 (0.18) -1.74 (0.16) -1.34 (0.16) -1.77 (0.28) -1.90 (0.22)
σ 0.83 (0.14) 0.86 (0.20) 0.64 (0.19)
Price β -2.12 (0.17) -3.72 (0.36) -3.72 (0.33) -3.45 (0.39) -4.19 (0.48) -4.13 (0.43)
σ 1.78 (0.34) 1.61 (0.43) 1.59 (0.40)
Class Parameters
Brand -2.08 (0.69) -0.08 (1.46) -0.54 (0.82) 1.59 (1.48)
Material -0.15 (0.35) 0.28 (0.52) -0.03 (0.36) 0.86 (0.60)
System -1.42 (0.38) -1.84 (0.47) -1.01 (0.33) -2.02 (0.64)
Design -1.76 (0.58) -2.05 (0.66) -1.72 (0.60) -2.64 (0.87)
Price per cup 0.57 (0.37) -0.13 (0.48) 2.08 (1.29) 0.72 (0.71)
Price 1.60 (0.53) 1.03 (0.58)
Visual attention 1.94 (0.36) 2.88 (0.66)
Number of parameters 12 18 19 24 29 30
In-sample
LL -745.11 -688.89 -656.50 -600.81 -578.33 -540.66
BIC 1568.98 1495.90 1437.68 1359.11 1346.96 1278.19
ρ2 0.24 0.30 0.33 0.39 0.41 0.45
Out-of-sample
Hitrate 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.64 0.67 0.68
Hitprob 0.43 0.49 0.51 0.59 0.62 0.63
Note: standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
Table 4.3. Estimation results for the coffee maker study
interpretation, with values between 0.2 and 0.4 indicating a very good fit (Louviere
et al. 2000). We also use the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for model
selection. Compared to LL, BIC penalizes for model complexity and can be used
for the comparison of non-nested models.6
First, the models fit the data in both applications quite well. Furthermore,
as suggested by the smaller BIC, larger ρ2, and LL-values, all heterogeneous
models outperform their homogeneous counterparts in both applications. For
example, the MEAA model outperforms the EAA model and the MEAA(va) model
outperforms the EAA(va) model. Moreover, the MMNL model outperforms all
homogenous models, including the best-fitting EAA(va) model. Thus, relaxing
6Note that the MEAA model nests all other models at the boundary of the parameter space,
hence the LL ratio test is not applicable (McLachlan and Peel 2000).
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MNL EAA EAA(va) MMNL MEAA MEAA(va)
Utility Parameters
Speed: 1.6 Ghz β -1.69 (0.11) -2.26 (0.19) -2.72 (0.20) -2.71 (0.21) -3.16 (0.26) -3.00 (0.24)
σ 1.15 (0.15) 0.89 (0.15) 1.08 (0.16)
Speed: 1.9 Ghz β -0.69 (0.09) -0.91 (0.12) -1.14 (0.13) -1.17 (0.13) -1.46 (0.16) -1.36 (0.16)
σ 0.24 (0.16) 0.56 (0.15) 0.07 (0.34)
Speed: 2.7 Ghz β 0.98 (0.09) 1.19 (0.12) 1.45 (0.13) 1.62 (0.13) 1.84 (0.16) 1.73 (0.15)
σ 0.39 (0.12) 0.01 (0.23) 0.24 (0.18)
Size: 26 cm β -0.31 (0.06) -1.68 (0.24) -2.04 (0.24) -0.44 (0.14) -0.38 (0.22) -0.07 (0.28)
σ 1.34 (0.16) 2.25 (0.33) 2.69 (0.40)
Size: 35.6 cm β 0.22 (0.08) 0.11 (0.17) 0.23 (0.18) 0.29 (0.13) 0.76 (0.23) 0.74 (0.22)
σ 0.73 (0.12) 0.84 (0.14) 0.97 (0.16)
Size: 40 cm β -0.03 (0.09) 0.41 (0.19) 0.52 (0.22) 0.00 (0.12) 0.13 (0.20) 0.06 (0.20)
σ 0.13 (0.16) 0.21 (0.25) 0.51 (0.27)
Capacity: 160 GB β -1.16 (0.10) -1.99 (0.19) -2.11 (0.19) -1.82 (0.16) -2.48 (0.26) -2.40 (0.24)
σ 0.69 (0.11) 0.56 (0.17) 0.43 (0.17)
Capacity: 320 GB β 0.05 (0.08) 0.23 (0.12) 0.15 (0.12) 0.05 (0.12) 0.08 (0.14) 0.05 (0.14)
σ 0.06 (0.13) 0.07 (0.24) 0.33 (0.13)
Capacity: 500 GB β 0.61 (0.08) 1.00 (0.13) 1.12 (0.11) 0.99 (0.11) 1.25 (0.14) 1.22 (0.14)
σ 0.07 (0.10) 0.00 (0.12) 0.01 (0.10)
Support: 1 year β -0.15 (0.10) 0.49 (0.26) 0.78 (0.37) -0.29 (0.13) -0.27 (0.13) -0.24 (0.12)
σ 0.17 (0.13) 0.27 (0.13) 0.30 (0.13)
Support: 2 year β 0.17 (0.08) 0.54 (0.27) 0.37 (0.42) 0.23 (0.11) 0.15 (0.11) 0.14 (0.11)
σ 0.29 (0.11) 0.16 (0.16) 0.02 (0.19)
Support: 3 year β 0.03 (0.07) -0.18 (0.22) -0.24 (0.36) 0.06 (0.10) 0.05 (0.10) -0.02 (0.10)
σ 0.03 (0.09) 0.01 (0.12) 0.00 (0.12)
Antivirus: 30
days
β -0.01 (0.06) -3.28 (0.55) -3.29 (0.54) -0.05 (0.09) -3.56 (0.81) -3.60 (0.67)
σ 0.36 (0.11) 0.99 (0.97) 0.51 (0.73)
Antivirus: 1 year β -0.10 (0.09) 0.25 (0.33) 0.24 (0.33) -0.18 (0.12) 0.05 (0.45) 0.00 (0.39)
σ 0.12 (0.10) 0.19 (0.48) 0.30 (0.51)
Antivirus: 2 year β 0.19 (0.09) 1.95 (0.41) 1.81 (0.38) 0.29 (0.13) 2.07 (0.51) 1.99 (0.47)
σ 0.21 (0.13) 0.22 (0.59) 0.30 (0.38)
Price β -0.36 (0.03) -0.98 (0.06) -0.95 (0.07) -0.56 (0.07) -0.76 (0.11) -1.08 (0.12)
σ 0.95 (0.10) 0.74 (0.07) 0.66 (0.08)
Class Parameters
Speed 2.21 (0.77) -1.28 (0.50) 2.65 (0.79) -0.83 (1.01)
Size -0.89 (0.40) -2.78 (0.49) 0.36 (0.45) -2.74 (0.74)
Capacity 0.82 (0.41) 0.44 (0.37) 1.28 (0.49) 1.16 (0.56)
Support -1.37 (0.77) 0.08 (1.28)
Antivirus -2.57 (0.49) -0.70 (0.56) -2.47 (0.53) 0.72 (0.79)
Price -0.18 (0.26) -0.52 (0.36) 2.31 (2.20) 1.39 (0.60)
Visual attention 2.34 (0.35) 4.79 (0.84)
Number of parameters 16 22 23 32 37 38
In-sample
LL -1415.82 -1199.59 -1164.76 -1111.62 -1067.89 -1020.64
BIC 2947.56 2558.56 2496.14 2455.05 2403.81 2316.56
ρ2 0.27 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.47
Out-of-sample
Hitrate 0.56 0.61 0.63 0.70 0.70 0.70
Hitprob 0.43 0.54 0.55 0.62 0.64 0.64
Note: standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
Table 4.4. Estimation results for the laptop study
the assumption of homogeneity in preferences is crucial, including for models that
accommodate ANA. In addition, in both applications, there is more to gain by
accounting only for preference heterogeneity vs. only for ANA. Second, the MEAA
and MEAA(va) models outperform the MMNL model, while the EAA and EAA(va)
models outperform the MNL model, i.e., in general, accounting for ANA leads
to considerable improvement in model fit across both applications. Finally, the
MEAA(va) model is, overall, the best-fitting model and outperforms the MEAA
model in both studies, even after accounting for model complexity. Similarly, the
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EAA(va) model outperforms the EAA model. Hence, the visual attention measure
is a useful indicator of ANA.7
To assess the predictive validity of the models, we additionally report hit rate and
hit probability as common measures of out-of-sample fit (Gilbride et al. 2006). Using
the individual-level posterior parameter estimates, we computed the measures from
leave-one-out cross-validation (Maldonado et al. 2015). In each fold, we randomly
left out one choice task for each respondent, repeated this procedure T times, and
averaged the results. Hence, all observations are also used once in the validation,
which increases the robustness of the results, however, at the cost of the need for
T estimation runs. The hit rate is the average rate of correct predictions across
the individuals. However, it does not convey any information on the “certainty” of
the prediction. By contrast, hit probability, as the average predicted probability
of the chosen alternative across the sample, does. These measures confirm the
in-sample model selection results. Although the relative differences across models
are somewhat smaller, we do not detect overfitting. In general, all the heterogeneous
models fit very well both in-sample (ρ2 values of over 0.39) and out-of-sample
(hit rate of more than 0.64 and hit probability of more than 0.59 among four
alternatives). Therefore, getting any additional improvement out-of-sample is
challenging. We would, hence, consider the MEAA(va) model to be more reliable.
As we will show, they generate somewhat different insights, particularly on the
individual level.
4.4.3 Parameter Estimates
The resulting parameter estimates are presented in the upper panels in Tables
4.3 and 4.4. In general, the estimates across all models in both studies have face
validity (e.g., negative price parameters) and reasonable magnitudes. However, we
do observe relevant differences in utility parameters across models. We observe
both increases and decreases in the magnitudes when moving from the worse-
fitting (M)MNL models to the better-fitting (M)EAA and (M)EAA(va) models.
For example, in the MEAA and MEAA(va) models, the mean price parameter
increases in magnitude compared to the MMNL model, while the heterogeneity
(i.e., σ) decreases. As we find some level of non-attendance to price in the laptop
7As an additional validation exercise, we have used the derived measure of visual attention in an
exogenous approach. Using a grid search, we determined the cutoff value for building the discrete
indicator of ANA. The corresponding attributes are then set to zero in the MNL and MMNL
models. These benchmark models (which can be estimated using standard software) outperform
the MNL and MMNL models and generate a similar fit compared to the EAA and MEAA
models. Additionally, we have tested an alternative specification of the visual attention measure,
assuming higher informativeness (and therefore weights) of the measure for the later choice
tasks due to potential learning effects. In particular, we have assumed a logarithmic function
for deriving the weights for the choice task number. Testing this measure using the simple
EAA(va) model did not clearly improve model fit for both data sets and led to substantively
similar results. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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study, it is expected that some of the heterogeneity recovered in the MMNL
model is now captured by the non-attendance class, shifting the mean away from
zero and implying less continuous heterogeneity. For the coffee maker study, the
shift in the price estimate initially seems counterintuitive considering it is fully
attended. However, as Hess et al. (2013) state, such changes may also depend on
the specification of other attributes. Along with the potential scale differences, the
latter complicates the direct comparison of the utility estimates. Assuming that
the true model includes preference heterogeneity and ANA, the results show that
neglecting the latter leads to biased estimates.
Turning to the class parameters in the (M)EAA models, we see large differences in
the intercepts across attributes in both datasets. This already indicates differences
in the attribute attendance probabilities, and interestingly, the differences in
intercepts persist in models including the visual attention measure. Regarding
the latter, we observe a positive and significant effect in both applications, i.e., a
higher level of visual attention generally results in a higher likelihood of attending
an attribute. Notably, the magnitude of the effect increases in the MEAA(va)
compared to the EAA(va) model potentially due to the confounding of preference
heterogeneity and ANA. As visual attention should be indicative of non-attendance
rather than low sensitivity, by better isolating these two in the MEAA(va) model,
the relationship between visual attention and attribute attendance becomes more
pronounced. We find further support of the confounding effect when examining the
average attribute attendance probabilities presented in Figure 4.1. In particular, in
both studies for almost all attributes, attendance probabilities are higher in the
MEAA models, becoming 100% for price in coffee makers and support in laptops.
The higher attribute attendance probabilities also translate into a higher prob-
ability of attending more attributes, as evident from the shift of the probability
distribution of the number of attended attributes to the right for the MEAA models
(see Figure 4.2). Analyzing the choices regarding prescription drugs and commuting
routes, respectively, Hole et al. (2013) and Hess et al. (2013) also find that many
attributes become 100% attended after accounting for heterogeneity. However, we
still see a considerable amount of non-attendance for most of the attributes in our
two applications. For example, except price and price per cup, the attendance
probabilities for all other attributes in the coffee maker study remain below 50%,
resulting in the majority of respondents attending to three out of six attributes
in the MEAA models. One potential explanation is the differences in the level of
involvement and the associated risk of the decision in the various contexts. We find
further supporting evidence by noting that the levels of non-attendance are lower in
the laptop study, potentially due to incentive alignment and a higher risk related to
financial cost. Additionally, we observe a larger shift of the probability distribution
for the number of attended attributes to the right in the MEAA models, with the
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Figure 4.1. Attribute attendance probabilities
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Figure 4.2. Probability of attending a certain number of attributes
majority attending to four out of six attributes. It is, however, noteworthy that
despite incentive alignment, some respondents did not attend to price.
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Returning to the comparison of the MEAA(va) and MEAA models, some dif-
ferences are visible in the attendance probabilities for price per cup in the coffee
maker study, where the MEAA(va) model retrieves and attendance probability
that is lower by 12.3 percentage points. Likewise, for laptops, we find attendance
probabilities that are 7.5 to 15.6 percentage points lower for capacity, size, and
price. As a result, the share of the respondents attending to three (four) attributes
in the coffee maker (laptop) study becomes larger, mainly on account of the smaller
share of those attending to five or six attributes. All in all, we find ample evidence
for ANA in both product categories, frequent use of semicompensatory (more than
98%), rare use of lexicographic (0-2%) and full compensatory strategy (less than
1%), and no use of random choice. Due to the better fit and potential issues with
confounding, from this point on, we focus on the heterogeneous models.
4.4.4 Visual Attention and Attribute Non-attendance
The relationship between visual attention and attribute (non)attendance merits
a more detailed discussion. All in all, paying more attention to an attribute
increases the likelihood of, but does not guarantee its use when making choices.
Moreover, while we observe positive slopes, due to variation in attribute intercepts,
the same amount of visual attention results in different attendance probabilities
across attributes, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Here, we have calculated the attendance probabilities for a range of values of
visual attention (observed in the datasets) using the estimated γˆ parameters. The
positive (negative) values of attribute intercepts shift this sigmoid relationship to
the left (right), such that for a given amount of visual attention (e.g., 0), a higher
attendance probability is implied for brand, followed by material, price per cup,
system, and design for coffee makers (left panel). Please note that we only have a
horizontal line for price, as it is always attended. Importantly, the intercepts are
not only affected by the relevance of the attributes for the decision-making but may
also confound with other effects such as, e.g., presentation format. In particular,
the attributes in the coffee maker study vary in size, color, and type of information
(numeric, text, or pictorial), which may affect the amount of attention they receive
(e.g., Milosavljevic et al. 2012). Due to the differences in the intercepts, the
lowest (highest) values of visual attention on a given attribute across respondents
(represented as dots in Figure 4.3) do not necessarily lead to the lowest (highest)
attendance probabilities. For example, brand has the lowest average value of
visual attention (−0.7) but a higher attendance probability than system or design,
which receive a moderate amount of visual attention. However, even in the laptop
study, which uses a standardized presentation format, we still observe substantial
heterogeneity across attributes. Moreover, the slopes are steeper in comparison to
the coffee maker study and this is potentially due to incentive alignment, which
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Figure 4.3. Effect of visual attention on attribute attendance probability (MEAA(va)) models
induces respondents to pay more attention to relevant information and be more
consistent in their behavior (Yang et al. 2018) as well as a standardized presentation
format. Both may subsequently lead to a less noisy measure of visual attention
and therefore, a larger effect size.
4.4.5 Differences in Class Allocation
We now turn to the comparison of the MEAA models to investigate how much the
visual attention measure helps with allocating people into classes. To this end, we
compare the entropy measure calculated in Equation (4.7). We obtain values of
0.66 (0.76) in the MEAA model and 0.75 (0.84) in the MEAA(va) model in the
coffee maker (laptop) study. Considering 32 classes in both applications, the class
allocation already appears to be quite good in the MEAA model and even more so in
the MEAA(va) model. To illustrate some general patterns and critical distinctions
between the models, we report an example of class allocation for two respondents
in the coffee maker study in Figure 4.4. However, these are representative for most
of the respondents in the analyses (64% and 70% in the coffee maker and laptop
studies, respectively), where the MEAA(va) model compared to the MEAA model
has a higher posterior probability for the identified class.
More specifically, id = 14 (top panel) represents the case (34% and 26% in
the coffee maker and laptop studies, respectively) where the MEAA(va) and the
MEAA models indicate the same class, but the former results in a higher posterior
probability. By contrast, id = 28 (bottom panel) illustrates the case (30% and
44% in coffee maker and laptop studies, respectively), where the class allocation
is different, with the MEAA(va) model having a higher posterior probability for
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Figure 4.4. Class allocation based on the MEAA and MEAA(va) models for
selected individuals in the coffee maker study
the identified class. As the classes are distinct in terms of the implied attribute
processing strategy, differences in the class allocation will have consequences for
other individual-level measures. For instance, the MEAA(va) model suggests that
id = 28, in addition to price (which is always attended), most likely attends to
design. In contrast, the MEAA model suggests that this respondent only attends
to price and potentially to price per cup. Therefore, the vector of parameters for id
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= 28 would be considerably different between the models, which will have further
repercussions for the WTP. Given that the models suggest different class allocations
(irrespective of which model leads to a higher posterior class probability) for a
considerable proportion of the samples (47% and 67% in the coffee maker and
laptop studies, respectively), one can expect substantial discrepancies between the
derived individual-level insights. Hence, the additional use of visual attention is
not only important to improve (in-sample) fit on the aggregate level but also to
obtain substantive results on the individual level, which in turn are relevant for
target marketing.
4.4.6 Relative Importance of Attributes and Willingness-to-pay
The aggregate values of the relative importance of attributes for both studies are
summarized in Table 4.5. Columns 3 to 5 contain the average values for the whole
sample, i.e., including individuals who do not attend to an attribute and therefore
have zero importance in the MEAA models. At first glance, the sample means
seem consistent (e.g., same ranking across attributes). However, we still observe
some meaningful differences in both studies. For example, for coffee makers, the
importance of design drops approx. 4 and price increases approx. 6 percentage
points in the model accounting for ANA. Similarly, for laptops, the MMNL model
understates (overstates) the relative importance of speed (antivirus). Moreover, due
to the inclusion of some individuals with ANA, the range of relative importance
across attributes increases even on this aggregate level from approx. 23 (31) in
the MMNL model to approx. 32 (36-37) percentage points in the MEAA and
MEAA(va) models in the coffee maker (laptop) study.
However, a more important comparison is between the results in column 3
(MMNL) and columns 6 and 7 (MEAA and MEAA(va)), where the average relative
importance is computed only for individuals that attend to particular attributes.
As the latter implies different subsets of the sample, the sum across attributes is no
longer 100%. Here, we see substantial increases in the relative importance across
all attributes (except for the always attended to price for coffee makers and support
for laptops). The magnitude of the difference depends on the amount of ANA for
a given attribute. For instance, the importance of design rises from 7.8% in the
MMNL model to approx. 32% in the MEAA and MEAA(va) models. Contrasting
with the results of Gilbride et al. (2006), we find larger differences in the relative
importance measure, implying that these differences are context-specific.
Furthermore, the difference between the MEAA and MEAA(va) models appears
to be less pronounced but still meaningful for practitioners. Even the mean sample
values (columns 4 and 5) differ by approx. 2 to 3 percentage points for price per cup
for the coffee maker study and speed and price for the laptop study. For the subsets
of attenders (columns 6 and 7), we find approx. 2 and 5 percentage point differences
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Mean across Mean across
all respondents attenders only
Data set Attribute MMNL MEAA MEAA(va) MEAA MEAA(va)
Coffee Brand 9.2% 6.8% 8.0% 23.7% 21.5%
makers Material 16.6% 16.3% 15.9% 32.0% 30.2%
System 10.5% 8.1% 8.8% 30.0% 30.5%
Design 7.8% 3.8% 4.4% 32.4% 32.2%
Price per cup 25.1% 28.5% 25.7% 30.6% 35.3%
Price 30.8% 36.4% 37.3% 36.4% 37.3%
Laptops Speed 35.4% 37.9% 39.9% 39.6% 43.0%
Size 15.0% 13.6% 14.6% 25.7% 30.1%
Capacity 19.9% 19.6% 18.4% 24.9% 27.5%
Support 4.0% 3.5% 3.4% 3.5% 3.4%
Antivirus 4.2% 2.2% 2.7% 30.4% 37.8%
Price 21.5% 23.2% 21.0% 23.2% 34.9%
Table 4.5. Average relative importance of attributes
for brand and price per cup for coffee makers and even larger differences of approx.
7 and 12 percentage points for antivirus and price for laptops, respectively.
The implied WTP across the three models, presented in Table 4.6, also varies.8
In additiona, for the MEAA and MEAA(va) models, we report the sample mean
(columns 3 and 4) and the mean across the individuals attending to an attribute
(columns 5 and 6).
For most of the attribute-level comparisons, the MMNL model seems to overesti-
mate the average WTP (columns 2-4). While in some cases the differences appear
to be small (e.g., for Krups vs. Severin 22.10e in the MMNL model compared to
18.98e and 20.45e in the MEAA and MEAA(va) models, respectively), in other
cases they are considerable (e.g., for Philips vs. Severin 43.50e in the MMNL model
vs. 23e and 22.73e in the MEAA and MEAA(va) models, respectively). This
finding is in line with the studies of Hole et al. (2013) and Hess et al. (2013). As
38.4% of the sample in the MEAA model and 40.2% in the MEAA(va) model ignore
the brand, they, subsequently have a zero WTP, which decreases the average value
over the sample. By contrast, when we consider only the subsets of attenders to
the specific attribute (columns 5 and 6), the MMNL model understates the WTP
across almost all attribute-level comparisons by more than two times. Interestingly,
the MEAA(va) model shows here (in absolute terms) slightly lower WTP values
(except for stainless steel vs. aluminum) compared to the MEAA model.
To obtain a better understanding of the individual-level differences, we present
the cumulative distribution of individual WTP values (see also Hensher et al.
8As the laptop study did not include a “none” option, we do not present the WTP calculations,
as WTP values are not necessarily meaningful (Allenby et al. 2014). Nevertheless, the general
patterns observed for coffee makers are also present in the laptop study. The results are available
upon request.
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Mean across all Mean across
respondents attenders only
Attribute MMNL MEAA MEAA(va) MEAA MEAA(va)
Brand: Braun vs. Severin 28.98e 20.99e 21.51e 72.83e 57.67e
Brand: Krups vs. Severin 22.10e 18.98e 20.45e 65.87e 54.83e
Brand: Philips vs. Severin 43.50e 23.00e 22.73e 79.83e 60.94e
Material: Stainless steel
vs. Aluminum
55.42e 23.61e 25.04e 46.44e 47.66e
Material: Plastic vs.
Aluminum
-25.42e -27.63e -24.84e -54.33e -47.27e
System: Pad vs. Capsule 28.81e 29.79e 30.25e 109.85e 105.00e
Design: A vs. D -33.56e -10.40e -9.97e -87.61e -73.50e
Design: B vs. D -7.68e -0.96e -0.84e -8.10e -6.17e
Design: C vs. D 0.54e 3.88e 4.11e 32.67e 30.30e
Table 4.6. Average willingness-to-pay for coffee makers
2013) for selected attribute-level comparisons in Figure 4.5. The Krups vs. Severin
comparison (upper panel) is representative for 6 of 9 attribute-level comparisons,
where the WTP stays (mostly) in the positive domain (i.e., for all individuals with
nonzero WTP, Krups is preferred over Severin). By contrast, plastic vs. aluminum
(lower panel) represents the other three cases, where the WTP in the MMNL model
spreads across both positive and negative domains (i.e., some individuals prefer
plastic over aluminum and vice versa).
In line with the previous literature (e.g., Hess et al. 2013), the MEAA and
MEAA(va) models in all attribute-level comparisons suggest a lower level of het-
erogeneity (i.e., the variance in the WTP distribution). For both datasets, the
recovered heterogeneity in WTP is overstated in the MMNL model, and it seems
to be driven mainly by extremes, for which we obtain (in absolute terms) unre-
alistically high WTP values (e.g., |WTP| > 100e for plastic vs. aluminum). At
the same time, the WTP for the rest shrinks towards zero (e.g., |WTP| of only
approx. 10 to 20e for a large fraction of the sample). By contrast, due to a high
level of non-attendance to brand and material, many individuals in the MEAA and
MEAA(va) models have WTP values of exactly zero, and therefore we obtain a
lower mean value over the sample. However, for the rest of the subset, the WTP
values are in many cases much higher than the MMNL model predicts. Hence,
consistent with Gilbride et al. (2006), we also find evidence that accounting for
ANA is crucial for accurate identification of subsets of individuals with high (but
realistic) WTP, i.e., the extremes of the preference distribution, and the proper
targeting of these segments following the suggestions of Allenby and Ginter (1995).
Comparing the WTP distributions of the MEAA and MEAA(va) models, we see
that the main difference in WTP stems from different subsets of individuals with a
(non)zero WTP for a given attribute, as already discussed in section 4.4.5. Note
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Figure 4.5. Cumulative willingness-to-pay distribution of selected attribute level
comparisons for coffee makers
that, e.g., the MEAA(va) model identifies more respondents with WTP values
of approx. 20e to 50e for Krups vs. Severin. Given that the MEAA(va) model
provides better class allocation and better model fit, we interpret the resulting
differences in WTP as important. Nevertheless, the WTP distributions of the
models with ANA are in general similar, and larger differences arise in comparison
to the MMNL model.
In sum, we conclude that it is crucial to control for heterogeneity and ANA in
discrete choice models to obtain relative importance and WTP values that are
realistic as well as meaningful and, at the same time, insightful for targeting in
marketing applications.
4.4.7 Optimal Price
To further investigate the differences in the managerial implications derived from
the models, we conduct a price optimization exercise. We develop a hypothetical
choice scenario for coffee makers in which consumers choose between four brands
and a none option (see Table 4.7). We focus on Severin as the focal brand of the
analysis. While according to all models it offers the lowest (brand) utility (see
Table 4.3), we are interested in whether it can gain a good position by differentiating
on design (C) and material (stainless steel) unique to the market and what the
optimal price for this product would be. For the analysis, we use the conditional
individual-level estimates again and focus on the three models with preference
heterogeneity (i.e., MMNL, MEAA, and MEAA(va)). The implied market shares
(for all models) across the four brands are between (approx.) 10% and 30% and
suggest no dominating market leader and a reasonable level of approx. 20% for
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opting out. Therefore, changing the price of Severin can lead to substitution
within and outside the category, which is crucial for meaningful price calculations.
Interestingly, although the aggregate market share predictions across the models
are relatively similar, there are still differences between the MMNL and the MEAA
and MEAA(va) models of approx. a few percentage points. In sum, we believe
that this market scenario with clearly differentiated alternatives is suitable for an
interesting price optimization task and contributes to a better understanding of
the models.
We optimize the profit of Severin under the assumption of costs per unit of 97e
(approx. 2/3 of the price) for prices between 100e and 200e, and the resulting
profit-maximizing prices for the three models are 145e (MMNL), 159e (MEAA),
and 155e (MEAA(va)). Hence, the models give different recommendations to the
manager: while the MMNL model suggests decreasing the initial price (by 4e ),
both models accounting for ANA, the MEAA and MEAA(va) models, advocate
price increases (10e and 6e respectively). Furthermore, the models’ optimal profits
per unit differ (12.25e, 15.54e, and 15.31e for the MMNL, MEAA, and MEAA(va)
models, respectively). Assuming the best-fitting MEAA(va) model to be the “true”
data-generating process and using the optimal prices from the MMNL model (e.g.,
using price∗MMNL in the profit function of the MEAA(va) model) leads to a missed
profit opportunity of approx. 3%.
Please note, that the results should not be interpreted as that the MEAA
and MEAA(va) models necessarily lead to higher optimal prices. However, our
price optimization exercise shows that accounting for ANA can lead to different
implications, and hence managers should consider using the proposed models.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show the prevalence of ANA in a marketing context, specifically
in two applications where individuals choose durable products, such as coffee
makers and laptops. Although one would expect that people are more careful when
making product choices in durable categories due to higher stakes, we find that
across the two applications, even after controlling for preference heterogeneity, the
majority attends to only three to four (different) attributes out of the available six.
Simultaneously, only a small fraction considers all the attributes, no attributes or
only one attribute. In such cases, assuming full attendance can be misguided and
lead to considerable biases in the derived implications.
Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence of the positive and significant effect of
visual attention on the probability of attending a particular attribute. Our proposed
model may further capture effects that stream from the presentation format of
the attributes and choice tasks in general, and therefore provides a framework
4.5. CONCLUSION 133
Attribute Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5
Brand Braun Krups Philips Severin
Material Plastic Aluminum Plastic Stainless steel
System Pad Pad Pad Pad None
Design B A D C
Price per cup 20 cents 24 cents 22 cents 25 cents
Price 129e 149e 139e 149e
Table 4.7. Hypothetical choice scenario
for testing how changes in presentation format affect attention, attendance, and
subsequently choice in CBC studies. In particular, Jonker et al. (2018) find that
people attend to more attributes when color-coding the background of the attribute
information is used (while keeping the size and color of the textual description of
the attribute the same), but do not investigate the role of visual attention. The eye
tracking literature, however, finds that the visual attention to and ease of processing
of the information may depend on its visual characteristics such as size or color
(e.g., Orquin and Loose 2013, Wedel and Pieters 2008). In our proposed framework,
saliency manipulations may, therefore, increase the attendance probabilities through
a shift in the intercepts to the left in Figure 4.3, a simple increase in the visual
attention, or a combination of both.
Notably, we show that the use of eye tracking to augment the ANA models is
informative in uncovering individual-level behavior. In particular, it helps to more
clearly classify individuals into segments related to different attribute processing
strategies. This implies less uncertainty in identifying the size of the segments
that the firm might want to target and differences in the individual-level results
(e.g., WTP). However, the model using the observed choices to infer ANA may
already be sufficient for recovering the approximate patterns of attribute processing
strategies as well as some key aggregate measures of interest (e.g., choice share
predictions, relative importance and distributional characteristics of WTP).
Building upon our findings, several implications are noteworthy for market-
ing practitioners. We have demonstrated that ANA is plausible and applied by
consumers in choice situations and that there is much to gain from employing
appropriate tools to account for such behavior for segmentation, targeting, and
pricing decisions. First, even on an aggregate level, models accounting for ANA
lead to different results. The models fit the data better, and the distributions
for parameters as well as WTP values are more plausible and realistic. As a
consequence, optimal (i.e., profit-maximizing) pricing decisions may depend on the
model employed by the decision maker, and ignoring ANA, result in untapped profit
opportunities. Second, because of ANA the preference distribution of consumers is
a mixture of zero and nonzero preferences and is crucial for marketing managers to
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distinguish when making decisions related to product attributes (e.g., product line
extensions or new product design). The relative importance and typically WTP
of attributes are higher for attenders in ANA models compared to the average
values based on the MMNL model, particularly if the fraction of ANA is high (e.g.,
system and design for coffee makers). Hence, when firms try to differentiate their
products on such attributes, it is essential to focus on the appropriate segment
(i.e., consumers with attribute attendance) instead of the whole population. On
the other hand, if firms are rather weak in a specific attribute, e.g., brand, they
should choose to target the segments that do not attend to brand as an attribute,
as they have higher chances of gaining a better position in those segments. Third,
using eye tracking as auxiliary information in models accounting for ANA leads to
substantively different and more certain allocation of individuals into classes that
describe specific attribute processing strategies and corresponding individual-level
WTP measures. Hence, considering the general trend of decreasing prices for eye
tracking (Wedel 2018), our proposed model, which retains a simple way of using
this information, can be valuable for practitioners that want to engage in one-to-one
marketing.
We see several limitations and potential extensions of the employed model.
First, we have used the eye tracking information as a proxy for visual attention.
However, it can instead be modeled as an outcome of an underlying latent process
to avoid potential measurement error (which we would expect only to strengthen
the effect of visual attention). Second, the model can be extended by relaxing
the assumption of stability in applied attribute processing strategies across choice
tasks. Several questions merit further investigation: whether such switching occurs
and to what extent, whether the potential biases are substantial or assuming
the stability of ANA strategies is acceptable. Third, while we focus on ANA,
some (subsets of) attributes may also be used for screening alternatives, which
leads to heterogeneous consideration sets. Model extension to account for both
possibilities can permit the investigation of additional sources of heterogeneity
across individuals and merits future consideration. Last, the model can be easily
extended to incorporate, e.g., alternative specifications of parameter distributions
(e.g., lognormal vs. normal), and attribute-specific slopes for the effect of visual
attention on attendance probabilities.
Additionally, contrasting respondents’ self-reported (stated) ANA measures with
our “revealed” measure from eye tracking might be interesting. Both work well in
isolation (see Hole et al. 2013 for stated ANA and this paper for visual attention
from eye tracking), but the question remains which of the measures is a more
appropriate indicator of ANA. Furthermore, Balcombe et al. (2015), using a different
modeling framework, suggest that these two measures might be complementary.
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Due to the flexibility of the MEAA model, both can be simultaneously incorporated
to test related hypotheses, which we leave for future research.
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